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Is It Impermissible to Kill an Innocent Threat in Self-Defense
Essay Instructions:
The midterm paper must be 2,800-3,000 words in length. You are required to submit the essay via Blackboard. There will be a penalty of one letter grade increment for every day after the deadline an essay is submitted. Further details regarding assessment and late penalties are available in the syllabus and from your TA.
Answer ONE AND ONLY ONE of the following questions:
1. “It is impermissible to kill an innocent threat in self-defense because it is impermissible to kill a bystander in self-defense, and the killing of an innocent threat and a bystander are on a par as far as permissibility is concerned.” Explain and evaluate this claim.
2. “Both Conscientious Driver and Mistaken Resident are liable to defensive harm because each makes a responsible choice to engage in a riskimposing activity that they can foresee might result in fact-relative wrongful harm.” Explain and evaluate this claim.
3. “If we accept Bazargan’s complex account of liability to defensive harm, then we must also accept that Minimally Responsible Threateners cannot be permissibly killed in self-defense since MRT’s relatively low degree of responsibility means that they are liable to only relatively modest levels of defensive harm.” Explain and evaluate this claim.
4. “Necessity is internal to liability, that is, a person can never be liable to defensive harm that is unnecessary.” Explain and evaluate this claim.
5. “It is, other things being equal, morally worse to harm someone as a means to an end because this form of harming involves compelling a person to serve an end that she is permitted to reject for herself.” Explain and evaluate this claim.
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Is Killing of an Innocent Permissible: A Philosophical Review
Introduction
The moral and philosophical debate over the justification of killing an innocent threat in self-defense has been a prominent issue of political philosophy and sociology, especially in the modern world, as it aims to provide a reasonable and justifiable answer to killing people by law enforcement agencies and citizens in self-defense. Unlike the anticipated stance, several philosophical propositions subscribe to the view that killing an innocent threat is justifiable if the threat poses an impending danger to someone’s life (Otsuka 74). Even when the person to kill does not have an immoral intention to threaten a person, this school of thought allows a person to kill him if the person perceives an impending threat from this morally innocent person (Ford 2). Hence, this philosophical proposition justifies killing a morally innocent bystander as it supports a person’s right to kill in self-defense.
On the contrary, I argue that this seemingly appropriate philosophical proposition entails several moral and philosophical flaws, and for the same reason, it is liable to be rejected based on better and more rational philosophical arguments. One of the loopholes in this argument that I propose is that it uses the proposition “choosing a lesser evil” philosophy to kill a morally innocent threat; however, this proposition is not justifiable as a defender is liable to respect a person’s human right to living a secured life (McMahan (a) 386).
Moreover, a person does not deserve to be killed if he or she is morally innocent and has no control over the circumstances, which shows them an impending lethal threat (Otsuka 74). Hence, based on these rational arguments, one may defend the proposition that killing a morally innocent individual is reciprocal to killing an innocent bystander. For the same reason, it is not morally or even legally permissible.
Arguments Justifying the Killing of a Morally Innocent Bystander
One of the arguments that proponents of killing self-defense promote is centered on the lack or presence of human rights to live. In this regard, this argument proposes that if a person X intends some actions that may violate a defender’s right to live, then the X loses his right to live, and the defender is permitted to kill this threat (Doggett 1). Furthermore, this view supposes that even if someone poses a threat but does not materialize it, that person violates universal rights and deserves to be killed even if the person is not morally responsible for that threat (Doggett 2). Hence, this aspect of the argument justifies killing a morally innocent threat using the condition that deprives a person of his human rights.
The argument in favor of permitting killing a morally innocent bystander further posits that killing an innocent bystander is not a reciprocal act to killing a morally innocent threat. To illustrate, suppose during a tornado, a projectile object is hurled toward a person, and the only way for a person to save his life is to use a sturdy bystander as a shield (Doggett 2). In this scenario, killing a bystander is not reciprocal to killing a morally innocent threat, as the former does not show any sign of threat to the person. Accordingly, without justifying why a person kills a person, his act of killing in self-defense is not justifiable, as in the case of the bystander (Doggett 1). Therefore, a person who kills a morally innocent person is justifiable as the reason why he kills him.
The question of moral innocence as the reason to justify not killing an impending threat also generates an argument to favor killing a morally innocent person. Accordingly, this argument posits that since a projectile or a rolling ball is morally innocent as they do not inherently intend to harm a person, killing the stone or projectile would be unjustifiable since they are morally innocent (Doggett 2). Hence, this aspect of the issue justifies killing a morally innocent threat since, even without his knowing, he poses a threat to another person’s life.
