How is Continued Economic Growth Compatible with Decarbonising the Global Energy System

To What Extent Is Continued Economic Growth Compatible with Decarbonising the Global Energy System
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To What Extent Is Continued Economic Growth Compatible with Decarbonising the Global Energy System
Under the existing and planned policies, energy-related CO2 emissions are projected to rise to 35 gigatonnes (Gt) in 2050, down from 33Gt in 2015. According to the 2015 Paris Agreement, the global targets of achieving a 20C and falling to 9.7 Gt might not be reached with the current trends (Gielen et al., 2019). Wang et al (2021) have also shown that the current climate commitments might not achieve the Paris Agreement to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by over 7% per year. There have been fears that the rate of global economic growth and climate policy might not achieve the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, academic literature has often opposed the observation that radical economic growth impacts climate mitigation efforts and the reduction of CO2 emissions (Wang et al., 2021). In the recent past, human-induced climate change has resulted in renewed attention over the need for a "low carbon" industrial revolution that calls for large-scale technological breakthroughs and a radical reduction in CO2 emissions in a global low-carbon economy (Newell, 2019). There have been international concerns over climate change, increasing carbon emissions, declining environmental quality, rising energy demand, volatile oil prices, and uneven and limited endowment of fossil fuels. These concerns have inspired the move toward decarbonizing the global energy system (Emenekwe et al., 2022). Countries and significant oil and gas companies such as Shell, BP, and Total are facing challenges in getting renewable energy to a level of price competitiveness with fossil fuel in a counter-carbon energy transition (Christophers, 2022). This paper examines the extent to which continued economic growth is compatible with decarbonizing the global energy system from the perspective of international politics of renewable energy.
While more and more states have called for a shift to "net-zero" emissions by 2050, the renewable energy (RE) transition will radically reshape world politics (Albert, 2022). This target is legally binding through the European Climate Law, and countries such as China have agreed to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. Canada, Japan, and South Korea have also committed to achieving the "net-zero" target nu 2050 and challenged Australia, India, and the United States to do the same. Although this transition appears uncertain, there have been debates on how it will restructure world politics. Growing literature from different scholars has investigated the economic and geopolitical implications. International political economy (IPE) scholars project that RE transition has the potential to substitute fossil fuel and advance the agenda of military and economic growth competition, as has been witnessed over the last two centuries in global politics (Albert, 2022). This argument systematically investigates how the transition may reshape global political-economic interdependencies, inter-state power balance, possibilities for conflict and peace, and global governance institutions. From the perspective of the non-substitutability hypothesis, Albert (2022) asserts renewable energy will not fully substitute for the benefits fossil fuels have offered the world in terms of building robust militaries and economies (Albert, 2022). In this argument, the hypothesis implies it will require a "Great Transformation" in military and political-economic bases of world order to achieve a fully decarbonized political and economic world. According to Albert (2022), achieving decarbonization will demand two abutted transitions: a shift towards a "post-growth" political economy independent of ongoing annual GDP growth and a change towards "demilitarization or weakening urge for arms racing to focus on disaster response, adaptation, and climate mitigation priorities.
The lack of academic and policy engagement with more profound RE transition politics has been mainly due to the overwhelming economic and technological focus. For instance, academic literature on transition management has focused on the ingredients of effective socio-technical transition while ignoring the global political dimensions. Scholars have traditionally explored the components of the socio-technical system at different levels, with energy industry players seeking to win a market highly regulated by selfish interests. Common discussions in the RE transition have involved shifts in global energy markets and climate change pressures that exert disruptive pressure on regimes. These discussions have been thought of as organizing the global energy system and how it functions with the main interest of enabling a transition away from the primary mode of organization. However, Newell (2019) argues that there is a need to understand the mechanisms through which pressures from below and above result in tension, cracks, and windows of opportunity. Acknowledging this fact from the IPE perspective will provide insights into who the main actors are in this process and how their power can cause transitions in energy systems (Newell, 2019). Although the literature on socio-technical change is critical in exploring the role of "niche" or emergent technologies and policies such as solar and wind and policy regimes, scholars have continued to avoid the questions of power and politics beyond specific governance practices and management strategies. In addition, while recent contributions have attempted to address this neglect, they have only considered political economy, power, and world order as top priorities. As Newell (2019) argues, it is critical to understand the role of states in energy transitions and the impact of global governance institutions can lead to constructive engagement with debates that draw insights from the literature on IPE.
Historical materialists view emergent world orders in terms of political, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions while considering their emerging limits, contradictions, and possibilities for different collectivities. From the material sphere, material conditions and ideas are connected from the perspective of reductionist "historical economism." Historical economism builds on past transitions that consider factors such as the role of science, prices, and human capital. Instead of taking a limited social and technological perspective in isolation, historical economist examines the underlying historical, political, and material factors enabling large-scale transformations. This approach allows for a better understanding of the contemporary energy transition politics in the world (Newell, 2019). Such a perspective is critical to understanding the topographies upon which opposing social forces will challenge the future organization of the economy in a carbon-constrained world, based on their role in counterattacking and shaping the last political changes and how they contribute to energy transition contests. According to Newell (2019), a detailed historical and political analysis will allow moving beyond concepts such as "win-win solutions" and "green growth" to the climate crisis. Such an approach will establish the trade-offs, conflicts, and compromises in...