Annotations on A Primer on US Civil–Military Relations for National Security Practitioners

FEATUREFEATURE
A Primer on US Civil–Military Relations for National Security Practitioners
DR. JESSICA D. BLANKSHAIN
Abstract
Whether or not they realize it, military ofcers, federal civil servants, and po- litical appointees take part every day in interactions that shape American civil– military relations. Tese national security professionals can beneft from familiar- ity with academic studies of civil–military relations, which ofer key insights on debates over the proper relationship between the military and the government, the military and society, and society’s role in overseeing government foreign and military policy, as well as important information on the current reality of these relationships. In an efort to make the academic feld of civil–military relations more accessible to national security professionals, this primer will discuss promi- nent analyses of each of the three key relationships—between civilian government and military, between military and civilian public, and between civilian public and civilian government. Te objective of the primer is to enable national security professionals—military and civilian—to critically evaluate arguments relating to civil–military relations and to be aware of the implications of their own actions.
Introduction
When we hear or think about American civil–military relations, it is often in the context of major stories at the highest levels of government. Pres. Harry Truman fring Gen Douglas MacArthur.1 Friction between Pres. Bill Clinton and Chair- man of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell over allowing gay service members to serve openly.2 Te “Revolt of the Generals,” a period of sharp public criticism from re- tired generals, faced by Pres. George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the midst of the Iraq War.3 Pres. Barack Obama requesting the resig- nation of Gen Stanley McChrystal after a Rolling Stone article revealed a command climate that openly disparaged civilian leaders.4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mark Milley publicly apologizing for “creat[ing] a perception of the military in- volved in domestic politics” by appearing at a photo-op with Pres. Donald Trump
during protests against police violence in Washington DC, as the president threat- ened to use federal troops to quell civil unrest.5
Despite our tendency to focus on these attention-grabbing incidents, the truth is that military ofcers, federal civil servants, and political appointees at all levels take part every day in interactions that shape American civil–military relations. It is therefore crucial that these individuals understand the dynamics and stakes that shape these civil–military relationships. While there are certainly eforts to edu- cate military ofcers, in particular, about the norms of civil–military relations and the profession of arms, such eforts are not uniform and are not matched on the civilian side of the relationship. Moreover, they often do little to connect national security practitioners to the booming academic literature on American civil–mil- itary relations. Academic studies of civil–military relations ofer key insights on debates over the proper relationship between the military and the government, the military and society, and society’s role in overseeing government foreign and military policy. Academic studies also ofer important information on the current reality of these relationships. It would be a mistake to assume that this literature is purely Ivory tower theorizing that has little to ofer practitioners living these roles and relationships on a day-to-day basis.
In an efort to make the academic feld of civil–military relations more acces- sible to national security practitioners, this primer will discuss prominent analyses of each of the three key relationships—between civilian government and military, between military and civilian public, and between civilian public and civilian gov- ernment. While important work on American civil–military relations is being done across academic felds, including history, sociology, and economics, this primer focuses primarily on contributions from political science, which tend to emphasize the implications of civil–military relations for policy processes and political outcomes. Te objective of the primer is to enable national security prac- titioners—military and civilian—to critically evaluate arguments relating to civil– military relations and to be aware of the implications of their own actions. After laying out the basics of a social science approach to civil–military relations, the primer will discuss the relationship between the military and the civilian govern- ment—how to balance civilian control and military efectiveness—before bring- ing in society at large, with a focus on how the military and society view each other, as well as how the public evaluates government conduct of military and foreign policy.
