Exercise of Power: Erdogan vs. Gülen

Erdogan vs. Gülen
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Introduction
Turkey has harmed Turkey’s worldwide image as a strong NATO member and a stability bastion between Europe and the Middle East. Tensions have grown in US-Turkey ties after Ankara called for the extradition of Fethullah Gülen, an Islamic preacher living in Pennsylvania who was blameful for the assassination attempt of Erdogan. The street people and all leaders, including opponents from the AKP, agreed on “democracy” on 15 and 16 July (Esen & Gumuscu, 2018). After the administration confirmed Erdogan, he promptly claimed that it “was a coup attempt by a tiny army element, the similarities.” Erdogan had accused the Gülen organization, since 2010, of creating a parallel state to topple the AKP administration. Erdogan remarked that this is “God’s gift for us, and that is why the army is cleaned.” (Gumuscu, 2016).
During his term in office, many felt it was one of his major successes to remove the Army from Turkish politics. Erdogan had, however, coopted high-ranking military commanders effectively (Yavuz & Koç, 2016). In post-coup purging, Erdogan was purged from the police, the courts, the National Intelligence Agency (MIT), the Ministry of Education, and universities, including the high-ranking Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) personnel. The divisive, more authoritarian actions of Erdogan represent a significant danger to Turkey’s democracy and secularism; there is no doubt (Gumuscu, 2016). The core issue was Erdogan’s growing personal authority when he took office in 2014. Equally, Erdogan accused Gülen (community) of building a “shadow state” within the Turkish state and creating a “Gulen-Israel axis” to topple it before Turkey’s first presidential election (Yavuz & Koç, 2016). The Turkish Foreign Ministry has this time said that “this has been more than a tragedy: it has been a campaign of terrorism.” It has been conducted by the illegitimate ‘Fethullah Gülen Terror Organization,’ and “the terrorists will be prosecuted according to the law.” In the history of the connections between Erdogan and the Gülen movement in Turkey, known as Hizmet (Service), the key to contextualize these charges resides.
Turkish politics began to grow in Fethullah Gülen in the seventies. The imam and spiritual leader of Gülen was born into a religious family, who emphasized the value of education for young people to offer a moral compass. In the country, its influence expanded steadily. He built private schools, private schools, and lodgings dubbed ‘lighthouses.’ The Gülen movement was created by students of such schools, who formed a network of religious and devout young businesspeople and Muslim charities of charity (Gumuscu, 2016). After the military revolution in 1980, Gülen’s network became widely suspected by the ‘defenders of secularism,’ and he was accused of preparing an Islamic State. For six years, Gülen has been in hiding.
The Gülen movements in the 1990s founded a new objective under Prime Minister Turgut Ozal. Opening schools in the Turkish Republics in the Gülen movement backed the neo-liberal ideas of Ankara and Washington for the postwar age. The initial one was opened to other post-Soviet Turkic states in Azerbaijan in1991. However, a leaked video of Gülen’s preaching marked a turning point in 1999. The Turkish Army, the police, and the judge were charged with infiltrating Gülen to undermine the Republic’s secular foundations. But, again, Gülen was a guy. Since then, he has lived in exile.
After 11 September, Islam’s position has acquired fresh impetus in world politics, which the Gülen movement has benefitted. Washington praised Gülen’s advancement of humanist and moderate Islam. Turkish politics, which went from secularity to Muslim society, was also a turning point (Kuru, 2017). In the populist speeches of the AKP in 2002, the pious half of Turkish society gained their voice. As a result of his victimization on behalf of secularism, his new leader, Erdogan, earned popularity. In 1998, Erdogan was taken away from his office as Mayor of Istanbul for reading a poem that contained lines such as “the mosques of our castles, our domes, our bayonets’ minarets, and the loyal of our troops.” (Kuru, 2017).
Though in 2003, before Erdogan became Prime Minister, Gülen and Erdogan never met personally. They both were religious Muslims who had opposed secularism in politics and the Military’s role. For ten years, Gülen had become a major friend of Erdogan by the Turkish Military’s threat to the AKP. The supporters of Gülen supplied the AKP with vital support, ensuring them three electoral victories afterward. In return, Erdogan gave the opaque businesses and religious activities of the G&uu...