Air Power Theorist: Most Relevant to Current and Projected Security Challenges

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AirPower Theorist: Most Relevant To Current and Projected Security Challenges
The 20th century saw a shift from an industrial to an informational society. Advancements in computer and communications technologies fueled the steady shift. The end of WWII coincident with the dawn of the Informational Age. The industrial revolution changed the aspect of wealth creation and war-making. The Wright brother's historic flight in 1903 encouraged people to seek more ways to exploit the airplane in war. Airpower theorists have viewed the airplane as an essential weapon that can undertake various missions, from dropping troops to striking deep into the adversary's camps. The plane is highly flexible, creating different worldviews on how it can be utilized to maximize its potential. The application of airpower has been met with controversies. Changes in technology have led to changes in the dynamics of airpower and hence shifting the application of airpower theories accordingly. Airpower theorists have disagreed sharply on utilizing airpower to achieve optimum results. This paper focuses on prominent airpower theorists Gorrell, Mitchell, Pape, Boyd, and Warden and outlines the Theorist whose ideas are more relevant in dealing with the current and projected threats.
Edgar S. Gorrell
Gorrell's plan was instrumental in advancing the ideas of airpower in the United States. Gorrell's theory advocates for specific strategic bombing objectives against the main targets of the enemy. In essence, a survey should be done to determine the most vital industries of the enemy (Cody 5). A study should outline how one industry is dependent on another. In other words, the choice of the target is the most delicate part of the operation. The ultimate aim is to cause a high level of destruction in a few essential industries instead of causing a small level of destruction in many industries (Cody 6).
John Boyd
Boyd focused his attention on paralysis through control warfare. Boyd's theory of conflict proposes a more psychological and temporal maneuver than physical and spatial. The ultimate aim is to break the spirit and will of the enemy via surprising and dangerous operations. Specifically, Boyd proposes an approach that disorients the mind of the enemy command by disrupting how command and control are done. He represents the process in the form of the observe–orient–decide–act (OODA) loop. Here, Boyd appreciates that victory is achieved by having a temporal advantage over the enemy in transitioning to the OODA loop, leading to psychological paralysis in the opponent's decision-making process (Fadok 16). This is done where one operates at a faster tempo compared to the adversaries. Boyd aims to deny the opponent the ability to cope with war's rapidly unfolding and uncertain circumstances. Once one creates a highly fluid environment, this creates an opportunity to hinder the enemy's ability to cope in such an environment.
Boyd further insists on maximizing friction in the enemy's camp while minimizing the same on one's side. Minimizing friendly friction entails acting quicker than the enemy (Fadok 14). The move is attained via exercising initiative at the lower levels of command. The decentralized approach needs to be guided by a centralized command. This is critical in ensuring a shared vision of a single commander's aim, achieving a strategic harmony among the tactical actions. Maximizing enemy friction entails attacking a variety of enemy actions rapidly. The aim is to overload the adversary's capacity to deal with more threatening events. The opponent is ultimately mentally incapacitated, hence crushing his will to resist.
John Warden
Warden believes that one cannot establish a coherent plan by commencing from the lower tactical level. He indicates that strategic thinking differs from the traditional approach planners have used to approach war. Instead, Warden indicates the need to start at the top by studying the enemy to understand his strategic objectives and nature. With this information available, one can deductively analyze the situation at hand. Warden advocates for deductive thinking as the force behind airpower strategy. Warden proposes that one must view the enemy as a system comprising various subsystems. Here, the focus should be on the totality of the adversary while being careful to avoid the outlined objectives becoming the enemies. A focus on the totality of the enemy entails having a good understanding of his composition (Warden 67). Information about their structure, geographical location, culture, and other important aspects is important in identifying where airpower should be concentrated. Warden identifies leadership as an important component. All organizations rely on someone or a group of individuals who control and direct the process. Destroying or incapacitating the leadership would bring down the entire organization. The strategic aim is to force the leadership to make concessions because of the force applied. In other words, one should focus on inflicting psychological pressure on the leader's minds, hence forcing them to comply with one's will.
Warden's theory posits that the essential ring is leadership, and hence incapacitating it makes the rest of the system useless and unable to function. However, not all systems have leadership as an essential aspect. For instance, a country like the United States has a highly redundant military and political structure. At the same time, the population is a major decision-maker. Hence, attacking an organization's leadership with a high level of redundancy would not yield many results.
Robert Pape
Pape agrees with Warden that the ultimate goal of any military action is forcing the adversary to comply with one's wil...