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Figure 1: The civil–military relations triad
A Social Science Approach to Civil–Military Relations
Te academic feld of civil–military relations involves the study of interactions among a state’s civilian public, its civilian government, and its military (see fg. 1).6 Tis framing does, of course, presume some degree of separation between these three components, as is the case for most large, industrial societies. Te nature of these relationships will vary by regime type. In a democratic republic, such as the United States, the public delegates governing authority to the government, which in turn delegates authority for providing security through the use of force to the military (see fg. 2). Peter Feaver notes “most of democratic theory is concerned with devising ways to ensure that the people remain in control even as profession- als conduct the business of government.”7 Put another way, “the claim of demo- cratic theory is that even when civilians are less expert, they are still rightfully in charge.”8 Tis nested delegation framing suggests the fundamental challenge of civil–military relations. Feaver summarizes this challenge as “the civil–military problematique”: how “to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the
1238426441687civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do.”9
Figure 2: Democratic civil–military relations as a nested delegation model
In studying civil–military relations it is important to understand the diference between normative arguments—discussions of what ought to be—and descriptive arguments—discussions of what is. Reasonable people can disagree on particular aspects of the ideal civil–military relationship in the United States, depending on their ideology and values. Empirical evidence helps us sort through the reality of the existing relationship. Another important distinction is between empirical data that simply represent facts—for example, an estimate of the percentage of military ofcers who identify as Republican—and empirical studies that attempt to inves- tigate a causal relationship—for example, that military training and experience socializing military ofcers to identify as Republicans. Te former is simply a matter of data availability and accuracy, while the latter requires not only data but
also appropriate methods for analyzing the relationship between diferent vari- ables. You may be familiar with the phrase “correlation is not causation.” When social scientists say this, they are generally referring to concerns such as selection efects, endogeneity, and omitted variable bias, all of which complicate the identi- fcation of the causal relationship between two variables that appear to covary in some way. For example, if we fnd military ofcers are more likely to identify as Republicans than are members of the general population, we cannot immediately assume that military service causes individuals to become Republicans. Tis ob- served relationship could be a result of a) military training and experience causing individuals to identify Republican, b) individuals who already identify Republican being more likely to join the military, or c) some other factor (such as geography, race, or gender) that is correlated with both military status and partisanship.
Some aspects of American civil–military relations are relatively settled from a normative perspective. For example, most agree the relationship between the military and the civilian government is properly one of military subordination. Other aspects of civil–military relations are more controversial. When does mili- tary dissent cross a line and threaten civilian control? Is there an operational sphere over which the military should have relative autonomy? Should a demo- cratic society rely on citizen-soldiers, or create a professional “warrior caste”? To what degree should military culture represent society’s values, particularly in terms of diversity and inclusiveness? What role should veterans play in partisan politics? Aside from such philosophical disagreements over these normative issues, dis- putes over the validity of various types of data and methods of analysis mean observers may not agree on how closely the civil- military reality resembles any of these normative visions. Tese are some of the many debates the academic litera- ture on civil–military relations seeks to shed light on.
The Relationship between the Military and the Civilian Government
Te relationship between the military and the civilian government has been the leg of the civil–military triangle that has received the most attention from politi- cal scientists. Scholars focus on questions such as: How do elected ofcials, civil servants, and military leaders interact at the highest levels? How do these interac- tions afect the balance between civilian control and military efectiveness? One can think of civil–military outcomes, in the most general sense, as falling along a continuum between two extremes. At one end, the military is so weak it collapses
on the battlefeld and is unable to assure the security of society. On the other end, the military is so powerful it overthrows the civilian government. Of course, there are many possibilities between these extremes. Feaver elaborates, “Because the military must face enemies, it must have coercive power, the ability to force its will on others. But coercive power often gives the holder the capability to enforce its will on the community that created it.”10 Feaver notes that while the traditional fear is this coercive power will be used in a coup, coercive power also creates other risks: “the possibility that a parasitic military could destroy society by draining it of resources,” or “a rogue military could involve the polity in wars and conficts contrary to society’s interests and expressed will,” or the military could “resist ci- vilian direction and pursue its own interests.”11
Civilian Control of the Military
