Conception of the Self

Name of Student Name of Professor Course Date Harry Frankfurt’s Conception of the Self Introduction In examining the self-concept, Harry Frankfurt’s guide opens the possibility of understanding what persons are. Frankfurt fulfills this role by questioning dominant paradigms following the above arguments, gradually exploring how Frankfurt’s distinction between first-order desires, second-order desires, and second-order volitions helps to explain human agency and self-identity, and then concluding by assessing the merits and consequences of the proposed conception of self. This essay discusses and analyses Frankfurt’s arguments and explains the efficiencies of the theory and its possible weak points. First-order and second-order desires Frankfurt starts by defining first-order desires, which are just a desire to act in one way or not in a certain way. These are the simple pleasures that people and many animals possess (Frankfurt 6). For example, one might experience a first-order desire to take a slice of cake or to avoid smoking. Second-order desires refer to goats in the second order since they are reflective desires. They reflect a higher degree of reflexivity and self-observation. These are the desires regarding the first-order desires. For instance, a person may undergo a second-order desire to cease having the first-order desire to smoke. Frankfurt identifies this ability to reflect and form second-order desires as typical of human agents and essential to his notion of the self. Second-order volitions Frankfurt goes a step further in his theory by developing that of second-order volitions. Second-order volition, therefore, refers to second-order desire that a given first-order desire becomes one’s will. In other words, it concerns the wish to have a particular desire and the wish that the particular desire is the desire that one has for the action (Frankfurt 10). For example, a person may wish for abstinence to be the desire that motivates them and not the vice that they are trying to avoid, such as smoking. This difference is significant in establishing Frankfurt’s conception of personhood. According to him, to be a person is to possess second-orde...