Which was Most Important in the American Victory over Japan in the Pacific War-New Military Technologies, Information Superiority, Superior Jointness?

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Military skills in innovation and technology as the most important factor in the American victory over Japan in the Pacific War
Towards the end of 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack towards United States in Pearl Harbor prompting the US to enter into the World War II. While the intention of the attack is a subject of debate, it has been argued that Japan intended to neutralize American striking power in the area. Already, tensions between the two countries were high as America had imposed sanctions on Japan in a bid to withdraw its military operations in China and Manchuria. Japan on its part was facing a serious shortage of oil and other natural resources and was hoping to increase its dominance in Southeast Asia including China to cater for its need for these resources (James, 705 707; Evan & Peattie 448). The surprise attack on American fleet was also aimed at cutting the allies communication with their supporters in Eastern Asia. What Japan did not realize is that America was more decisive, had a superior strategy, superior military and information technologies, had good innovation and improvisation skills and that together, the allies were strong than expected. Combined, these factors led to the defeat of Japan and the eventual surrender in 1945.
One of the factors that enabled America to defeat Japan in the Pacific was its superior strategy. The attack by Japan at Pearl Harbor meant that for the first time, during the WWII, America had to fight on two fronts. The key strategic principle in regard to the allocation of resources was to focus first on defeating the European Axis. On the side of America, this strategy was interpreted in a liberal way allowing for the country to launch an offensive war against Germany and Japan between the year 1943 and 1945. The American fleet, expanding after its first setback at the harbor, provided the muscle with which America would launch an offensive attack against Japan. Further, the American army had devoted at least one third of its military resources to the pacific war. Once the resources were fully mobilized, America proved capable of waging offensive wars on the two fronts at the same time, a development that had overlooked when they had first attacked on Pearl Harbor.
Japan naval strategy up to the time of the attack on American fleet at Pearl Harbor was planned to assume a subordinate service role where the navy would offer support to the ground operations. In this context, the navy role was to supply and offer the ground forces any necessary support and there were no plans to risk the ships in naval confrontations unless in an unavoidable circumstances (James 707). The attack on Pearl Harbor was not meant to deviate from the traditional role of the navy and was in fact expected to be hit and run after which the ground forces would take over. Japan also assumed that it would take over a year for America to recover from the attack, a period during which the former would have strengthened its defense perimeter in the pacific. This was not to be the case as America was quickly able to mobilize its resources within a very short period of time.
Another factor that led to the defeat of Japan by America is that the latter had strong innovative and improvisation skills as compared with the latter. During the great depression, American had a passive foreign policy which also meant that the role of the navy was passive. However, in the light of antiwar sentiments and treaty limitations, the country maintained its solidity as a fighting institution, its fleet and its policy of offensive sea control (Baer, 119). These three interrelated principles helped shape the course of the navy in 1930s. As a fighting institution, it meant that America was and had to be always prepared to enter into an offensive war if provoked. The navy operations at that time were guided by three concepts; the "War Plan Orange provided the rationale for a big navy…and…the concept of a balanced fleet…" (119) served as a compromise of contending interests and perspectives within the navy. The final concept was that of a treaty navy which justified the need for growth of navy resources.
Together, the above three concepts provided a threat to the navy, established a force structure and affirmed the navy’s strategy of sea control. During this time and based on the three concepts, the country started to modernize its ships. Further, it developed doctrines and designs for submarines and aircraft carriers. The Marine Corps also established a doctrine which would allow the navy to be tactical and active both in water and on land. The first concept called for training of additional army personnel so as to increase the fleet in the Western Pacific (Baer, 120). As opposed to the US, Japan’s naval design was designed to reflect speed and fire rapidity as opposed to armor. This is despite the fact that the country was a leader in naval air and undersea developments. In essence, the aircraft carriers and the submarine were still considered to be supportive weapons for ground forces rather than weapons of offensive attacks. Further, while Japanese planes and ships were first, they were often fragile and could not withstand a lot of fire power. American ships and planes on the other hand were agile and could withstand firepower for long giving American fleet an advantage over the Japanese fleet. In essence, America used two strategies in its war against Japan; sequential and cumulative strategies (Wylie 118). The sequential strategy involved the drives across the pacific up to the shores of the Japanese empire. This was characterized by a number of military conflicts between the two countries and their allies. The cumulative strategy was aimed at strangling Japan’s economy and encompassed among other things imposing sanctions and destroying essential supply lines.
Besides having superior military machines including ships, air planes and gun pow...