My Philosophy Paper: Mental Properties And Physical Properties
These are suggested paper topics for your second 5-7 page paper. Each of the prompts asks you to think about at least one of the articles you have read during this part of the class. Make sure you do discuss that reading in your essay. If we have read other articles that are relevant to what you have to say, make sure you discuss those readings as well. If you wish to write on some topic other than one I suggest here, talk to me about it.
The papers are to be approximately 5-7 pages (1500-2100 words) long, double-spaced, with normal margins, and normal (12 point) font. Remember to adequately characterize the position you are addressing, and to give, argue for, and defend your own views. Your paper is due November 13, by 7 PM. Email the paper in Word format. The subject line of your email should be "My philosophy paper" (without the quotation marks).
1. Fodor argues that mental properties are not identical with physical properties, that instead they are multiply realized in physical properties. Kim argues that if this is so, then so much the worse for psychology. What is the relation between mental properties and physical properties? What does your answer say for explanations of behavior, both human and non-human?
2. Nagel, Searle, and Levine rely on some powerful intuitions. Can a physicalist accommodate these intuitions, or should we give up physicalism?
3. What is the correct way of thinking about the mind in relation to the body? What problems does your approach solve? What special problems does it face and how do you suggest resolving them?
4. Can a materialist explain consciousness, or does the existence of consciousness mean that dualism must be true?
5. Is there an unresolvable explanatory gap in materialist explanations of mental phenomena? If so, are there any unresolvable explanatory gaps that dualists face? If not, then how can materialists deal with the apparent explanatory gap?
7. Is artificial intelligence possible? If so, then how do we build semantics out of syntactical engines? If not, then what, other than dualism, can explain how human beings are able to comprehend meanings (semantics) even though we too are just syntactical engines?
8. Are animals conscious? What do you mean by “conscious”? Are we conscious? If so, is our consciousness relevant to our actions; what does consciousness explain?
9. Is there something it's like to be a bat?
10. How might we design a computer to have thoughts and experiences? Does it matter whether our machine is a robot?
write the no.5
My Philosophy Paper
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My Philosophy Paper
Philosophers do agree that science does indeed leaves us with an explanatory gap when it comes to ideas and workings of the mind. There is a lot of information in the mainstream reading the brain and the mind and how each or both works. However, in spite of this vast amount of information regarding the brain and the conscious mind, philosophers still believe that the relationship between the two remains a mystery. Two sets of explanations emerged as a result of the above mystery and these led to the materialists and dualists. Dualists believe that the mind and brain or body are entirely or radically different and therefore, need to be understood differently. Conversely, the materialists believe the mind and body cannot and should not be distinguished. Both sects seem to present substantial evidence to rebuff the claims of the other and no common ground is yet to be achieved. However, there are those who believe both sets of explanations have lapses in their explanations. Therefore, this article seeks to determine the explanatory lapses or gaps in materialism as well as dualism while also seeking to explain how materialists can deal or do away with the evident explanatory gap.
Chalmers et al (1999) defines materialism within the realms of philosophy as “the thesis that the ultimate nature of the mind is physical; there is no sharp discontinuity in nature between the mental and the non-mental.” However, like any other known knowledge out in the world, there are philosophers who believe that the mental is not physical. Anti-materialists believe that “mental phenomena are different in kind from physical phenomena” (Chalmers et al., 1999). Anti-materialists often like to use the conceivability argument which borrows or dates back to Descartes. In Descartes’s demonstration or explanation of the dissimilarity between the body and the mind, he stated that because one could perceive a situation with his mind and where the body does not exist, then there has to be a difference or distinction between the body and mind. However, materialists often counter Descartes’s thoughts by questioning the obvious; should we think that what is possible should directly coincide with what is conceivable? The above response is indeed true, however, it fails to provide a clear and concrete answer as to the distinction or otherwise between the mind and the body. However, one thing does stand out; materialism does not provide a distinct and clear account of the mental phenomena “in terms of the physical” (Chalmers et al., 1999). Levine (1983) uses the “reduction of water to H2O and pain to the firing of C-fibres” to help further explain the explanation lapses in materialism. He states that while chemistry explains how H2O is formed to the point of where it becomes water, “a physicalist theory of qualia still ‘leaves something out’” (1983). According to Levine, since the qualitative character of something is not explained, it is indeed plausible that an object or a creature could assume “the relevant physical or functional state and yet not experience qualitative character.” Can one truly ascertain whether pain is the firing of C-fibres or whether the identification of water and H2O is one and the same thing? With such questions lurking, it is indeed comprehensible why an explanatory gap exists in materialists explanations of mental phenomena.
Knowing the existence or the concepts of H2O and water will not or does not necessarily mean one knows this identity. According to David Papineau (2011), “the explanatory gap arises because we cannot derive the facts about conscious states a priori from the physical facts, in a way that we can derive facts about water, and facts about temperature, and so on, from physical facts.” Therefore, instead of simply knowing that H2O will eventually convert to or be reduced to water, it is essential to also understand why the above happens. Levine (1983) covers it well when he states that the process of reduction should explicitly “explain what is reduced.” By ‘what is reduced is reduced’ he meant “whether we can see why, given the facts cited in the reduction, things must be the way they seem on the surface.” The chemical process is indeed comprehensive and answers all the questions regarding the formation of H2O, however, there are lapses (physical or functional theory of qualia) as to why H2O eventually leads to water.
Are there any unresolvable explanatory gaps that dualists face?
Dualists also face a problem in bridging the explanatory gap that exists in understanding the world. Thu...