Collaboration and Information Sharing Within HSINT

Collaboration and Information Sharing Within HSINT
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Collaboration and Information Sharing Within HSINT
Introduction
The 9/11 attack will forever remain fresh in the minds of many Americans. This attack on the World Trade Center in New York brought about changes that have influenced the state of security intelligence in the U.S. for the past two decades. The attack led to a direct and specific focus on how intelligence on security was collected, analyzed, shared, and acted upon at every level in the country. Before the 9/11 attack, the country had two distinct levels of intelligence. These included domestic intelligence, which mainly included intelligence that was collected by the police and was considered local or applicable within the country (Randol, 2009). Randol continues to note that there was also foreign intelligence, which mainly included all intelligence that was collected outside of the country. However, after the 9/11 attack, it became clear that there was a need to merge the two because the information collected outside or within the U.S. proved crucial to the maintenance of security in the country. The attack and others, like the Boston marathon attack, showed that there was a need to combine the efforts of all intelligence agencies to ensure security in the U.S. is ensured. As Randol (2009) notes, the importance of aspects of collaboration and information sharing increased immensely after 9/11 as homeland security intelligence (HSINT) became increasingly connected at all levels. Currently, every piece of information collected at any level of government is taken with a touch of seriousness and urgency that was not there before. As Bjelopera (2011) indicates, “information acquired for one purpose, or under one set of authorities might provide unique insights when combined, in accordance with applicable law, with seemingly unrelated information from other sources.” The statement above brings about the importance with which every piece of intelligence is taken, and also reveals how the ideals of collaboration and information within HSINT lead to an intertwined web of intelligence sharing. Provided herein is a discussion of the depth of collaboration and information sharing within HSINT and the changes, transitions, and challenges to the same. Further, this paper will also offer recommendations on how information sharing will be enhanced to help prevent future terrorist attacks.
Intelligence Collection Disciplines
As already indicated, intelligence collection today has been subdivided into different sections and involves everyone in the U.S. Security decisions that concern the national security of the entire country are guided or influenced by the information share is collected and shared at all levels of governance. However, the collection disciplines happen to be quite a number, and these basically mean the levels of intelligence that is collected within the U.S. There are two major disciplines that showcase the intelligence collection disciplines. These two include the technical and non-technical. Examples of technical means include imagery intelligence or IMINT, signals intelligence or SIGINT, and measurement and signatures intelligence or MASINT (Randol, 2009). On the other hand, non-technical means are the ones that mainly involve people, and examples include open-source intelligence (OSINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) (Randol, 2009). These two are used interchangeably or where applicable to help reveal or determine how best to protect the country. Human intelligence can be combined with signals intelligence to help reveal a threat or the connection between the parties involved. However, it is crucial to mention that all the above would not be possible without the establishment of the Homeland Security Federal Information Sharing Environment. With this environment, it became increasingly possible for the different entities to be sharing intelligence at all levels.
Information Sharing Environment
The presence of different entities in a complex and diverse society like the United States made it increasingly difficult to find ways to facilitate collaboration and sharing of intelligence. It created a need for the country to develop a platform that could allow the different entities at all levels to work together to create an intelligence community that was continuously sharing information within itself. Therefore, this led to the establishment of the Information Sharing Environment or ISE, which brought about a seamless or unified flow of intelligence. Congress was behind the initiative to start an ISE that could then facilitate and consolidate information collection to help counter-terrorism in the country. As Bjelopera (2011) indicates, a collaborative environment was needed to help ensure that information flowed fast and was in the right hands at the right time, so that necessary action could be taken. This came through the signing of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Tobin, 2005). Tobin writes that this reform was “designed to improve the collection and dissemination of intelligence and the coordination of counter-terrorism activity while protecting sources and methods and respecting privacy and civil liberties.” While it cannot be said that the implementation of the Act has been a success, the initiative was welcomed as it laid the foundation for an intelligence community. The ISE has given birth to several other programs that are helping ensure that intelligence sharing is a continuous process. An example of one program that spells out crucial aspects or tips that help ensure heightened collaboration includes the Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP).
The 9/11 Commission Report of 2004
The 9/11 Commission Report of 2004 made recommendations that are critical in enhancing information sharing. The report acknowledged that the US government has access to a vast amount of information. Despite such details, the US government had a weak system for processing and using what it had. For instance, the undistributed National Security Agency (NSA) information that would have assisted in identifying Nawaf al Hazmi in January 2000 and subsequently prevented the 9/11 attack was not shared (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 200). Given such challenges to information sharing, the report recommended the following. Firstly, information procedures should offer incentives for sharing gathered intelligence. Reports should be in the form that allows a maximum number of people to access them. According to Menges, Putz & Pernul (2020), a decentralized data model would ensure that databases from different agencies are searchable across agency lines. Such a database should have its secrets protected through control to access to data, where one cannot access the whole network. Secondly, the President should lead efforts aimed at ensuring that the various agencies share information. The report identified presidential leadership as critical in developing government-wide concepts and standards. The leadership of the President is necessary for developing the essential policy and legal issues for information sharing.
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA)
IRTPA amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) to allow the FBI to get wiretaps and undertake secret searches on terrorist suspects who have no connection to a foreign power. The change aimed to enable the FBI to deal with lone actors who may be sympathetic to formal terrorist groups. The provision was meant to increase the FBI’s ability to target individuals suspected of terrorism activities (Hedrich, 2007). Additionally, IRTPA made it a crime to offer material support that a donor is aware will be utilized in terrorism activities. Whether in the form of financial assets, training, safe house, or communication, IRTPA criminalizes such acts. Further, IRTPA assisted in organizing the intelligence community (IC) and mandated the establishment of the process aimed at improving information sharing among the IC and state officials (Hedrich, 2007). This included establishing the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position to serve as the head of the IC and be the President’s chief advisor in matters of intelligence. The DNI is supposed to ensure the coordination and integration of the agencies that make up the IC. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) establishment to serve as a multiagency center in analyzing intelligence reading terrorism would ensure that such information reaches the appropriate agencies for action.
National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (NSISS)
NSISS acknowledges that valid constraints on sharing information exist. When dealing with sensitive information, restrictions have to be imposed to ensure that information does not get into the wrong hands. State governments and the private sector may impose limitations on the dissemination of crucial information. NSISS also identifies a lack of network interoperability as a huge barrier when sharing information across departments and agencies (United States White House Office, 2012). Because of differences in policies and technological assets, authorizes users are unable to gain information. Overcoming the challenge of information sharing requires shared risk management. Instead of avoiding risk, a...