Policy Paper for Southern Thailand Insurgency

Policy Paper for Southern Thailand Insurgency
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Policy Paper for Southern Thailand Insurgency
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the home to many contemporary conflicts. Founded by five initial members of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines, ASEAN has been expanding its footprints to cover several other countries in the region (Oishi, 2016). The most common phenomenon among the members is that conflicts are a common occurrence, some of which have geopolitical implications across the Asia-Pacific. This policy paper focuses exclusively on the conflict in Southern Thailand and it examines the origins and current state of the conflict. Additionally, the policy paper will compare this conflict with others in the region that have been successfully resolved or that have seen positive steps towards resolution. Lastly, the paper will recommend courses of action for the government of Australia that can assist in resolving the conflict.
Origins and Current State of the Conflict
The insurgency in Southern Thailand has persisted for decades, but its origins could be over a century old. The insurgency is rooted in the ethnic Malay nationalist opposition to Thai rule and perceived colonization, which followed the extension of Siamese sovereignty over the sultanate of Patani in the early 20th century (Wheeler, 2019). This sultanate has been South Asia's leading center for Islamic learning and is renowned for its religious scholars across the Middle East. Patani previously had a loose and tributary relationship with Siam, which became the modern state of Thailand. It comprised a Chinese descent majority and was a thriving commercial and trading center. In 1909, the treaty between Bangkok and Britain formally made Patani part of modern-day Thailand, which was followed by efforts among the Thai to accommodate and assimilate the Malay Muslims into the Thai identity (McCargo, 2014). However, the Malay have found it difficult to embrace ‘Thainess.’ The religious differences have not made this easy since Thai is predominantly Buddhist while the Patani Malays are Muslims.
The area affected by the insurgency comprises the region historically known as Patani, which roughly corresponds to three Thai provinces: Yala, Narathiwat, and Patani. There are also four districts of the neighboring Songkla that aligned themselves with the historical Patani. The region boasts of an estimated 1.8 million people, 80% of whom are Malay Muslims. Throughout the last century, insurgents have emerged across this region to challenge the Thai military. The history of violent conflict as it is known today emerged from the 1960s through to the early 1980s, where violence included mass shootings and bomb attacks (McCargo, 2014). The documented history of Patani spans several centuries since some observers have studied the relationship between Patani and Siam from as early as the 17th century. In all cases, Patani has remained opposed to Siam rule, which persists even today.
The main observation is that the Siam-Patani relations have always involved conflicts, which could explain the current status of the insurgency. According to Chambers et al. (2019), Siam had subjugated Patani in several instances, including in 1785 and 1791 by the successor of the state of Ayutthaya. Similarly, Patani has historically rebelled against the subjugation, including in 1808 when a rebellion resulted in Patani being dissected into seven administrative units. The Siamese forces have had to quell multiple insurgencies, often through force. However, the forceful methods have failed to enforce submission and have only served to accelerate and provoke continuous revolts and resistance.
The current status of the insurgency can be described as a stalemate. From the historical background given above, it can be observed that the Patani-Siam relations have been characterized by subjugation followed by revolts and insurgence. The only difference is that in the last half-century, the level of violence has gone up, and so has the number of casualties. Between January 2004 and October 2021, it has been estimated that over 7294 people have does while an additional 13550 have been injured (Bakhshi, 2021). The security incidents in the region during this period have reached 21235. The violence peaked in 2007 but has since declined as manifested through fewer deaths and injuries. A conflict can be considered a stalemate when there are no solutions found through negotiations. Even though diplomatic efforts have been stepped up in recent decades, the negotiations have not been successful in reducing the level of violence between the Patani insurgents and the Siam forces. For instance, there was a monthly average of 27.9 incidents and 23.1 casualties that were reported throughout 2020. These figures increased in 2021 to 38.8 incidents and 36.7 casualties. A short-lived ceasefire was announced in 2020, majorly due to COVID-19, but there are attacks in November 2021 intended to disrupt the local Deep South elections.
Overall, the current state of the conflict is that the negotiations are failing to produce any positive results. The failures can be attributed to several factors, including the fact that the conflict has lasted for centuries and the Patani region does not seem eager to embrace the idea of being part of Thailand. In addition to the historical factors, the very nature of the insurgency makes it difficult to control. First, the group is highly decentralized, which makes it difficult to combat. In many conflicts, eliminating the leadership tends to cause entire groups to collapse. In cases where insurgents are decentralized, it becomes increasingly difficult not only to combat but also to engage in negotiations. Second, its leadership operates off-stage, which means that there is no direct connection between the group and its leadership. Third, the group’s cells are highly localized, which adds to the disconnect with the leadership. In this case, various groups are likely to break off from the leadership if the outcomes of their activities do not align with their interests. For example, some groups learned of secret talks between the BRN and Thai authorities, which resulted in some groups detaching themselves. Even negotiations in such a scenario are less likely to succeed.
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