Kasserine Pass and the Proper Application of Airpower

Airpower Studies

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Airpower Studies

Courtesy U.S. Air Force History Office Kasserine Pass

and the Proper Application of Airpower

By S H A W N P. R I F E

In November 1942 the Allies began Operation Torch, a massive invasion of French Morocco and Algeria with over 107,000 troops—three- fourths American—designed to throw Axis forces out of North Africa. Many factors including faulty decisions, confused command relation- ships, supply problems, and inexperienced troops thwarted hopes for a rapid victory. Forces under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel concentrated in Tunisia and were reinforced. Allied difficulties culminated in near disaster at Kasserine Pass in February 1943. In the process, the U.S. Army learned a major lesson on the appropriate rela- tionship between air and ground forces—a lesson that it later put to good use. Kasserine Pass is the only important battle fought by the Armed Forces—either in World War II or since that time—without enjoying air superiority.

During the winter of 1942–43, the air organi- zation in North Africa paralleled the division of ground forces into American, British, and French contingents. Major General Carl Spaatz, nominal commander of Allied Air Force, ordered Eastern Air Command under Air Marshal William Welsh to support British 1st Army while Twelfth Air Force under Brigadier General Jimmy Doolittle, hero of the April 1942 raid on Tokyo, was di- rected to support all U.S. land forces. In particular, Twelfth Air Force’s XII Air Support Command

(ASC) was charged with cooperating with the American land forces, organized and consolidated under II Corps.

465327-2311210U.S. Air ForceLoading fighter bombers, Tripolitania.

XII ASC possessed a large proportion of avail- able American fighters and light and medium bombers but suffered a number of operational handicaps. The rainy season turned many airfields to mud. Logistics shortfalls and inexperience among ground crew reduced sortie rates. Lack of radar coverage at the front forced XII ASC to rely upon fighter sweeps for counterair operations, which the Germans usually managed to avoid.

Aerial Umbrellas

One of the most crippling obstacles for XII ASC was poor air support doctrine as embodied in Field Manual 31-35 of April 9, 1942, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces. Although the Army Air Force had spearheaded development of this man- ual, intending that it address only the conduct of close air support, in trying to reconcile dif- the supported ground force. The final decision as to priority of targets rests with the commander of the supported unit.”1 This excerpt would be the centerpiece of the doctrinal disagreement between air and ground officers. Despite any agreement on what FM 31-35 actually meant for command and control of airpower, General Dwight Eisenhower, who exercised nominal control over the entire Al- lied force, wrote in January that “[we] have a pub- lished doctrine that has not been proved faulty.”2 A headquarters memo of October 1942, stating that aircraft should not be “frittered away” on unimportant targets but instead “reserved for con- centration in overwhelming attack upon impor- tant objectives,” failed to resolve the problem.3

The effects of this doctrinal dispute were ex- acerbated by the lack of an effective air-ground support team. Inexperience and inadequate train- ing on all levels, the fluid situation on the ground, and frequent command changes all con- tributed to the problem. The Americans neglected to glean any meaningful lessons from the British experience in the Western Desert. Neither of the architects of the