Realism and International Security: Will the US and China Go to War?

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Realism and International Security: Will the U.S. and China go to War?
Perhaps the most significant challenge to U.S. power is the rise of China (Heywood, 46). The rise of China as a superpower has been a polemic point of discussion in recent years, particularly regarding its relationship with the United States, the current ‘global’ hegemon. Scholars from distinct schools of thought remain divided on whether China can rise peacefully or in direct conflict with the U.S. is inevitable. The U.S. assumed its current position by asserting its power and dominance, and there have been concerns about whether China would choose the same route. By focusing on the ‘end’ of U.S. unipolarity; the Thucydides Trap and its geographical deterrents; nuclear deterrents; Sino-American economic independence beside, China’s economic growth; and the potential reannex of Taiwan; this essay will argue that while the U.S. and China have the capability of starting a way, neither has good enough reasons, yet, to enter into one. As discussed in the essay, both states recognise that engaging hostilely is detrimental and costly to their interests and international politics. Further, this essay will rank these reasons from least to most likely to trigger war and explore them through offensive and defensive realism lenses.
End of U.S. Unipolarity
Since the end of the Cold War, the world transitioned into a unipolar world with the U.S. as the supreme power. The Cold War era presented the world with a bipolarity structure that was seen as a necessary system that would help the superpowers balance their powers (Nye, 84). However, with the U.S. remaining as the only country with a multifaceted character through its capabilities militarily, geographically, economically, and technologically, the world ushered in a unipolarity structure with the U.S. as the unipole (Ikenberry, Mastanduno, & Wohlforth, 1). For the past four decades, the world has watched the U.S. ascend and maintain its supremacy. However, its pursuit of hegemon status soon made it susceptible to counter-hegemonic balancing by other up-and-coming powers (Layne, 7). While in the past it was seen that the U.S. capabilities were beyond reach, currently, China is proving to be a stern force behind hegemonic counter-balancing efforts, and with good reason, Layne (7) indicates that the days of the U.S. maintaining its dominance are numbered.
Heywood (52) rightfully indicates that the 19th century was dominated by the European nations buoyed by the industrial revolution. The 20th century saw the U.S. dominate and extend its dominance far and wide. In the 21st century, so far, the U.S. has maintained its primacy, however, Heywood predicts that the 21st century could, in the end, be termed the “Asian century” (52). China’s looming dominance is sizable owing to its sustained growth in wealth and the largest population on earth. Therefore, there is a widespread belief that China will seek to assert its power a bit more aggressively, and the standard realists predict intense competition will ensue. However, like the U.S., the expectation is that China will face a lot of resistance, and there is a likelihood that the world will bear witness to yet another standoff like the Cold War (Glaser, 81). There are those who strongly believe that the world can never have a global hegemon, and therefore, such individuals expect China’s pursuit to dwindle in aggression with time. Mearsheimer (160) opines that the difficulty of maintaining a nation’s status as a global hegemon will, in the end, subject China to regional hegemony status. Further, Mearsheimer continues to indicate that China will seek to grow its dominance in Asia while distancing itself from other fairly great powers in the region like Japan and Russia (162). The goal will not necessarily be to rule with an iron fist but to radiate its dominance in the same way the U.S. does to neighbouring countries (Mearsheimer, 162).
To a global superpower, China’s rise is a threat to the status quo. However, there are those showing optimism about China’s rise, noting that it is less likely to cause global conflict. Glaser (81) opines that currently, “the structural forces driving major powers into conflict will be relatively weak,” and therefore, China’s ascend need not cause alarm. However, there is no concrete guarantee of peace, and with the U.S. and China on a collision course recently, the expectation is that the soft power struggle will continue. Layne (212) makes it clear that the power struggle between the two superpowers will persist as long as it takes the U.S. to come to terms with its “own decline and the end of unipolarity.” The two main contributors to the standoff between China and the U.S. are China’s pride and the U.S. wariness of China’s “undecided state” regarding the status quo (Michael, 87). There is a likelihood that China will persist with its pursuit of power as a counter-balance scheme to the primacy of the U.S. However, with its resourcefulness and current standing, the U.S. appears to still maintain an upper hand over China.
In accordance with Mearsheimer’s theory, China is likely to take a revisionist approach as it pursues unipolarity (46). However, this theory is unsubstantiated because China has increasingly become a state embracing defensive realism for more than half a century. Unlike before, China has slowed down on its revolutionary rhetoric and is not supporting insurgencies in other countries. Further, China has, in the recent past, pursued a cooperative security approach in its relations with neighbours and beyond. The eventual effect of this is a conducive regional environment for China and others (Jahlil, 50). Therefore, while all evidence points to a power struggle, none appears to showcase cause for violence or war between the U.S. and China.
