Criticizing Garcia’s Philosophy on Racism

Criticizing Garcia’s Philosophy
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Criticizing Garcia’s Philosophy
In this essay, besides highlighting an exposition of Garcia's racism philosophy, I will argue that Garcia’s definition of racism characteristics and arguments regarding the relationship between social structure and racism are wrong and based on self-conception because of four main counterarguments opposing Garcia's racism philosophy. Firstly, regarding his argumentation, Garcia has not had a thoroughly new theoretical understanding of racism but claims to clear ambiguities concerning how to utilize terms. Secondly, individuals can show goodwill to other people due to their race, and that can still demonstrate racism. Thirdly, moralizing racism (for instance, by always regarding it as a vice) makes him misrepresent his investigation, making his phenomena description suit his desired definition. Fourthly, most Whites have traditionally been inoffensive racists such that they have assumed people of color's inferiority minus Garcia's "ill-will," failing to consider this belief. The four counterarguments show how the philosopher is not accurate but merely based on self-conception.
Garcia provides a non-doxastic and “volitional” assessment of racism, claiming that it is majorly an aspect of ill will. Specifically, according to Garcia, humans understand racism as a crucially spiteful form of racial-based disrespect for specific people's welfare. In its main and most malicious form, racism is an ill will or hatred directed to an individual or individuals concerning their allotted race. Within a derivative form, one becomes racist whenever they never care at all, fails to care adequately as morality dictates, or never cares in the appropriate manner concerning persons assigned to a particular racial group, wherever disregard is based on racial category (Garcia, 228). Racism is an aspect that critically includes people’s intentions, dislikes, likes, wants, and their detachment from their moral virtues. Such an observation allows us to explain racism's theoretical ties to several kinds of contempt and hatred. Garcia’s theoretical effort encompasses shifting the discussion’s framework from the socio-political direction to the ethical one, where he holds the argument that racism is a vice. Because racism is considered a vice here and "goodwill" centered on erroneous beliefs is never clearly vicious, the concept can never account for racism.
The philosopher explored different implications and merits of his views about racism and considered some situations that may seem problematic regarding his theory. Some significant implications and pros of the suggested approach to understanding racism exist. First and foremost, it recommends that bias, in its pre-judgment stringent sense, is never critical to racism and that some racial discrimination may never strictly be racism. Regarding this opinion, racism is not majorly a cognitive issue. Therefore, it is not an element of when or how someone makes decisions or rulings. People can appropriately refer to bias-based perception as racist such that they typically are entrenched in prior racial disrespect; they rationalize or promote the disregard. Secondly, whenever racism is much considered, the individual with racist fears, desires, feelings, dispositions, and hopes is racist despite never acting on these thoughts in a manner to hurt individuals labeled as the hated race’s members. Thirdly, favoritism or race-based partiality must not be racist. Favored treatment in affirmative action is never usually dependent on any racial disrespect. Finally, concerning the racist opinion, racist prejudice must not always be mindful. The actual rationale why individual one may not rent individual two a room might be that individual one views individual two as a member of a certain racial group, whereby individual one has a hatred (Garcia, 231-233). Above all, racism is a concept that critically includes people's intentions, dislikes, likes, wants, and detachment from their moral virtues.
Regarding his argumentation, Garcia has not had a thoroughly new theoretical understanding of racism but claims to clear ambiguities concerning how to utilize terms (Garcia, 229). Specifically, the philosopher argues that he is performin...