The Criminal Justice System in Its Environment

Disciplinary Assignment: The Criminal Justice System in Its Environment
Name
University
CJUS 520
Professor
December 8, 2022
Memorandum-Part 1
TO: Recipient Name
FROM: _____
DATE: November 13, 2022
SUBJECT:
Main Issues: Brady v. Maryland U.S. 83 (1963)
In this hearing within the Maryland Court, the judges made their ruling based on the presented facts material to the case and the United States constitution. However, the court questioned the admissibility of the tabled evidence as the petitioner, and their crime partner faced first-degree murder charges and was accorded capital punishment. In this case, the petitioner accepted to having committed the offense, indicating that his crime partner was the one that committed the real killing. Based on this account, the judges and the complainant’s attorney accepted that the complainant was liable to be held guilty for the offense relating the first-degree murder and requested only that the judges make a ruling that is devoid of capital punishment. During this hearing, the claimant’s jury lobbied the prosecutor to let him evaluate the mate’s extrajudicial sentiments. A great deal of these were turned over to him, but the prosecution withheld the one in which the mate admitted to having committed the actual murder and was not brought to the petitioner’s knowledge until after his trial, conviction, and sentencing, as well as after the Maryland Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction. In a proceeding following the conviction, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor’s act to suppress the evidence undermined the petitioner’s due process of the law (Brockway, 2013). It remanded the case for a fresh trial regarding the punishment question instead of the guilt question because they believed that nothing within the repressed confession “could have undermined [petitioner’s] offense under the killing in the first degree” (Brockway, 2013). It was held that the petitioner was not denied the constitutional right when their fresh trial was constrained to the punishment question, and the judgment was affirmed. Suppression via the prosecution of favorable evidence to the defendant who had lobbied it undermines due process in contexts where evidence remains material to punishment or guilty, irrespective of the prosecution’s bad faith or good faith. The decision by the Court of Appeals to restrict the petitioner’s fresh trial to the punishment question did not violate their due process right or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because the suppressed evidence was admissible solely on the punishment issue (Crump, 2016). The U.S. Supreme Court rules that suppressing evidence that could tilt the case in favor of the defendant upon request violates Amendment Fourteen’s due process mandate. This is because the evidence was material to punishment or guilt, irrespective of whether the government concealed it in bad or good faith. Evidence suppression violated Brady’s right to due process and, thus, the opportunity for the subsequent trial.
Main Issues: Giglio v. United States U.S. 150 (1972)
When trials relate to one individual’s testimony against another, the judge must establish who to believe. In contexts where the prosecution witness had made a covenant to testify in return for immunity or leniency from the prosecution, such a deal could influence the witness’s credibility before the court. In this case, the petitioner filed the motion for a fresh trial based on the discovered evidence indicating that the government did not disclose the alleged leniency promise made to its primary witness in exchange for his testimony. During the motion hearing, the Assistant United States Attorney presenting the case to the selected jury acknowledged that they assured the witness that they would not prosecute them once they testified before the jury during the trial. The Assistant trying the case was not informed about the promise. It was held that the behavior of the Assistant to fail to inform his associates and superiors, as well as their lack of authority, was not controlling, and the prosecution’s responsibility to present all the relevant material evidence to the grand jury was not met, and thus constituted a violation of the constitutional due process prompting a fresh trial (Library of Congress, n.d. [a]). More specifically, the court held that the exculpatory evidence incorporated evidence impacting the witness’s credibility in scenarios where their reliability is probable and determinative of the innocence or guilt (Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, 2014). When the witness’s reliability is determinative of innocence or guilt, non-disclosure of the evidence influencing the credibility falls in the rule irrespective of whether withheld in good faith or otherwise. Overall, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Assistant’s inability to exercise authority or inform their associates or superiors could be termed as controlling and the prosecuting attorney failed to fulfill their duty to table all the evidence material to the jury’s final decision. In this way, such actions violated due process, thus warranting a new trial (Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, 2014). The Supreme Court finally held that the agreement evidence influenced the witness’ validity and credibility.
Main Issues: United States v. Agurs U.S 97 (1976)
In this case, the defendant was charged with second-degree murder for stabbing Sewell to death in a brawl. Evidence tabled during the hearing indicated, among other things, that the victim had been wielding two knives before he was murdered. The respondent used one of those knives to stab the victim repeatedly, leading to his death. As a result, the respondent’s counsel lobbied for a fresh trial, indicating based on the evidence that Sewell had a criminal history and had pleaded guilty to wielding a deadly weapon and assault, arguing that the responded was acting defend themselves and that the prosecuting attorney did not share such knowledge to the defense attorney. In this context, the District Court declined the gesture based on the grounds that Sewell’s criminality evidence was immaterial since it illuminated his character not clearly indicated in the uncontradictory evidence, especially the fact that he was wielding two knives. In addition, the court stressed that the self-defense argument was inconsistent and that Sewell was stabbed repeatedly while the perpetrator remained unhurt (Library of Congress, n.d. [b]). The Court of Appeals reversed this ruling, noting the materiality threshold of Sewell’s criminal history and that the fact that it was not shared promoted the need for a fresh trial since the judges might have made a different ruling based on the tabled evidence (Amato & Jones, n.d.). It was held that the prosecutor’s action of not tendering Sewell’s criminality history to the defense attorney did not deny the respondent a fair and just trial as provided in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. After the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision, the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision. It ruled that for purposes of the defendant’s right to due process and fair trial, ...