In particular, analysts have focused on “civilian control”—the civilian govern- ment’s ability to ensure it gets the military policy it wants, despite the fact the military is physically more powerful than the civilian government in that it di- rectly controls the instruments of violence. Tere is a temptation to believe “civil- ian control” as such is not an issue in the United States because no one is seriously worried about a military coup. But, as Owens notes, “this is a straw man.”12 Lind- say Cohn writes that a true understanding of “control” extends beyond which party—civilian or military—has formal authority to include “the concepts of gov- ernance, infuence, and obedience.”13 In particular, “Te literature on political control of the military agent is largely in agreement on three points: civilians must have the institutions and authority to issue orders, they must not be subject to undue infuence in the formulation of the orders, and they must be obeyed when they issue orders.”14
In his classic work, Te Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington identifes three responsibilities of military leaders in relation to the civilian government. Te frst is the “representative function,” the professional requirement “to represent the claims of military security within the state machinery.”15 Te second responsibility is to exercise the “advisory function.” Tis is the professional imperative “to ana- lyze and to report on the implications of alternative courses of action from the military point of view.”16 Te third responsibility is to exercise the “executive func- tion.” Huntington writes this responsibility requires the professional military “to implement state decisions with respect to state security even if it is a decision
which runs violently counter to his military judgment.”17 Richard Kohn picks up this thread of the executive function, arguing that:
[I]n practice, the relationship is far more complex. Both sides frequently dis- agree among themselves. Further, the military can evade or circumscribe civilian authority by framing the alternatives or tailoring their advice or predicting nasty consequences; by leaking information or appealing to public opinion (through various indirect channels, like lobbying groups or retired generals and admirals); or by approaching friends in the Congress for support. Tey can even fail to implement decisions, or carry them out in such a way as to stymie their intent. .
. . We are not talking about a coup here, or anything else demonstrably illegal; we are talking about who calls the tune in military afairs in the United States today.18
Tis suggests a disconnect between normative ideals of civilian control of the military and the civil–military bargaining that occurs in practice.19 We now turn to an overview of the academic theories that examine the ways in which civilian control is likely to vary in practice, and the ways the civilian government can at- tempt to maximize control.
Te “classical” literature on civil–military relations, epitomized by the works of Huntington (a political scientist) and Morris Janowitz (a sociologist), focuses on ideological and ethical factors.20 Both authors suggest military professionalism is the key to ensuring civilian control. Huntington defnes a profession as having specialized expertise, corporateness, and social responsibility. He argues that mili- tary ofcers ft this description, having specialized expertise in the management of violence, the ability to set their own entrance standards and enforce their own professional ethic, and a responsibility to provide security for the society that de- pends on them.21 Te aspect of this literature most likely to be familiar to national security professionals, and particularly military ofcers, is Huntington’s theory of “objective control,” a system in which civilian and military spheres are distinct, and civilians grant military ofcers signifcant autonomy over operational and tactical decisions in exchange for the military’s willingness to stay out of politics and policy decisions. Huntington argues objective control maximizes military professionalism.22 Huntington further predicted that for the military to succeed in providing security in the face of a signifcant threat like Soviet Communism America’s individualistic, liberal society would need to become more like the military. Tis is one area in which he difers signifcantly from Morris Janowitz,
who instead argues that the military should evolve with societal values and norms.23
More recent work by Feaver has shifted the focus from internal controls on military behavior (in the form of indoctrinating a professional ethic of subordina- tion) to external controls in the form of monitoring and punishment. Feaver sug- gests the civil–military relationship can be modeled with the “principal-agent” framework familiar to economists who study contract theory and organizational economics.24 Te civilian principal and military agent may have divergent prefer- ences (generally not over the fundamental aim of national security, but over the means by which national security is to be achieved). At the same time, the military has more information about its activities, and expertise on military issues, than does the civilian principal. Te challenge is for the civilian principal to ensure the military “does what it has contracted with the principal to do, how the principal has asked it to, with due diligence and skill, and in such a way as to reinforce the principal’s superior role in making the decisions and drawing the lines of any delegation.”25 Feaver suggests the civilian cannot achieve this by relying on mili- tary professionalism alone—instead the civilian principal must create a system in which it is able to monitor the military’s behavior and punish misbehavior ac- cordingly.26
In terms of achieving control, Cohn summarizes the relationship between dif-
ferent methods of control by turning to sociologist Max Weber, who argues that in terms of motives for obedience, “selfsh gain is the weakest, but it can be strengthened by ideals or afnities, and one or both of these in conjunction with a belief in the legitimacy of the control relationship will yield the most stable situation.”27 Cohn puts these factors together in more concrete terms as follows:
