Airpower Studies: Billy Mitchell's Perspective
Provide a 150 word minimum response to each of the 2 postings of the classmates in regards to questions A and B.
Please note you can agree or disagree in your response with any of the responses from the classmates as long as you back it up with explanation and facts. You must use at least 1 source from class readings for each response at minimum and 2 other sources from class or outside of class.
In-text citations must be done in accordance with Global College Style Guide attached and not APA. (Questions A and B responses below have done citations appropriately).
QUESTION A: Current doctrine claims that "The Airman’s perspective provides the ability to force multiple dilemmas on adversaries, decreasing their decision space for potential courses of action." Is it clear from your readings that Mitchell and other early airpower theorists understood this perspective, why or why not?
QUESTION B: In Winged Defense, Billy Mitchell stated “Air power has rudely upset the traditions of the older services.” Do you concur with Mitchell’s proclamation? Based on your readings that frame the emergence of airpower during this era, did the other services view airpower as complementary or indispensable?
Justify and support your answer using your experience and source support from the assigned readings.
Classmate’s responses:
Plank’s Initial Response to Question A:
I think Billy Mitchell understood the concept of “forcing multiple dilemmas on adversaries” very well. In his letter to Expeditionary Chief of Staff entering WW1, he observed how the French were utilizing airpower and instantly saw two things. First that he thought the USAF should be established as a separate entity and second, that it would be with “strategical” airpower that the U.S. could contribute most effectively to influence the decision of the war (versus artillery spotting airpower or counter-air). (Mitchell, 1917). This is backed up by the historical research mentioned Maurer’s 1978 “Early Concepts of Military Aviation”. He mentioned how both the Germans and Allies recognized at roughly the same time, the future importance of air power. With battle-lines relatively stagnant and sea power dormant, the Germans were pivoting to aerial bombardment. The Allies recognized how bombing “a few specific, well known chemical factories” would reduce the number of chemical shells that could be produced. Additionally, bombing Mercedes and Bosch plants could simultaneously reduce the speed at which new airplanes could be reproduced. I think these concepts which they considered advantageous without debate, are the definition of forcing multiple dilemmas on the adversary because now they not only have to worry about attacks from the front line, they have to plan for attack on their key infrastructure, thus diverting time and resources away from the front line. To me it’s clear the early leaders of airpower saw the strategic implications especially on the strategic side while more traditional (non-airpower centric leaders) saw air power only as a tool to support the front line ground troops.
Provide Response here:
Hello Plank,
I agree that Billy Mitchell understood the concept of “forcing multiple dilemmas on adversaries” exceptionally and had sufficient information to rationalize his ideology. Notably, Billy Mitchell was conversant with the global military environments, and the First World War was significant before the signs (Maurer 1978, 138). Therefore, Billy Mitchell noted how the use of the strategy influences the military success of various superpowers, including Germany and French. Before the First World War, most of the countries' military services were operating singularly with minimal and complementary tactics meant to suppress the tactical abilities of the enemies. However, Billy Mitchel found that most countries become more successful after utilizing the various military organisms within a unified attack and coordination strategy (Mann 2002, 48). Through the ideology of “forcing multiple dilemmas on adversaries,” Billy Mitchel also noted that most military operations were more successful when they created destruction and dilemma, especially by destroying the strongholds and sources of frontline command. For example, destroying the German military power plants like Benz weakened its military capabilities, making the country vulnerable and less supportive of its allies. Thank you for the work well do...
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