Joint All-Domain Command and Control for Modern Warfare

AIRPOWER STUDIES

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Airpower Studies

SHERRILL LINGEL, JEFF HAGEN, ERIC HASTINGS, MARY LEE, MATTHEW SARGENT, MATTHEW WALSH, LI ANG ZHANG, DAVID BLANCETT Joint All-Domain Command and Control for Modern Warfare

An Analytic Framework for Identifying and Developing Artifcial Intelligence Applications

1. Challenges of Implementing Joint All-Domain Command and Control Within the U.S. Air Force’s Current Operational Level Construct

Multidomain operations (MDO) arguably represent a means of waging warfare increasingly employed by the United States and others for decades. Land, sea, and air forces are brought to bear against adversary air, land, and sea forces that often rely on capabilities from space-based systems and digital information from computer networks. Given these additional domains, what is driving today’s modern warfare vision for MDO? In modern warfare, space is no longer a sanctuary in which offensive and defensive actions are rare, and cyberattacks on adversary networks and network self-defense are expected and planned for likely before kinetic hostilities even begin. In fact, actions in these newer warfighting domains are happening in the current gray zone, further emphasizing the urgency for close synchronization of efforts among all domains available in competitions and conflicts. The Air Operations Center (AOC) is the primary operational-level central command and control (C2) node for the U.S. Air Forces. These physical centers with large staffs are where planning, execution, and assessment of air operations occur. There are currently several region AOCs and six functional AOCs (Table 1.1) around the world. Functional operations centers (OCs) support functional combatant commanders (COCOMs) in the areas of global strike, space, mobility, special operations, cyber, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Regional AOCs support geographic COCOMs and are used for planning and executing theater operations in support of a joint force commander (JFC).

Current Operational-Level Command and Control Challenges The technological architecture underlying the baseline AOC system is made up of a patchwork of C2 systems that enable all phases of the air-tasking cycle (ATC). The AOC is normally employed by the joint force air component commander (JFACC) to exercise control of air forces in support of combined and joint force objectives. The effectiveness of the AOC construct, along with the associated doctrinal concepts of a functional air component commander and a centralized air planning process with decentralized execution, was demonstrated to great effect in Operation Desert Storm, galvanizing the role of the AOC in operational-level C2. The AOC has been tested in numerous conflicts since Desert Storm and, although methods for employing it have evolved, the AOC has remained the accepted paradigm for C2 of air forces. Nevertheless, the AOC construct has recently been challenged for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the increasing attention on MDO: The growing emphasis on improved cyber and space integration has placed new functional and technical demands on the AOC. Its ability to handle these challenges is limited by processes, systems, training, and planning and execution experience. In addition, emerging technologies in the fields of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) are enabling new capabilities and new threats. RAND Project AIR FORCE was asked by Air Combat Command (ACC), Directorate of Plans, Programs and Requirements (A5/8/9) to examine and recommend opportunities for applying AI and, more broadly, automation, to deliberate planning and products for multidomain command and control (MDC2). The companion report, not available to the general public, provides technical details for this research and an extensive review of previous research.

The AOC commander is responsible for managing operations, establishing battle rhythms, and planning, coordinating, executing, and assessing air operations based on JFC or commander Air Force guidance.2 The AOC battle rhythm follows a nominal 72-hour ATC (Figure 1.1). The cycle begins with the Strategy Division (SRD) defining objectives, effects, and guidance for the air tasking order (ATO) period. The continuous nature of the 72-hour ATC means that as one day’s ATO is being executed and monitored by the Combat Operations Division, the ATOs for the next two days are being planned by the SRD and Combat Plans Division.

The Air Force currently operates under the paradigm of centralized control and decentralized execution, in which the C2 of air operations is concentrated in the AOC and execution of the ATO is expected to be done across subordinate nodes. AOCs work in coordination with higher headquarters; lateral organizations, such as other joint force centers and components; subordinate units; and other OCs as necessary. AOCs are connected to each other and to forward nodes through classified and Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network networks and telecommunications systems that enable voice, phone, chat, and email capabilities. Examination of alternative C2 constructs, such as distributed control or multidomain (MD) C2, are underway with the Doolittle Wargames and activities at geographic commands.3 Two challenges of the current AOC construct of great concern and worth special mention are the speed of the current planning process and the focus on deliberate planning.

Planning Speed AOC systems and processes have evolved to best enable a commander’s objectives to be efficiently transformed into targets and sorties to find and attack them. Conflicts in the past 20 years conducted with AOCs have allowed a reasonable amount of planning and reaction time. Support elements, such as electronic warfare, cyber, and space, have been integrated to the greatest extent possible and in a largely manual fashion. This would be challenging in a high-end conflict and will become increasingly infeasible as the scope of MDO expands. The canonical 72-hour ATC works well in such fairly steady-state operations as a strategic bombing campaign; strikes against static, dug-in forces; support to preplanned ground operations; and planning ISR support against an insurgency. Much of this planning cycle is taken up by coordination meetings among components, commanders, and various echelon levels, which begin up to 72 hours before execution. Targets are carefully developed using many sources of intelligence and munitions, and platforms are deliberately selected one to three days in advance to maximize probability of kill and to minimize risk and collateral damage. Commander and legal reviews occur at multiple levels. Coalition partners must be integrated, synchronized, or at least deconflicted. Plans also are released to wing- and squadron-level units more than ten hours before execution to allow detailed tactical-level planning to minimize risk and maximize effectiveness. All of this care allows for the management of risk and the efficient employment of airpower, but these plans take time. This comprehensive planning process is exacerbated by the fact that the United States is likely to be on the defense in most near-peer conflicts, attempting to delay and stop a plan that an adversary has put into motion. Unless the preplanning is almost perfect, a 72-hour ATC will not work well if the adversary can achieve its objectives in 60 hours, for example.

