Manufacturing Consent and Mass Social Media in China

Manufacturing Consent and Mass Social Media in China Student's Name Institution Course # and Name Professor's Name Submission Date Introduction Countries have directly or indirectly used mass communication to effectively and powerfully disseminate a propaganda function that supports the system and is based on internalized assumptions, market forces, and self-censorship. In business, manufacturing consent is utilized to increase the sale of a product by influencing audiences and readers. Surprisingly, some nations use manufacturing consent to manipulate their citizens or hide information that may damage their international reputation. The US used it during the terror attacks in 2001, and China used it in the recent COVID-19 pandemic. The People's Republic of China (PPC) government constructed, controlled, and disseminated consent in its mass social media platforms. The benefit they obtained was maintaining China's Communist Party (CCP) legitimacy and social stability. However, there are concerns about media manipulation, especially in state-society relationships. This paper will focus on China's media manipulation, information control, and public opinion formation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Literature Review Government Control and Manipulation The People's Republic of China was the epicenter of the recent pandemic in the world, and the leadership had to pioneer in the trial of strategies that would contain the viral spread. Ferrara et al. (2020) highlighted that the pandemic demonstrated the potential real-world consequences that may result from the spread of online misinformation, abuse, and manipulation. The authors liken state control of citizens' minds on a pertinent issue like the viral pandemic in 2020 to intentional bullying and slavery. Surveillance is crucial in monitoring online activity and identifying potential threats to the government's narrative. The Chinese government employs a vast network of surveillance technologies, like internet monitoring, facial recognition, and social credit systems, to track and monitor citizens' online behavior. Successful surveillance practices by the government help silence dissenting voices and ensure that the best decision remains dominant on all social media platforms. The Chinese government implemented stringent measures to control the dissemination of information and shape public opinion during the COVID-19 pandemic (Green et al., 2024). Standard features visible in Chinese efforts include low credibility of information dispersed to the public and visible fake, unverified, and misleading details. Censorship programs in China are complex and lawful as guided by the government's policies. The PPC enforced legislative actions and digital technologies to regulate their domestic internet. This legislation was referred to as the Great Firewall (GF) and slowed down cross-border internet traffic and blocked access to specific international websites. The GF works by checking transmission control protocol packets for sensitive words that are used to block access to specific links or sites (Wu et al., 2023). The impact of this legislation is that it blocks international internet tools like Facebook, Google Search, Twitter, and mobile applications, limiting access to information sources outside the country and forcing international firms to adapt to domestic rules. However, the GF has also helped the growth and development of the Internet economy in China because it prefers the monopoly of domestic firms while reducing competition from foreign Internet companies. Yan (2020) was concerned with comprehending the control and management of digital media information in authoritarian countries like China. A visible concept from this literary work was that authoritarian government, including the PPC, always keeps a keen eye on information that has the potential to challenge its legitimacy, and in this case, the ruling party of the CCP. Yan (2020) also notes that even the Chinese have questioned its government, but all details on how the pandemic was handled are confidential and can only be evaluated domestically. Public Opinion Formation during the Pandemic During the COVID-19 pandemic 2020, the PPC used mass social media platforms to shape public opinion and perceptions, reinforcing its authority and maintaining social stability. Through strategic messaging, information dissemination, and public sentiment management, the government sought to control the narrative surrounding the outbreak and ensure political control (Moynihan & Patel, 2020). There was consistency in the information delivered on all government communication platforms. Liao et al. (2020) analyzed engagement data from government agency posts in China to evaluate public engagement during the pandemic. The authors collected Weibo data relevant to the virus for two months to identify major thematic concerns for online discussions. It was noted that the Chinese needed to be more engaged with government agencies or the National Health Commission of China's posts. Instead, they looked forward to the information posted by personal accounts because of their empathy, the likelihood of associating blame with individuals or the government, and the ability to express more worry about the COVID-19 pandemic. The Chinese government should have improved the timing of its communications to reduce the public's obsession with timely information from personal accounts (Liao et al., 2020). The government's communication during the pandemic was its tendency to merely share policies and situation updates that needed to be more empathic to capture public interest. Social Stability and Political Legitimacy The People's Government of China is partly authoritative and partly democratic in handling the COVID-19 pandemic. State-run media outlets and government-affiliated accounts amplify the party's messaging and reinforce its authority (Moynihan & Patel, 2020). The CCP aims to maintain social stability and ensure political control by controlling the flow of information and shaping public discourse. Social media platforms were instrumental in disseminating official narratives and managing public sentiment during the COVID-19 pandemic. The government utilized these platforms to provide updates on the pandemic, promote public health measures, and highlight its efforts to contain