Introduction to Law Case Briefs

Introduction to Law Case Briefs
Nelson v. Lewis
TOPIC: Strict Liability.
CASE: Nelson v. Lewis, 344 N.E.2d 268, 36 Ill.App.3d 130 (1976).
FACTS: The plaintiff, Jo Anne Nelson, a two-and-a-half-year-old girl, was playing in the defendant's backyard with other children, including the defendant's daughter. While playing, the plaintiff accidentally stepped on the defendant's dog's tail. The large Dalmatian, which had been chewing a bone, reacted viciously by scratching the plaintiff's left eye. She suffered permanent damage to the tear duct as a result of the attack. There was no evidence that anyone had teased or aggravated the dog before the incident. Further, there was no evidence that the dog had ever attacked anyone.
HISTORY: The plaintiff filed a suit seeking damages, which the circuit court dismissed. She appealed on the ground that her unintentional act did not amount to provocation.
ISSUE: Can the plaintiff’s unintentional act constitute provocation.
RULING: Yes. The statute upon which the plaintiff based her arguments did not distinguish between intentional and unintentional provocation. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the verdict delivered by the circuit court.
RATIONALE: The court contended that within the plain meaning of the “dog-bite” statute, unintentional provocation would appear to constitute provocation. The court, in this regard, concluded that the defendant’s claim that an unintentional act constituted provocation was consistent with the statute. The court also factored in the fact that the dog was of quiet temperament and disposition. It did not have a history of having attacked anybody else before the incident.
RULE: The judges relied on the “dog-bite” statute that in part states that the owner of a dog or any other animal can only be liable for damages if the animal attacks someone without provocation. In this case, it was determined that the dog had been provoked.
Marbury v. Madison
TOPIC: Judicial Review.
CASE: Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
FACTS: In January 1801, after President John Adams lost his re-election bid, he nominated his close advisor, John Marshall, to fill the seat of Chief Justice. Even though Marshall did not have prior experience as a judge, his nomination was overwhelmingly approved by the U.S. senate. After that, President Adams embarked on filling many other judiciary positions with his supporters before his exit. He nominated 42 men as judges of peace but did not manage to deliver the commissions of four of them in good time. Among the four was William Marbury who was a Virginia politician. After Jefferson took office, he ordered his secretary of state, James Madison, to withhold the four undelivered commissions. This prompted Marbury to file a suit to get his job. However, instead of going to the circuit court, he opted for the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Did Marbury and the other four appointees have a right to their commissions?
Did the Supreme Court have a remedy to the problem?
RULING: Under the leadership of Marshall, the court found that the rights of the plaintiff had been violated. However, the court that it had no jurisdiction in such a case as it could only act as an appeals court. The suit was, therefore, dismissed.
RATIONALE: Since the plaintiff's rights had been violated, he had the right to sue and seek remedy. However, such a remedy could only be gotten from a federal judge who had had the authority to issue a writ authorizing Jefferson to acknowledge the appointments. The plaintiff would have gotten a better hearing at the circuit court.
RULE: The judges relied on Article 3, Section 2 of the Constitution, which stipulates that the court had jurisdictions in limited types of cases and could only act as an appeals court in all other types of cases. Marbury's case fell in the category of "others."
McCulloch v. Maryland
TOPIC: Scope of Legislative Power.
CASE: McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
FACTS: After the U.S. Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States in 1816, several branches were opened countrywide, including one in Baltimore, Maryland. Consequently, the state of Maryland imposed a tax on the bank. A cashier, James McCulloch, who worked at the Baltimore branch, refused to pay the tax. The state filed a suit against the cashier for lack of compliance. It argued that it was entitled to tax any business that fell within its borders.
HISTORY: The Baltimore County court determined that McCulloch had violated the state laws and ruled in favor of the state of Maryland. The case was moved to the court of appeals, which upheld the lower court's decision. The case was further moved to the Supreme Court.
 ISSUE: Whether a state government can enact a tax on a federal institution chartered by congress.
RULING: The state government had no authority to impose tax on a federal institution. So doing would effectively compromise federal legislative law. The Supreme Court reversed the earlier ruling.
RATIONALE: The court held that the constitution, though limited in its powers, supersedes all the other laws. In this regard, a state government cannot interfere with the operations of the constitutional laws instituted by congress. That meant the state of Maryland violated the constitution by imposing tax on the national bank.
RULE: The Supreme Court judges relied heavily on the constitution, and in particular, the “Necessary and Proper" clause, which states that it affords the U.S. federal government certain implied powers that are not explicitly expressed in the constitution.
Curtis v. Loether
TOPIC: Right to Jury Trial.
CASE: Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S. Ct. 1005 (1974).
FACTS: The petitioner filed a civil rights suit against the respondents under section 812 of the Civil Rights Act. Being a black woman, she claimed that the respondents refused to rent an apartment to her because of her race. She sought injunctive relief and punitive damages and later added a claim for compensatory damages.
HISTORY: The respondents requested a jury trial at the district court and were turned down. This prompted them to appeal, whereby the court of appeals reversed the district court's decision. The petitioner moved the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Were the respondents entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment?
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court declared that under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the petitioner’s action was a tort one since it was a damages action. As such, the Seventh Amendment served to preserve the respondent’s right to a jury trial. Therefore, the court affirmed the appeals court decision.
RATIONALE: The judges argued that according to the Seventh Amendment, the right to a jury trial should be awarded to any party upon demand if the value in controversy exceeds 20 dollars. They further argued that the amendment extended to suits in which legal rights were the bone of contention. The judges also contended that since this was a suit seeking damages, it was within the spectrum of tort cases and was, therefore, recognizable action at common law. Despi...