Deliberate Versus Dynamic Planning Most AOC processes are directed toward building an ATO to service preplanned targets. This is a direct and natural consequence of the types of conflicts in which the AOC has matured and can be exemplified by the number of personnel authorized to the deliberate targeting process and those assigned to dynamic targeting (DT) (the companion report provides details about manning). The Combat Operations Division, where the DT cell is located, is much smaller than it appears. First, almost half of the division is dedicated to defensive—not offensive—operations. Second, the vast majority of the other cells, such as strategy, combat plans, ISR, and Air Mobility Division, are almost fully dedicated to deliberate planning and do not support DT. If critical targets are not known in advance, most of the AOC’s deliberate planning processes are less relevant and sorties must simply wait for targets to be found. This was the case in Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example, in which 79 percent of the desired mean points of impacts were against targets planned outside the ATO cycle.4 Because much of the deliberate targeting process is omitted in these cases, these sorties and their support (such as tankers and ISR) are inherently less efficient and riskier than those with preplanned targets and mission packages. To maximize efficiency and minimize risk, planning for DT involves determining the best C2 process (such as kill boxes), coordinating with the ISR or other component assets that might find and identify targets, determining the most-flexible platform types and munition loadouts, deconflicting airspace when routes to targets are determined, providing tanker support for sorties that might be loitering for long periods of time, and performing target engagement approval if necessary. All of these DT steps are primarily conducted manually using human-to-human communications and reasoning to navigate the large number of stove-piped databases and chains of command. As a result, simply using the current AOC to generate sorties for broad use in DT is not a realistic expectation, given the current AOC staffing bias toward deliberate planning; the manpower and tools are simply not adequate to handle that number of sorties, assuming that the number of dynamic targets could be found. In addition, timeliness, a critical element of a successful engagement against dynamic targets that can relocate, would be affected.

Differences Across Air Operations Centers The AOC baseline architecture is made up of more than 40 applications connected by thousands of machine-to-machine interfaces spread across three to ten networks.5 The two applications installed for the greatest number of duty positions are Internet Relay Chat and business services products. The former is a major point of integration between human planners, and the latter is an all-purpose tool that allows operators to bypass limitations of major command, control, communication, and intelligence systems. Problematically, Internet Relay Chat and business services products have no interfaces with other AOC applications, pointing to major seams between a primary communication channel, a primary planning tool, and all other AOC applications. Each AOC weapon system has evolved to be its own distinct entity because of the unique needs and concerns of its functional demands or area of responsibility. For example, the remote location of the 613 AOC and the large distances between its subordinate and commanding nodes are a challenge to air operations, whereas the 603 AOC must manage challenges and threats within its areas of responsibility, which include Europe and most of Africa, as well as interface with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Funding streams to various AOCs also differ. Functional AOCs also differ by mission. Although all AOCs should be capable of basic tasks, such as planning, execution, and operational-level assessments, some AOCs also have additional tasks, such as cyberspace defense or theater air and missile defense. Although no true AOC baseline exists, and each has evolved to meet the needs dictated by its mission, many needs—and challenges—are also shared across AOCs.

Challenges Unique to Space and Cyber Operations Centers Air Force Chief of Staff General David L. Goldfein described effective MD integration as “using dominance in one domain or many, blending a few capabilities or many, to produce multiple dilemmas for our adversaries in a way that will overwhelm them.”6 The challenges with better integrating the air, space, and cyber domains are numerous and daunting, including such problems as multilevel security, lack of authorities at the regional AOC level, and lack of compatible communications. In the case of cyber, many different levels of security are involved, and authorities for planning and execution often reside far from the theater and component levels, and few of these authorities are delegated forward.

Challenges in Emergence of Near-Peer Threat Environments The AOC and the JFACC’s execution of the ATC face external threats. As the AOC has grown and evolved, it has been upgraded and modified many times to keep pace with advancements in technology, doctrine, and the forces under its control. Although the systems, processes, and personnel that constitute the weapon system have been tested in a variety of conflicts—from regional war in Europe to counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East— they have never faced a challenge similar to the conflicts envisioned by the National Defense Strategy involving China or Russia. Such high-end conflicts raise two additional concerns with current AOC operations: • survivability of the AOC facility and personnel itself • robustness to cyber and communications attacks. These concerns will be exacerbated in MDOs, which involve a greater number of personnel and information systems and for which planning processes are even more prolonged and operations are more reliant on fragile connections that a sophisticated adversary has capabilities to deny, degrade, and disrupt.

Survivability As the centerpiece of air operations planning, a JFC is wholly dependent on AOC processes for planning and executing an air campaign. However, for overseas AOCs with significant warfighting responsibilities, their ability to operate in the face of kinetic attack is not at all assured.7 For example, the 613 AOC at Hickam Air Force Base on Oahu and the 603 AOC at Ramstein Air Base in Germany would support U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and U.S. European Command, respectively, in fights against China or Russia. However, both organizations place their systems and personnel in unhardened above-ground centralized facilities. Although all AOCs are responsible for creating and maintaining a continuity of operations with backup facilities and personnel, it appears likely that a significant delay would occur as damage assessment and handover were conducted between sites. The loss of personnel to an AOC attack is also likely to have far-reaching effects because AOCs contain the personnel most qualified to plan and conduct air operations in a particular theater, as well as liaisons with many different components and units, making an AOC a particularly high-value target for adversaries.

Robustness to Cyber and Communications Attacks Similar to the physical attacks on AOC facilities and personnel, the information and communications systems of the