Te strength of government control over its agents should increase when there are institutions supporting civilian authority, civilian leaders competent and confdent in defense policy making, an agent culture of subordination to legiti- mate authority, an efective system of principal monitoring and punishment, and low average preference discrepancies between the government and the agent organization.28
Civilian authority is complicated in the American case by the separation of power between the executive and legislative branches. What does it mean for the military to be subordinate to the civilian government when the civilian gov- ernment is divided on military policy? As Owens notes, “while the president and secretary of defense control the military when it comes to the use of force,
including strategy and rules of engagement, Congress controls the military di- rectly with regard to force size, equipment, and organization, and indirectly re- garding doctrine and personnel.”29 Jim Golby fnds that the Senate does use its power to confrm presidential appointments to shape senior military leadership, with presidents of both parties more likely to appoint ofcers with ideologies more similar to their own when the president’s co-partisans control the Sen- ate.30 Owens further argues: “When the two branches are in disagreement, the military tends to side with the branch that most favors its own views, but never to the point of direct disobedience to orders of the commander in chief.”31 In a comparison of the American and British systems, Deborah Avant fnds that divisions within the civilian government can make the military less responsive to civilian eforts to spur military adaptation.32 In a separate study, Avant argues that disagreement between civilian ofcials over policy goals also leads to more pushback from military leaders about their desired missions.33
While none of the authors above suggest that a military coup is a serious threat in the US today, they point to a number of areas on the margins where the mili- tary could challenge the civilian government’s ability to conduct policy as it chooses.
Patterns of Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness: The Role of Military Expertise
It is important to remember there are two sides to the civil–military problema- tique; in addition to a military subordinate to civilian control, society also desires a military strong enough to protect it from threats. Tus, an important test of a pattern of civilian control is how well it contributes to the efectiveness of a state’s military. How might civil–military relations afect military efectiveness? At the extreme, civilians might intentionally keep the military weak, starving it of funds and personnel, in order to prevent the military from amassing too much power. Even in today’s constrained fscal environment, few would argue this is the case in the United States. But more subtly, the pattern of civilian control chosen by the government may afect a state’s ability to efectively build military capacity and connect political goals with military means. For example, Amy Zegart, argues that political leaders designed a number of important national security institutions— including the National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staf—to maximize their own ability to exert political control rather than to maximize their efective- ness in implementing national policy.34
Eliot Cohen points out that—in contrast to the recommendations of Hunting- ton’s objective control theory—there have been occasions when wartime civilian leaders such as Winston Churchill and Abraham Lincoln were involved in strate- gic, operational, and tactical decisions.35 Cohen selects for analysis a handful of cases in which he argues civilian trespassing in the military sphere led to good outcomes, and thus does not prove objective control always harms military efec- tiveness, but he does illustrate that neither does civilian intervention necessarily reduce military efectiveness, and that indeed it may be benefcial in some in- stances. Civilian “meddling” may help to minimize “the disjunction between op- erational excellence in combat and policy, which determines the reasons for which a particular war is to be fought.”36
Risa Brooks also analyzes how a state’s civil–military relations afect its ability to formulate successful strategy.37 Brooks argues good strategic assessment re- quires information sharing and strategic coordination between civilian and mili- tary, as well as a military competent to assess its own (and others’) capabilities and a clear decision-making and authorization process.38 Brooks hypothesizes the quality of strategic assessment will vary with civil–military preference divergence and with the civil–military balance of power. In particular, she suggests strategic assessment will be of the highest quality when preference divergence is low and the civilians are dominant. It will be worst when preference divergence is high and civilian and military share power, with no party clearly dominant. Te quality of strategic assessment will be “fair” when the military dominates.39 As one of her case studies, Brooks analyzes the quality of strategic assessment with respect to post-confict planning for the 2003 Iraq War. She argues this was a case of “mixed” results as the civilian side was clearly dominant, but preference divergence was high as a result of military resistance to Rumsfeld’s transformation eforts:
Underlying disputes over policy and strategic issues induce political leaders to employ oversight mechanisms to ensure military compliance with their initia- tives … while these tactics mitigate problems in information sharing … and provide for a clear authorization process … the safeguards are also often counter- productive to strategic coordination. Tey truncate political-military dialogue and limit the range of perspectives represented in the advisory processes.40
In other words, Brooks suggests that when civilians are too heavy-handed in their monitoring and punishment of military behavior, they may stife civil–military dialogue, resulting in faulty strategic assessment.