Thucydides Trap
The Thucydides trap posits that conflict is likely to end in the event a dominant power, like the U.S., is challenged or feels challenged by a growing power like China. The Thucydides trap was coined from the Peloponnesian War between the dominant city-states of Sparta and Athens. Though Sparta ended up winning the war, the end of the conflict also ended Greece’s golden age. The repercussions of the war reverberated across the country, and instead of a satisfying win with spoils in plenty for the winner, the dominant city-states ended Greece’s prosperity. The lesson from this trap is that whenever two superpowers go to war, there is no single winner. So, for the U.S. and China, war may not be the best option. Currently, China matches the U.S. militarily on many fronts, which introduces a security dilemma (Marcus). Realists are of the opinion that the changes in the intensity of the security dilemma could signal danger and an increase in the risk of war. Realist pessimism posits that an increase in the intensity of the dilemma could stir up the competition, and in such instances, war is inevitable. However, the opposite of the above is true, with countries seeking prosperity and choosing restraint. As Glaser (82) indicates, the dynamic above necessitates peace and the option of restraint over war, a likely occurrence in the current power struggle between China and the U.S.
China’s rise and the U.S. wariness of the same present a Thucydides trap moment. However, whether the two countries end up in war, and the entire world with them, lies in how the U.S. interprets China’s rise. Currently, the U.S. appears to be ready to challenge China whenever necessary and show restraint whenever possible. However, as long as Washington continues to perceive China’s rise as a threat to its security, economic interests, and diplomatic presence in Asia, the chances are high that a full-blown conflict will materialise. As predicted by the Thucydides trap, the end of such conflict will leave both countries and the entire world far much worse than before. Therefore, policies of engagement and restraint would guarantee more stability both regionally and globally (Jalil, 58).
Aside from the above, there is also the aspect of geography and it being a major deterrent to the two countries succumbing to the Thucydides trap. The two countries are indeed massive and among the largest countries in the world. China’s size stands at 9.597 million km2, while the U.S. stands at 9.827 km2. Further, China and the U.S. have difficult topographical features and complex populations, and therefore, they would pose a huge challenge to any superpower seeking to dominate them. China and the U.S. are not close enough to warrant similar fears and worries showcased in Europe, where a country’s rise often spelled doom for the neighbouring countries. With the Pacific Ocean separating the two countries, there is an increased level of security and a reduced threat posed by either country to each other (Keck). Therefore, while there still remains a possibility of a war breaking out between the two countries, it currently appears inconceivable. However, all the above could prove futile if the two countries refuse to cooperate, show restraint, and work out ways to lessen the tension between them. So, it remains to be seen whether Beijing and Washington will choose to moderate the security dilemma and facilitate cooperation.
Nuclear Weapons
In the world today, there are only nine countries that are known to possess nuclear weaponry (Union of Concerned Scientists). These countries include Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Pakistan, India, Israel, North Korea, and France. In total, these countries own 13,000 nuclear weapons, which are considered to potentially have much more devastating effects than the bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima by the U.S. (ICANW). The Union of Concerned Scientists offers a clearer perspective noting that one nuclear warhead on a U.S. submarine possesses the same destructive power as all the bombs that were used in the First World War. Such facts are beyond comprehension, and with China and the U.S. possessing nuclear weaponry, this happens to serve more as a deterrent than a trigger for war.
Realism posits that countries ought to acquire nuclear weapons. The idea behind this thinking is that as more countries acquire nuclear weapons, security is guaranteed (Cimbala, 129). These sentiments are echoed by Ahmed (376), who indicates that the only way a country can guarantee absolute security is through acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The guarantee of mutual assured destruction is the biggest reason why countries can develop nuclear weapons but choose not to use them. Total war between nuclear-armed states would only yield catastrophic results. A war between China and the U.S. is probable, however, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where the two are in a full-blown war, and nuclear exchange is fair game. Such an exchange would have a devastating end with both countries losing in each other’s loss than they stand to gain in winning the war. The U.S. and the Soviet Union amassed nuclear weapons to the point where neither of the countries was sure of its ability to disarm the other in the event of war (Graham). Instead of showcasing their power over one another, the U.S. and the Soviet Union attained levels so powerful that neither could kill the other. Currently, the U.S. and China are in a similar position. Though the U.S. has more nuclear weaponry than China, it cannot risk a nuclear war with China because of a lose-lose outcome of such a war. While it is possible that China could be wiped out of the face of the earth, the U.S. would cease to be a superpower owing to dama...