Richardson vs. Ramirez: Rightly or Wrongly Decided?

Law Term Paper: Richardson vs. Ramirez
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Law Term Paper: Richardson vs. Ramirez
In 1974, three individuals who had served and completed their sentences after being convicted of felony filed a class petition on behalf of themselves and other ex-felons in the same locality. They sought to challenge the refusal of three different California counties to register them as voters on account of their felony convictions (JUSTIA, n.d.). They named the Secretary of State and the three county election officials who had denied them registration as the defendants. The three respondents contended that their disenfranchisement was unconstitutional. In typical voting rights cases, states must vindicate voting restrictions by proving beyond reasonable doubt that the limitations are necessary for the achievement of "compelling state interest ."Similarly, the means of obtaining the objectives of the state must not be suppressive. To this end, the respondents opined that the state of California had no compelling interest in justifying its decision to deny them the right to vote. They also faulted the provisions of the California Constitution and the statutes that denied ex-felons the right to vote, claiming it deprived them of equal protection. The three county election officials named as defendants by the respondents opted not to contest the suit and agreed to henceforth register all ex-felons to vote. However, the California Supreme Court ruled that the acquiescence of the election officials did not render the case moot and went on to make a decision.
In delivering its verdict, the Supreme Court relied on section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which dictates that any state that denies its voters the right to vote should have its representation in the U.S. House of Representatives reduced. However, the Supreme Court noted that the section had contained an exception that allowed states to disenfranchise citizens who had participated in rebellion or “other crimes ."In light of this, the judges held that restriction of voting on account of felony was distinguishable from other forms of voting restrictions. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that disenfranchising felons who had completed their sentences did not, in any way, violate the Equal Protection Clause. It, therefore, dismissed the suit.
The Ruling was Erroneous
Looking at the decision of the Supreme Court from diverse perspectives, one is bound to conclude that the Court erred in its verdict. At this juncture, it is crucial to note that the Supreme Court relied entirely on section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to decide the case. In so doing, members of the Court completely misread section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court should have taken time to consider the legislative history of the section concerning what it initially contemplated or the goals it meant to achieve. According to Bourne (2007), section 2 was formulated as part of a wider scheme to provide support to the Republican Party and the newly freed African American slaves. The latter were rightly perceived as adherents of the former. As such, the section was geared towards encouraging the inclusion of African Americans in the electorate in the South while at the same time excluding unconstructed whites who had taken part and lost in the Confederate rebellion. This underscores that section 2 is faulty since, from the outset, it had ulterior motives, which included needlessly disenfranchising some citizens. As such, relying on the section to decide a case of such magnitude as the Richardson vs. Ramirez set a wrong precedent, which is detrimental to the country's legal system. For instance, the section provides loopholes to deny minority citizens the right to vote.
As previously noted, the framers of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment had ulterior motives up their sleeves. Indeed, this was the feeling of one of the dissenting judges in the Richardson vs. Ramirez case. In dissension, Judge Marshall contended that the purpose of section two was clearly to encourage states to reinforce the voting rights of formerly enslaved people (Bourne, 2007). Those who crafted the section compelled the states to comply by suggesting that failure to do so would culminate in them losing power in the Congress and Electoral College. The dissenting judge argued that the framers of the section must have known that felon disenfranchisement existed and could have actually approved it. However, that approval should not form the basis to make the practice constitutional. The judge, therefore, implicitly suggested that felon disenfranchisement should be subject to constitutional scrutiny. This is because it paved the way for the legal system to deny some minority members their right to vote.
The Origin of the Exception Clause in Section 2
The other bone of contention as to why section 2 of the fourteenth amendment is defective and unreliable is the vague language the framers employed, especially the phrase “other crimes ."This was the only common ground between the dissenting and majority judges in the Richardson case. The majority side alluded that the phrase "other crimes" was indeed scant. However, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority stated that...