As the above discussions have hinted, at the crux of the civil–military prob- lematique is the role military expertise plays in policymaking and policy imple- mentation. What does it mean for military ofcers to advise without advocating for particular policies? In what realms should the military have more or less au- tonomy in choosing and carrying out its actions? What should military ofcers do if they don’t feel their advice is being adequately heard and considered? What should civilians do if they believe military ofcers are using advice strategically to control policy?
Te Huntingtonian model of military advice has increasingly been questioned, both in terms of its practicality—can such a model of advising be achieved in practice?—and in terms of whether doing so would be desirable in a normative sense. Risa Brooks notes that in Huntington’s conceptualization, “relations be- tween civilians and the military in advisory processes are therefore essentially transactional, rather than collaborative.”41 In this model, senior military leaders “ should readily ofer politics-free assessments of military options after civilians provide them with defnitive guidance about their goals in international conficts.”42 Janine Davidson argues that in reality, both sides—civilian and military—end up frustrated by the civil–military dialogue around use of force decisions. Tey be- come trapped in a perpetual chicken and egg problem in which military leaders are frustrated that civilians will not give them specifc guidance on policy objec- tives from which to begin their planning process, while civilians are frustrated that military leaders will not provide them with a full range of options from which they can determine achievable goals.43
Tis Huntingtonian view of the military’s role in policymaking is often referred to as “best military advice.” Jim Golby and Mara Karlin argue that this term is problematic, and risks “creat[ing] the impression that military advice is better than civilian advice.”44 Tey further argue that this framing reinforces the ten- dency to view the advising relationship as transactional, with the military provid- ing a take it or leave it option that civilians disregard at their peril.45 In addition, “best military advice” reinforces the unrealistic framing of a clear separation be- tween military and policy spheres, making it more difcult to connect military policy to overall strategic and political goals.46
Elsewhere, Golby argues that Huntington’s formulation of military profes- sionalism and objective control “has created the lasting impression that civilian leaders must implicitly trust, and grant autonomy to, military leaders” when in- stead “autonomy must be earned and re-earned continuously through the daily
demonstration of character and competence, and the commitment by members of the profession to police themselves and hold one another accountable.”47 He further argues that to earn autonomy and trust:
US military leaders must recognize their advice must evolve as political condi- tions change; must focus more on cooperation with civilians than on civilian control; empower mid-level leaders and staf ofcers to participate fully in the interagency process; anticipate problems rather than waiting for a political end state; and focus on how military tools can accomplish civilian goals.48
Similarly, Risa Brooks contends that a “new approach [to the advisory process] should promote greater engagement by military leaders with civilian policymak- ers in considering political objectives and policy-related issues.”49
Te reader may, by now, have noticed that much of the literature on the military- government relationship focuses on the military’s responsibilities and obligations. Tis literature on the civilian side of the equation remains underdeveloped, but civilian responsibilities have not been entirely ignored. Golby and Karlin note that an important part of the responsibility for a healthy advising relationship falls on civilian policymakers, who must be knowledgeable about national security af- fairs and prepared to engage in this iterative process.50 Alice Hunt Friend argues that the government “civilians” in the civil–military relationship are not simply “not military.” Rather, “the experience, skills, knowledge, and vision that civilians bring to their politically enabled roles in the civil–military relationship provi...