PHLB60H Essay 1

Running Head: METAPHYSICS BY PETER VAN INWAGEN Metaphysics by Peter van Inwagen [Student Name] [Course Title] [Instructor Name] Introduction Peter van Inwagen, the professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, has provided an interesting view of metaphysics in his book of the same title. He has attempted to answer questions that are crucial to the world of metaphysics and externality. This essay aims at explaining his ideas of sensations of the common external objects and whether or not his ideas pose a threat to Berkeley`s concept of reality of the external world and internal thoughts. Van Inwagen`s Externalism There has been much debate on the concept of externality which claims that an external world is, in fact, a reality independent of the internal mind. Peter van Inwagen, one of the leading analytic philosophers of our times, has also proposed an argument in favor of externality. In his book, Metaphysics, van Inwagen argues that "our sensation of whiteness and the property whiteness of common objects cannot be the same thing"CITATION Pet08 \p 66 \l 1033 (Inwagen, 2008, p. 66). He has made use of an elaborated example of Alice and Alfredians. He argues that the property of whiteness of an object is experienced by us through our sensations of whiteness either directly, or through the objects having it. In other words, it is the properties of the objects that cause us to experience the sensations of the property and in its absence we might not be able to experience those sensations. That being said, van Inwagen proposes that it is not necessary that our sensations of whiteness of an objects and the property of whiteness of that same object are the same thing. Van Inwagen provides another argument in support of this claim by giving the example of Alice and Alfredians. Here the author raises two very important questions. The first is whether it is the Alfredians who misperceive the world of common objects? And the second is whether we, as humans, see the world as it is while Alfredians see it as it is not?CITATION Pet08 \p 66 \l 1033 (Inwagen, 2008, p. 66). The author explains that just because the Aflredians perceive something differently than we do does not make their perception any better or worse than our own perceptions as their sensations are just as good and suitable. However, this also implies that our sensations of whiteness and the property of whiteness are not the same thing. Van Inwagen here implies that the internal reality is different from the external reality while external reality is independent from the internal state of mind. He then proposes that given the arguments presented above, it can be assumed that "Berkeley`s identification of the sensible properties of common objects with the sensation we have when we experience common objects"CITATION Pet08 \p 66 \l 1033 (Inwagen, 2008, p. 66). The author has presented some very logical arguments in support of an external world and made an effort to prove its existence. He goes on to claim that objects that exist external to our mind are not something to be refuted since it is not something we just happen to believe but is rather something we experience to be true. He argues that we experience external sensations because our sense actually experiences something in the external world and thus, whether or not our perception is accurate, it is clear that the external world does in fact exist independent of our internal mind. Berkeley`s Idealism All these arguments pose a question to the philosophy of Geroge Berkely about mental dependency of ideas and positive metaphysics. He claims that the world exists only in our minds as an idea. However, he does so without denying the physical existence of the world but instead, provides a relatively different definition of existence. According to Berkeley, for anything to exist or to be ‘real`, it is important that it is perceived by the mind as real. He claims that in order for the external world to be real it must possess certain spiritual substances and not just the material ones CITATION Pet08 \l 1033 (Inwagen, 2008). Berkeley argues that the objects present in our external environment are things that we perceive through our sensations which in turn are made up of our ideas. Ideas (or sensations) are things which exist only in our minds and are not something which is present in the external world and thus, external objects that we perceive through our sensations and ideas of that sensation exist only in our minds CITATION Pet08 \l 1033 (Inwagen, 2008). So in short, Berkeley believes in a metaphysical view that ideas and m...