Iranian Uprising of 2009

Iranian uprising of 2009
Name
Institution
Iranian uprising of 2009
Introduction
The Iranian uprising of 2009 was as a result of the alleged election fraud that brought President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad back to power. The protests took place in various cities in Iran with Tehran being the epicenter in support of opposition candidates, Mehdi Karoubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi (Al Jazeera English, 2009). The regime responded to these demonstrations by using the police and the Basij Militia leading to the death of 36 people according to government reports, but supporters of the opposition candidates claimed that at least 72 people died. Although the supreme leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei praised the high voter turnout and urged the country to unite, he later ordered an audit of the election results.
Many thought that the uprising will lead to a revolution to remove president Ahmedinajad from power, but if failed to have far reaching effects on Iranian society. In essence, the uprising was by professionals and students who felt that the current regime was stifling press freedom and human rights, and also endangering Iranian security by pursuing its quest for nuclear energy, which led to its isolation by the international community. Although the uprising failed to produce long-term impacts in Iran, it challenged the common political, economic and social order in Iran. The government used force and intimidation to quell the protests in major Iranian cities. The resulting deaths could have been avoided if the government used a better strategy in managing the uprising.
The political, social and economic order that was broken
The uprising brought to the fore the political tensions between the clerics and Amhedinajad. The clerics are a powerful ruling class in Iran and they view Ahmedinajad as a threat to their interests, mainly economic interests and also taking the country to unnecessary risks (CNN, 2009). On the other hand, Ahmedinajad is popular due to his hostility to what he views as corruption of the clerics; by hijacking the 1979 Revolution to serve their personal interests. There was division among the clerics, but many of them wanted Ahmedinajad to lose; hence putting the supreme leader in a precarious position.
Despite having the powers to order for the recount of the votes or endorse the results, the supreme leader chose the latter. The Supreme leader holds immense powers and represents both clerical and non-clerical forces, and has to rule by balancing the two. Some factions of the clerics, especially the one led by Rafsanjani wanted the supreme leader to annul the results, but since the Ayatollah is the defender of the regime, he had no otherwise but to defend it (Wright, 2009). There are two political forces that were at play during the uprising: those who supported the incumbent, which is mainly made up security forces and the anti-regime forces that demonstrated. There was a likelihood of a far reaching disaster that could have destabilized the Middle East region had Ahmedinajad lost compared to the demonstrations caused by the alleged electoral fraud.
The political hostility between the clerics and Ahmedinajad was influenced by the control that the president has over the country’s security forces. The election fraud clouded the big picture because most Iranians were tired of the old elite represented by the clerics, while the president was the champion of anti-clerical campaigns (The Guardian, 2009). Despite the fact that the demonstrators wanted to liberalize the Islamic republic from imperial rule, their chances of success in the uprising was next to nil because they were used by the two competing forces for their own advantage. Ahmedinajad argued that clerics such as Rafsanjani would endanger the revolution and become puppets of Western interests, while opponents argued that the uprising was just a sign of more things to come and Ahmedinajad had to go for the good of the country (Friedman, 2009). The election and the Supreme leader forced the competing ruling elite to accept Ahmedinajad, but the uprising broke the close political relationship between the clerics and the president.
The uprising may have limited impact on the economic setup of Iran, but it is closely linked to a hard economic reality by the most Iranian citizens due to sanctions imposed by the international community because of Ahmedinajad’s pursuit of nuclear energy, which the West views as a way of acquiring nuclear weapons (Erdbrink, 2009). Most Iranians used the uprising to vent their displeasure with the handling of national security issues by the regime, which affects them economically. Since ahmedinajad assumed power in 2005, investment in oil and gas fields diminished because international oil companies are not interested in investing in the country due to the volatile political situation. Decline in foreign direct investment has been in the decline since 2005 due to the crippling economic sanctions put on the country.
Since the revolution of 1979, the clerics have used their power to amass wealth to benefit their families at the expense of the common Iranian. Due to the political rivalry that the stolen election and the resulting uprising created, the clerics will no longer enjoy their economic sway because Ahmedinajad emerged triumphant in the end due to his opposition to clerical excesses (Giroux, 2009). Chances are that he will use his power to undermine the economic power of the clerics. In fact, much of the support of Ahmedinajad came from religious and traditional segments due to his opposition of the ruling elite. Socially, the demonstrators were mainly university students and professionals in Tehran who could dare challenge the regime (The Guardian, 2009). Ordinary Iranians did not join the demonstrations mainly due to the social gap between different groups. Ordinarily, many people would have expected millions of Iranians to join the demonstrations due to the stolen vote, but this was not the case. During the height of the demonstrations, a majority of Mousavi supporters failed to join it. This shows the social gap between the students from elite universities in Tehran and the common Iranian who feels disenfranchised by the Ahmedinajad regime.
Context of the crisis
The presidential election was conducted on 12th June 2009 with a high voter turnout compared with the 2005 election. Election results were announced two hours after closure of voting, which looked impossible. All the three opposition candidates rejected the results claiming election fraud. Although the 2005 election was controversial, the 2009 elections saw an escalation of controversy. Mousavi claimed that he will not accept the manipulation of the results and lodged an appeal with the Guardian Council. When the council certified the controversial results, demonstrations broke out in many parts of the country especially in Tehran in opposition to the government’s ban of street protest. The Iranian crisis outlined a conflict between the citizens and their government, state and nation, and leading personalities.
According to the Associated Press, in one instance Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami reported during the Friday prayers that anyone fighting the Islamic Republic or the leader of the Republic should be fought until death. He also called for the execution of leaders of the demonstration because they were fighting God. When the demonstrators saw that the ...