Canadian Democratic Problem, Friendly Dictatorship

Canadian Democratic Problem
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Canadian Democratic Problem
For almost two decades now, there have been huge controversies surrounding the various decisions made by Prime Ministers in regard to the operations of the House of Commons in Canada. According to pundits and critics, the decisions have been on attempts of helping either the premier or ruling party advance their agendas in case the opposition appears to be too strong or escape accountability to their actions. Examples of such actions include the dissolution of the House of Commons in the years 2003, 2008, 2009; calling for earlier elections in 2000 and 2008 with the latter happening even after the prime minister promised to do away with this during the campaign period; and proroguing the House of Commons to avoid a vote of non-confidence in the Prime Minister. It is true this questions that various scholars, pundits, critics and the general public have questioned whether too much power is concentrated at the office of the Prime Ministers. Some have even asked where the prime ministers acquire these powers from. With the help of scholars and pundits, the Prime Ministers draw these might powers from the reserve powers which allows them to make arbitrary decisions. Exercising prerogative powers have resulted in an undermined democracy in Canada and it is becoming a norm. from the manner in which the recent prime ministers have exercised their prerogative powers, it can be said that too much power is concentrated in the office of the prime minister.
The Canadian parliamentary system of Canada is facing fundamental problems that are undermining its democracy. Too much power is concentrated in the office of the prime minister especially over the operations of the House of Commons. In the Canadian government system, the House of Commons is the parliamentary assembly of representatives who have been elected to represent the citizens in the government (Smith, 2007). In this regard, concentrating too much power in the office of the prime minister over the House of Commons in a democratic like Canada is a problem. Uncontrolled power in any type of a government may lead to abuse of power. Moreover, abuse of power diminishes democracy of a country. Based on some of the constitutional conventions, the prime minister is allowed to exercise the reserve powers. This paper focuses on the concentrated power in the office of the prime minister by examining some of the specific powers that allow prime ministers to overrule Parliaments, hindering the MPs from performing the duty. The core responsibility of the MPs is to ensure that the government is accountable to the citizens. The paper will conclude by explaining some of the reforms that should be undertaken to correct this problem.
The sweeping powers (reserve powers) have been and will continue to be the source of might powers that are only left to the governor general (Carter, 2015). In few occasions, prime ministers have exercised these powers to summon, prorogue and dissolve the House of Commons (Carter, 2015). This demonstrates that the prime minister have unconstrained power in deciding when the House should perform its duties as provided by the constitution. Therefore, accessing these powers lenders a sitting prime minister a political advantage over both minority and majority circumstances (Simpson, 2011).
The Canadian constitution does not give a clear relationship between the governor-general and the prime minister, thus it is not helpful in determining who should exercise the reserve powers (Russell, 2011). Generally, the prime minister draws his might from these powers. In the Canadian parliamentary government system, the prime minister is the one who controls the day-to-day activities of the House. Besides allowing the government to set the agendas, it further allows it to carry them in a smooth manner. In the House, the prime minister enjoys strong loyalty from the MPs, which he gets by rewarding those who are co-operative. Through this approach, the prime minister is allowed to award those who are loyal to him with either cabinet posts or appointing them to important committees. Additionally, he has the powers to punish those who are not loyal by either removing them from the House or barring them from running as candidates of the party in any future elections (Lagassé, 2012). These powers are all concentrated in the office of the prime minister. The party numbers in the House has no leverage over the powers of the prime minister because party leaders are appointed and replaced by the party that has the majority in the House. Based on this, the MPs have no base through which they can stand against a powerful leader to represent their constituents in an effective manner (Snow, 2012).
Instead of being like a presidential executive government system, these powers have made the prime ministers to be like the historical monarchs. Therefore, the Canadian democracy evolution is like the story of taking away the powers of the Crown and giving them to Parliament to check on the unconstrained power of the prime minister. The ability to access, exercise and retain these powers is leading to a situation where the office of the prime minister to have the power to make certain decisions that limit the Parliament from performing its sole role of accountability (Snow, 2012).
The prime minister has the power to disrupt the operations of the House such as postpone the vote of non-confidence against the government to avoid being held accountable for misusing public resources. An example is when Prime Minister Harper prorogued Parliament in December 2008 by postponing the intention of three opposition parties from defeating his government based on a vote of non-confidence. Again in December 2009, he prorogued parliament for several weeks to avoid being held accountable for misleading the House in the issue of detainees in Afghanistan (Aucoin, Turnbull, & Jarvis, 2011).
Prime ministers are likely to abuse these prerogative powers by using them for their personal or partisan advantages. However, when the prime minister has abused these reserve powers, Canadian politicians, pundits and scholars disagree on the constitutional bases of these abuses. Majority of the recent prime ministers have bused these powers. The first prime minister to abuse them was Prime Minister Joe Clark when he failed to summon parliament for 142 days after the 1979 elections (Aucoin, Turnbull, & Jarvis, 2011).
The power to call early or snap elections is also concentrated on the office of the prime ministers. They are permitted to call elections during times that are favorable or postpone them when times are not favorable to their party. An example is when the Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper called for an early elections in 2008 merely two years after the...