The right of self-defense is also supportable through another dimension of the justification of killing a morally innocent person. Based on this justification, an unjust threat justifies a defender in killing a morally innocent threat; for instance, this argument entails that a morally innocent person is morally obliged not to pose a deadly threat to a defender (Ford 1). Therefore, when a morally innocent person inadvertently poses a deadly threat to a person, he loses his right not to be killed. Hence, when a person threatens a defender, he breaks up or distorts the moral symmetry between the two and deserves to be killed in preemptive retaliation (Ford 2). In light of these arguments, it becomes clear that proponents of killing in self-defense use the rationale of human rights and moral-based rights violations to support their claim.
Arguments Justifying the Impermissibility of Killing a Morally Innocent Threat
Regardless of the justification of the argument that killing an innocent threat is justifiable, I believe that it suffers from loopholes and philosophical drawbacks, which reinforce the thesis killing under these circumstances is not justifiable. One of the arguments that support killing a morally innocent threat is that his action, which poses a grave threat to someone’s life, deprives him of the right of protection against killing. In other words, regardless of his moral innocence, such a person deserves death, as he is liable for such a punishment (McMahan (b) 386). However, a person liable to be killed differs from a person who deserves to be killed, and this difference refutes the argument in favor of killing in self-defense.
When a person deserves to be killed, it implies that one has a strong reason to kill that person, whether he is capable of killing him or not. Conversely, I propose that liability is a broader term and entails that a person may be liable to be killed, but at the same time, he may not deserve to be killed (McMahan (b) 386). Using this liability proposition, a scholar builds up an argument against killing morally innocent people in self-defense; according to his argument, the liability of a person to be killed allows a defender to kill that person even though the person does not intentionally produce any threat to the defender (McMahan (b) 386). Hence, this liability to be killed violates the rights of the person.
To illustrate this complexity associated with liability proposition, I must present examples from imaginary life situations. Suppose an identical twin brother of a notorious killer faces a situation where he has to take shelter in a remote residence. After opening the door, the resident mistakes him for his identical killer brother and kills him (McMahan (b) 387). Under this scenario, the philosophical and moral justification for killing the twin broth of a notorious killer becomes highly complex and nearly inexplicable.
To elaborate on this complexity, I may refer to the in-depth understanding of the underlying factors behind this problem. For instance, when the resident aims to shoot the twin, even though he is justified and morally innocent in his assumption, he would violate the twin’s right to live (McMahan (b) 387). Moreover, the resident’s deadly threat to the twin makes the twin justified in killing the resident. Otherwise, he would violate the twin’s right to live and not be killed even under a completely excusable misunderstanding (McMahan (b) 387). Hence, even though the residents have all the right to live and not to be killed, his innocent state makes him liable to be killed by the twin.
Hence, a right-based explanation of the liability of the twine and the resident makes the understanding and justification of the act of killing in self-defense more objectionable and controversial. Therefore, I posit that such an interpretation of killing an innocent threat using fundamental human rights creates more problems than it solves. Another similar example further accentuates the invalidity of right-based justification of killing an innocent threat. I would suppose that a fat man is sunbathing on a cliff under which another person is basking on the beach (McMahan (b) 388). However, one of the fat man’s friends pushes him off the cliff, and he falls on the man lying underneath the cliff (McMahan (b) 388). This condition creates even more perplexing issues regarding the right-based justification of killing an innocent threat.
In this regard, I may argue that if the person lying on the beach uses his umbrella to impale the fat man and kill him, he commits an impermissible act of killing an innocent threat, which would be reciprocal to killing an innocent bystander. To illustrate, I may posit that even though the fat man would kill you, he is morally innocent, as his intent is not to kill you ...
Professor’s Name
Course
Date
Is Killing of an Innocent Permissible: A Philosophical Review
Introduction
The moral and philosophical debate over the justification of killing an innocent threat in self-defense has been a prominent issue of political philosophy and sociology, especially in the modern world, as it aims to provide a reasonable and justifiable answer to killing people by law enforcement agencies and citizens in self-defense. Unlike the anticipated stance, several philosophical propositions subscribe to the view that killing an innocent threat is justifiable if the threat poses an impending danger to someone’s life (Otsuka 74). Even when the person to kill does not have an immoral intention to threaten a person, this school of thought allows a person to kill him if the person perceives an impending threat from this morally innocent person (Ford 2). Hence, this philosophical proposition justifies killing a morally innocent bystander as it supports a person’s right to kill in self-defense.
On the contrary, I argue that this seemingly appropriate philosophical proposition entails several moral and philosophical flaws, and for the same reason, it is liable to be rejected based on better and more rational philosophical arguments. One of the loopholes in this argument that I propose is that it uses the proposition “choosing a lesser evil” philosophy to kill a morally innocent threat; however, this proposition is not justifiable as a defender is liable to respect a person’s human right to living a secured life (McMahan (a) 386).
