United States Pegasus Command (USPEGCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR)

Joint Forces Essay
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Joint Forces Essay
Part 1
The JTF command and control structure, based on forces available and anticipated objectives of the JTF-APOLLO, which was set up in response to the crisis in the United States Pegasus Command (USPEGCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), is shown below.
GCC/CCGCC/J-Staff
SAG, ESG, & MEUCAB & IBCTSFJFLCCJFMCCJFACCARFORMARFORAFFORNAVFORJTF/ “xxx”
The GCC/CC supported by the GCC/J-Staff will be responsible for all combat and noncombat activities and operations of the U.S. armed forces in the USPEGOM AOR. Using COCOM authority, the GCC will have complete and nontransferable authority to conduct those operations of command over established forces including assigning and applying commands and forces, delegating tasks, and providing authoritative oversight over all facets of military activities, logistics, and joint training. The GCC/CC will employ commands and forces as necessary to accomplish the anticipated objectives of overcoming the blockades of the Tangy Strait chokepoint and Caballos Port, overthrow enemy forces inhabiting Ringneck Island and eliminate them, as well as execute successful Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations to buttress efforts by the Neptune government to eradicate the Sons of the Trident insurgency. Moreover, the GCC/CC will establish the Joint Task Force (JTF), which will be responsible for establishing and organizing attached forces using OPCON command authority to carry out joint functions and accomplish the anticipated objectives.
The JTF will comprise of service and functional components: the JTF organizational structure will capitalize on the unique capacities of each components to accomplish specific tasks in the crisis. JTF service components will include the Air Force Forces Command (AFFOR), Area Forecasts (ARFOR), Marine Corps Forces (MARFOR), and Navy Forces Command (NAVFOR). The Service component commanders will fulfil the Services support function by taking charge of all facets of planning and implementing operations as directed by the JTF (Estrada, 2005). In addition to accomplishing assigned operational missions, the service component commanders will also be responsible for choosing specific units for attachment to other subordinate commands as well as informing the JTF and other supporting commanders of any logistical support changes that might significantly impact operational capacity or the planning process (Joint Task Force Headquarters, 2018). The functional components of the JTF will include the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), and the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC).
The JFACC will establish both unity of effort and command for joint air operations by planning, delegating, and controlling joint air. On the other hand, the JFLCC will exercise command over land operations including all service components participating in the land operations. Conversely, the JFMCC will have authority over attached forces and assets made available for conducting maritime operational missions. Functional component commanders will control military operations and exercise TACON command authority as delegated by JTF over assigned military forces or capabilities. The functional component commanders will advise the JTF on the best use of the military capabilities allocated to achieve the anticipated objectives. They will also be responsible for reporting events and agents in the Joint Operational Area (JOA) (Pearce, 2018). The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) will employ forces from the Special Operations Forces (SOF), the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) will employ forces from the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) and Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB).
On the other hand, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) will employ forces from the Surface Action Group (SAG), Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), and the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Those functional components employing different service forces should have a flexible structure to allow expansion and contraction under varying conditions without compromising capability or coordination (Ratliff, 1994). While the JTF will retain OPCON command authority over these service forces, the functional component commanders will have TACON command authority limited to the detailed direction of movements within the operational area as well as use of combat support assets for the delegated task.
Part 2
Based upon the scenario and available forces, as well as the anticipated objectives, one of the capabilities of the available service in relation to objectives is its qualitatively superior military capacity. The training, doctrine, and upkeep of Saturn’s forces is significantly below those of Neptune and the U.S. In addition to relying on aging Soviet military doctrine, Saturn is currently employing a mix of newer Chinese and dated Soviet manufacture, particularly in its air force, as compared to the allies’ largely modern air force assets. Besides, while Saturn has an extensive air force, it lacks air-to-air refueling assets, a critical advantage that available U.S. forces have. Available forces also have an advantage over Saturn’s forces in the form of a marine unit, supported by a relatively strong air power. Although Saturn has invested heavily in its amphibious assault as evidenced by its two battalions of Marines, three large amphibious troop ships, and one amphibious cargo vessel, available U.S. marine forces, while centered around only one battalion landing team, are better supported by a formidable air force.
Another source of advantage is U.S.’s sophisticated SOF unit. Saturn has a company-sized SOF that is currently believed to be aiding and training the Sons of the Trident insurgency, but it is not as effective as their U.S. counterparts. Moreover, although Neptune lacks any militarily significant capability in space or cyberspace, its IT infrastructure is superior to Saturn’s, whose space and cyber space capability is also unknown. On the other hand, based upon the scenario and available forces, as well as the anticipated objectives, one of the limitations of the available service in relation to objectives is its quantitatively lower military capacity. Saturn’s military still outnumbers available forces. Besides, while almost all of Neptune’s forces have taken part in periodic multilateral and bilateral defense exercises with U.S. forces, they are unable to conduct independent operations on a large scale or along major multiple lines of effort even if. Neptune’s modest maritime force of three modern...