USSPACECOM and the JFACC in Space Coordinating Authority (SCA)

Please provide a response to the following 3 answers (A, B, and C) stating if you agree or disagree. Please use sources to support your answer. Please see the assignment attached.

QUESTION A: The new USSPACECOM has been established as a geographic combatant command, but the narrative surrounding this new unified command often adds the unofficial tag “with functional command like responsibilities.” First, state whether you believe this unofficial qualifier is true and/or relevant, and why. Then, explain how you believe the introduction of USSPACECOM as a geographic combatant command changes the military’s perception of space.

ANSWER: Kimberly Response to Question A:

USSPACECOM is absolutely relevant as a geographical command as well as a functional command.  The geographical backing is based on the published USSPACECOM’s AOR as the area surrounding earth that is equal to or greater than 100km above mean sea level. (JP 3-14, 2020, 1-3) As this area encompasses the entire planet, USSPACECOM is then able to have those “functional command like responsibilities” because they are within operational reach of all the other combatant commands.  The functional aspect rings true because space capabilities can provide any CCDR “near-worldwide coverage and access to otherwise denied areas.” (I-4)  

This changes the military’s perception of space because now its tactical relevance is available 24/7/365, and it does not matter where on the planet the assistance is needed from or to USSPACECOM.  However, commanders need to understand the basics when it comes to space operations.  This will help them employ forces to the best of their ability to meet mission requirements. (JP 3-14, 20202, I-12)  This can include orbital or environmental considerations, which can severely affect or degrade any spacecraft’s operational capability if managed poorly. (I-12)  As NASIC points out in Competing in Space, it is also important to claim space as a geographical domain because other countries (China and Russia mostly) are trying to lay claim as well with continuing development of several anti-satellite weapons.  It is important for the US to stay relevant and maintain he leading edge in the physical (geographical) domain of space. (2018)     

Kimberly

QUESTION B: Consider how the formation of USSPACECOM and the United States Space Force (USSF) may change the C2 structure for the key position of Space Coordinating Authority (SCA). In your view, (1) will the JFACC normally be appointed the Space Coordinating Authority by the Joint Force Commander? And (2), if the JFACC is no longer designated the SCA, how does this impact the JFACC’s ability to command air assets? Justify your answer and explain your reasoning.

ANSWER: Brian’s Initial Response to QB Wk5:

    USSPACECOM being a geographic command and having a dedicated area of responsibility (AOR) presents a unique challenge, and by providing support to the joint warfighter, USSPACECOM presents a similarity to other functional commands (JP 3-30, LeMay Center Edit, 2021). However, the authority to direct space assets and integrate them in the modern air war is opening another door for the component commanders.

     Based on the evolving nature of space as a necessary function to all operations, I believe the Space Coordinating Authority will reside with the JFACC. The SCA, operating with the direct support of the director of space forces (DIRSPACEFOR) may fully integrate space operations into the daily ATO cycle (North, 2008, 3). No matter which component commander holds the title of JFACC, with the formation of the USSF, I believe the DIRSPACEFOR will be a USSF officer moving forward.

    If the JFACC is not designated the SCA I believe the ability to command air assets will degrade.  From a lowly tanker driver’s perspective, the ability to rapidly communicate and re-direct refueling missions, with the help of satellite communications, data link-based architecture, and GPS navigation, is paramount in enabling the air to ground war.  I do not have much in the way of reliable long-range immediate communications without space. Additionally, the SCA’s ability to specify when and where GPS signals are optimized enables the precise organization of aircraft locations and the precise engagement of munitions, even when enemy electronic degradation methods are in place (North, 2008, 4).  Separating the SCA from the JFACC role forces delays and adds steps in the request chain for these actions.

-Brian

QUESTION C: With USSTRATCOM’s efforts to revitalize, upgrade and solidify the nuclear enterprise, does the addition of the B-1 fleet to Air Force Global Strike Command (a non-nuclear capable aircraft) help or hurt USSTRATCOM’s nuclear revitalization effort? Support your answer using course concepts and sound reasoning.

ANSWER: Tom's Initial Reply to Question C

      I was assigned to Dyess AFB as an IMA reservist in the legal office when the switch of the B1s from ACC to GSC occurred. I can honestly say that the move did not merit much mention. There were more issues with record management during the switch than any relative change in morale, posture, and attitude of the Airmen assigned. Despite the move, the teams knew we would never be flying nuclear weapons, so there wasn't any change in their structure or planning. What happened was that the B1 found new life in Afghanistan and Syria. The teams won acclaim for their bombing runs in Afghanistan using conventional bombs (B-1 Lancer: From Nuclear Bomber To Taliban Killer | The National Interest Links to an external site.2020). We learned that the B1 is good at supporting ground forces and being a reliable presence for operations in remote locations. Nevertheless, the B1 is soon to be replaced by the B21 Raider, which affects the answer to the question (B-21 Raider Stealth Bomber: The Definitive Guide - 19FortyFive Links to an external site.).  

      The nuclear revitalization effort was aided by moving the B1s to GSC because the B1 teams would be the basis of the new B21 groups. The move appears to have been prescient as the B21 replaces and upgrades the B1 and B2 systems. Though, if that's why they were making the move at the time, they didn't tell us. The move appeared designed to get all the bombers under one command. The nuclear component had little if anything to do with the action because the B1s were no longer nuclear capable. To be sure, there are efficiencies to be gained, even more so when two types of bombers are replaced by 1. The B1s would have withered had they remained under ACC.

      The fact is that such bombers are an asset against enemies without air capabilities during traditional bombing campaigns and provide support to land-based troops. However, as we have learned, there are more and more actors and states with nuclear ambitions. "Middleweight militaries and non-state actors can now muster weaponry once available only to superpowers" (Mote 2014, 83). Though we will have more modern and stealthier delivery vehicles, these moves do not help STRACOM's efforts to protect us against the decentralized possible use of nuclear weapons. The B21s are likely necessary as a counterweight to China's ambitions but ultimately will be left looking for a day-to-day role like the B1s.