Philosophy of human rights

Philosophy Of Human Rights Student’s name Department: University Course: Course Code Instructor’s name Date OPTION 2: Part A In "How Should Human Rights Be Conceived?" Thomas Pogge conceptualizes human rights as twining either with inaction by state agents or inactions of state agents. Human rights, as formulated through this prism, all too easily become a way of making them manageable and enforceable so that they fall within the purview of political or legal regulation to be breached under official scrutiny and remediation. Pogge further elaborated that through doing so, this thought of tagging human rights with state actions crosses cultural and national boundaries, thereby becoming the global point of referring to the redressal of grievances that come under the purview of governmental frameworks (Pogge 1995). One of the strongest arguments favouring the state action requirement is that it makes human rights enforceable. Human rights, especially those referring to acts or omissions of states, fall under jurisdiction relating to legal and governmental systems open to holding them accountable. This kind of linkage ensures that clear and structured avenues for recourse and redress are made available to the victims, one of the most crucial steps toward human rights protection. He emphasizes defining human rights in this perspective; such a definition is provided within an extremely strong mechanism for observance and realization through national and international law (Pogge 1995). The monopoly and legitimacy give the state the power to use force and regulatory powers; thus, the unique agent can be accountable to a level that no private actor can do. Pogge further suggests that by basing on human rights violations as a criterion in benchmarking state action, there is some ability to maintain universal standards as opposed to different jurisdictions. It sets an internationally recognized level of standards that certain acts or omissions by the state amount to human rights violations and further provides for international scrutiny and intervention. The idea is to set universality in a varied world through cultural, social, and political norms. The state action requirement is set to avoid any relativistic interpretations of human rights; in the end, they could endanger their universality and, thus, applicability and functionality worldwide. Pogge is perhaps uniquely different in his definition of state action: He includes the direct actions of state agents and their failure to act—state inaction. This definition is vital in that it includes the responsibility of the state not only to respect but also to protect against and prevent violations emanating from any quarter. This view would undermine the state's role as a passive entity being demanded to refrain from rights abuses and an active protector to see that such rights are exercised. Finally, though Pogge makes a strong case for the state action requirement, it has its critics. He has been opposed to the view that he might elicit disregard for the role of other non-state actors in the occurrence of human rights abuses. In today's world, which is so intricately networked through a web of multinational corporations and other non-state actors wielding huge power, the limitations of what could classify as a human rights violation to state actions will likely throw up massive protection gaps (Pogge 1995). It is asserted that such an inadequate definition of those who propose human rights protection is too narrow and does not serve the purpose. Thomas Pogge advocates for the state action requirement in human rights violations with much reason and emphasis on practical enforceability and determination to make a universal standard. Pogge incorporates state inaction into that framework, expanding states' obligations to protect human rights from committing abuses themselves or allowing others to do so and from failures to prevent human rights violations through acts or omissions. It may need to be further elaborated in light of some of the more contemporary issues arising from non-state actors, but this is a principle that assists in moo...