the virus (Hua & Shaw, 2020). Renowned journalists were afraid to deliver conflicting information to what was reported by the government. All ruling governments strive to ensure that they obtain and maintain the trust of their citizens throughout their period in office. This means that the Chinese government had to ensure that it remained legitimate to its citizens by all means, and this situation was more complicated because reports of unexplained pneumonia started in Wuhan. Liu et al. (2022) report that all social media platforms used in China spread information about the virus, including WeChat, Weibo, QQ, and Facebook. In China, 90% of the public was very concerned about the pandemic from January till the end of February, and they always wanted to access any information associated with the virus (Liu et al., 2022). False information that alcohol, Indigowoad Root, and Shuanghuanglian could prevent COVID-19 was spread via social media platforms (Liu et al., 2022). The government had to act spread and take control of information shared with its citizens immediately before the whole nation could be misled. Global Implications and Information Influence China's media control impacts the world by exporting surveillance technologies and authoritarian practices to other countries. China is a trade partner for many third-world countries, and given the culture of borrowing effective and affordable approaches between allies, these countries will appreciate China's surveillance tools. Facial recognition systems, internet monitoring tools, and social credit systems will benefit China's trading partners (Cho, 2020). A direct effect of trading these media control and manipulation tools is that they will support authoritarian leadership in these nations. Moreover, a country that wants to embrace a less democratic and more authoritarian government will borrow relevant aspects of governance from the Chinese government. In another study, Lyu and Takikawa (2022) provide a school of thought that partly supports efforts taken by the PPC to control the information that local citizens obtain and what they can access from international sources. Negative and biased names like COVID-19 and 5G coronavirus were constantly used to refer to this pandemic (Lyu & Takikawa, 2022). The discrimination was even worse when the Chinese people and the PPC were referred to as bioterrorists by various media stations. Research Question How does Chinese mass social media manufacture consent? Case Study during the Pandemic The People's Republic of China became the center of focus for the first month as they implemented health policies to contain the spread of the virus in their country. Face mask mandates and lockdowns were among the drastic measures taken by Xi's government, but they spread throughout China and later globally. Health practitioners alleviated COVID-19 symptoms using psychological support, stem cell therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, rehabilitation training, and physical therapy (Tang et al., 2023). China was the first country to manage domestic transmission and resume regular economic and social activity. The zero-COVID strategy allowed it to take advantage of the economic endurance of rival states and make significant economic strides as other countries struggled to contain COVID-19. Nationwide protests in the last two months of 2020 forced the Chinese government to relax most of its restrictions, and this impact was an immediate surge in reported cases. However, China's economy continued to create jobs and record significant growth in international trade even though there was lower retail consumption. COVID-19 suddenly impacted China, bearing in mind that they did not have any preparation for the pandemic whatsoever. All economic development projects in the country had to come to a standstill as the government directed all the time and resources to manage the nightmare. As of February 2020, the laboratories in China had confirmed 40554 cases of COVID-19 infection and reported them to the World Health Organization (Tian et al., 2020). The situation was worse when statistics about mortality and recovery rates emerged. Approximately 88% of infected patients were in hospitals in Mainland China, and this viral spread peaked in February. Beijing experienced a similar viral infection outbreak in 2003, which must have yielded better health outcomes concerning COVID-19 (Tian et al., 2020). However, the country has made significant steps to revive its economy and recover from this pandemic. As of 11th April 2024, the total number of coronavirus cases reported in China since the onset of the pandemic in December 2019 is 503,302 cases. Out of this, reported deaths were 5,272, and 379,053 individuals recovered. There are 118,977 active cases, and 94% are in mild condition (Worldometer, 2024). Being the epicenter of this viral disease, China will always remain the focus of media attention whenever a similar case has been reported anywhere in the world. The following health pandemic will also borrow a lot of information from how the Chinese government returned to normalcy. Domestic and international observers noted that the Chinese government used social media to set agenda communications during the pandemic, but their motives were only sometimes constructive. Wang (2022) reported that Chinese government official accounts were actively posting information regarding the virus, emotional tributes to public servants, and US-China relations at that time. There was massive censorship by the Chinese government on posts about the pandemic online. Hale (2022) reports on the cat-and-mouse games played by critics of zero-COVID regulations and the government. Photographs and videos of mass protests quickly circulated in personal accounts on Weibo and WeChat and received thousands of views before government censors permanently deleted them. Chinese social media scrubbed off searches like "Beijing," "Xinjiang," and "I saw it" because they were related to the mass protest that happened earlier on. China's Great Firewall blocked locals from viewing associated posts shared on Western platforms like Instagram and Twitter because these platforms are officially banned in China. This is a true reflection of how the Chinese government handled this pandemic from its onset in December 2019, and the same approach is used today to prevent sensitive info...