Air Power and Its Contribution to Joint Force

Please provide a response to the following 3 answers (A, B, and C) stating if you agree or disagree. Please use sources to support your answer. Please see the assignment attached.

1. QUESTION A: Much of this lesson revolves around the capabilities of airpower and its contribution to the Joint Force.  However, airpower also has limitations.  Identify three limitations of airpower and explain how the COMAFFOR/JFACC overcomes or minimizes these limitations.  (Be sure your answer is confined to airpower.  For example: do not select an airpower limitation that is mitigated by land power, sea power, space power or cyber power.)

ANSWER: 

Airpower has proved it’s worth through its evolution.  Although the doctrine of airpower showcases its extreme benefits, it also has three specific limits I will discuss.

The first limitation of airpower is it can be geographically challenging.  The distance that aircraft may have to fly to get to their targets could create problems, as seen in Libya. (Matlock et al, 2014, 125). The issue of distance is bridged with aerial refueling, but that only adds another layer of planning but if there is no fuel, there is no mission.  To overcome this limitation, the COMAFFOR/JFACC will need to determine the desired effects and assign an appropriate level to of effort to achieve them. (AFDP 3-01, 2019, 6) Since assets may have to travel vast expanses to get to target areas, meticulous planning and execution is a must.  Maybe an entire strike package is not the answer to a certain mission that has to travel long distances, but a long range bomber instead can answer the objectives.  Each mission is unique and there never is a one stop answer to fulfill it.

The second limitation of airpower is airmen need to understand it is not the final answer to a political strategy. (Farquhar, 2017, 51). Multiple strikes on an objective and then calling it a day is not going to solve the greater problem at hand.  In some cases, airpower cannot decipher between good guys and bad guys.  A way to overcome the is the COMAFFOR/JFACC will have to utilize airpower carefully to achieve the overall political objective without using excessive force and damaging the overall intent. (52) 

The third limitation is airpower is only at its finest when tactical C2 is present.  Another example proved in Libya when fighters and bombers had to complete the entire kill chain on their own without tactical C2 support and were completely overwhelmed. (Matlock et al, 2014, 121)  The obvious fix for this is the COMAFFOR/JFACC need to always integrate tactical C2 into the theater of operations to ensure smooth operations- assisting in the kill chain, refueling operations, and overall command and control services.  This includes sensors and communications, which could prevent delays in targeting. (120)

Airpower is a deadly force when used correctly, but when it stands alone, the struggles are apparent.  The COMAFFOR/JFACC need to make the appropriate decisions to utilize airpower where it can make the greatest impact to the operation.

1. QUESTION B: Reflect on what you’ve learned about counterair, counterland, and countersea operations.  Choose one of these key mission areas.  Describe how the JFACC uses C2, people, processes, and products to effectively integrate airpower capabilities for mission success in your chosen area.

ANSWER: 

The JFACC uses integrated C2 platforms to supplement joint countersea operations. On the surface of the sea, ship-based C2 is limited, therefore, the JTF utilizes airborne C2. It is becoming increasingly common for sea-based services to utilize the USAF airborne systems such as the E-3 AWACS and E-8C JSTARS. Specifically, the E-8 has been used to track ships and boats and the E-3 has been used to supplement the Navy’s limited E-2 Hawkeye surveillance capability (Dalman, 2014, p. 95). To further integrate airpower capabilities in the maritime environment, the JFACC will also need to be aware of different requirements for mid-air refueling. Planners will need to be aware of cross-service technical differences (boom/basket). Planners will also need to verify that mid-refueling requests are clearly communicated through the JAOC (AFDP 3-04 Countersea Operations, 2019, p.38).

The Navy and Air Force are working on a new product that will supplement JTF countersea operations. Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2), is a combat communications network that will allow the Navy and Air Force to communicate (more efficiently) with one another and share vital targeting information in a joint maritime environment. Allowing Navy and Air Force personnel to share targeting information will be vital in a potential conflict in the Pacific region. Air Force airborne assets typically have greater range and can point their sensors further over the horizon, allowing the Air Force to share this information (faster and clearer) with surface vessels will be vital to efficient operations in the Indo-Pacific (Lagrone, 2019, Navy, Air Force).

While working with an attack squadron at RIMPAC 22 this past July, I spoke with Air Force attack pilots, and they would commonly state that Air Force to Navy communications need to be improved. During joint countersea and counterair training, communication is imperative for safety, both services would utilize precious time to ensure all assets were using the correct frequencies on a myriad of different radios. A system like JADC2 could quickly and accurately speed this process up, while simultaneously providing a joint process that ensures targeting information is shared.

1. QUESTION C: This week’s readings introduced you to several joint airpower integration issues unique to coalition and interagency contexts. In your view, which type of operation (coalition or interagency) presents greater integration challenges to JFACCs as they strive to achieve objectives. Explain why you believe this is so.

ANSWER: 

          As formidable as interagency conflicts can be, I believe they ultimately pale in comparison to coalition efforts, which stir in myriad “technical and policy-driven obstacles to seamless integration” (Drape, 2012, p. 74).  A coalition is an “ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013, pp. II-21).  It represents a collection of bureaucracies, which—by necessity and definition—will only become more complex when compared to any one, individual country’s defense department.

          The complexities are almost too diverse and numerous to consider.  Certainly, ideological and cultural differences are at play, but so are challenges as basic as equipment compatibility, varying levels of sustainability, and contribution capacity (budgets, personnel power, etc.).  The Joint Publication plainly acknowledges the limitations: “unity of effort through unity of command for a multinational operation may not be politically feasible, but it should be a goal” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013, pp. II-22).

          I saw this play out multiple times with stationed at NATO’s LANDCOM in Izmir, Turkey.  The Turkish military does very few things the way we would, but our relationship (which is currently weakening) superseded preference or doctrine on most days.  One seemingly simple but powerful example would be the NATO insistence on blue ink signatures for official documents.  As a joint assignment, the US Army naturally assumed the leading role, thus insisting on black ink for all signatures.  I was surprised by how emotional the argument became.  In the end, the Army begrudgingly adopted blue ink.

          In my opinion, more than technical expertise and familiarity, emotional intelligence (EQ) is vital to long-term coalition success.  Travis Bradberry wrote the authoritative book on the subject; here’s how he summarizes it, “Good decisions require far more than factual knowledge. They are made using self-knowledge and emotional mastery when they’re needed most” (Bradberry, 2009, p. 46).  While EQ is deemed a “soft skill,” its relevance becomes increasingly self-evident as diverse personalities accumulate toward a common goal.

Works Cited

Bradberry, T. (2009). Emotional Intelligence 2.0. San Diego: TalentSmart.

Drape, J. (2012). Building Partnership Capacity: Operation Harmattan and Beyond. Air and Space Power Journal, 65-93.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013). Joint Publication 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.