Moreover, a person does not deserve to be killed if he or she is morally innocent and has no control over the circumstances, which shows them an impending lethal threat (Otsuka 74). Hence, based on these rational arguments, one may defend the proposition that killing a morally innocent individual is reciprocal to killing an innocent bystander. For the same reason, it is not morally or even legally permissible.
Arguments Justifying the Killing of a Morally Innocent Bystander
One of the arguments that proponents of killing self-defense promote is centered on the lack or presence of human rights to live. In this regard, this argument proposes that if a person X intends some actions that may violate a defender’s right to live, then the X loses his right to live, and the defender is permitted to kill this threat (Doggett 1). Furthermore, this view supposes that even if someone poses a threat but does not materialize it, that person violates universal rights and deserves to be killed even if the person is not morally responsible for that threat (Doggett 2). Hence, this aspect of the argument justifies killing a morally innocent threat using the condition that deprives a person of his human rights.
The argument in favor of permitting killing a morally innocent bystander further posits that killing an innocent bystander is not a reciprocal act to killing a morally innocent threat. To illustrate, suppose during a tornado, a projectile object is hurled toward a person, and the only way for a person to save his life is to use a sturdy bystander as a shield (Doggett 2). In this scenario, killing a bystander is not reciprocal to killing a morally innocent threat, as the former does not show any sign of threat to the person. Accordingly, without justifying why a person kills a person, his act of killing in self-defense is not justifiable, as in the case of the bystander (Doggett 1). Therefore, a person who kills a morally innocent person is justifiable as the reason why he kills him.
The question of moral innocence as the reason to justify not killing an impending threat also generates an argument to favor killing a morally innocent person. Accordingly, this argument posits that since a projectile or a rolling ball is morally innocent as they do not inherently intend to harm a person, killing the stone or projectile would be unjustifiable since they are morally innocent (Doggett 2). Hence, this aspect of the issue justifies killing a morally innocent threat since, even without his knowing, he poses a threat to another person’s life.
The right of self-defense is also supportable through another dimension of the justification of killing a morally innocent person. Based on this justification, an unjust threat justifies a defender in killing a morally innocent threat; for instance, this argument entails that a morally innocent person is morally obliged not to pose a deadly threat to a defender (Ford 1). Therefore, when a morally innocent person inadvertently poses a deadly threat to a person, he loses his right not to be killed. Hence, when a person threatens a defender, he breaks up or distorts the moral symmetry between the two and deserves to be killed in preemptive retaliation (Ford 2). In light of these arguments, it becomes clear that proponents of killing in self-defense use the rationale of human rights and moral-based rights violations to support their claim.
Arguments Justifying the Impermissibility of Killing a Morally Innocent Threat
Regardless of the justification of the argument that killing an innocent threat is justifiable, I believe that it suffers from loopholes and philosophical drawbacks, which reinforce the thesis killing under these circumstances is not justifiable. One of the arguments that support killing a morally innocent threat is that his action, which poses a grave threat to someone’s life, deprives him of the right of protection against killing. In other words, regardless of his moral innocence, such a person deserves death, as he is liable for such a punishment (McMahan (b) 386). However, a person liable to be killed differs from a person who deserves to be killed, and this difference refutes the argument in favor of killing in self-defense.
When a person deserves to be killed, it implies that one has a strong reason to kill that person, whether he is capable of killing him or not. Conversely, I propose that liability is a broader term and entails that a person may be liable to be killed, but at the same time, he may not deserve to be killed (McMahan (b) 386). Using this liability proposition, a scholar builds up an argument against killing morally innocent people in self-defense; according to his argument, the liability of a person to be killed allows a defender to kill that person even though the person does not intentionally produce any threat to the defender (McMahan (b) 386). Hence, this liability to be killed violates the rights of the person.
To illustrate this complexity associated with liability proposition, I must present examples from imaginary life situations. Suppose an identical twin brother of a notorious killer faces a situation where he has to take shelter in a remote residence. After opening the door, the resident mistakes him for his identical killer brother and kills him (McMahan (b) 387). Under this scenario, the philosophical and moral justification for killing the twin broth of a notorious killer becomes highly complex and nearly inexplicable.
To elaborate on this complexity, I may refer to the in-depth understanding of the underlying factors behind this problem. For instance, when the resident aims to shoot the twin, even though he is justified and morally innocent in his assumption, he would violate the twin’s right to live (McMahan (b) 387). Moreover, the resident’s deadly threat to the twin makes the twin justified in killing the resident. Otherwise, he would violate the twin’s right to live and not be killed even under a completely excusable misunderstanding (McMahan (b) 387). Hence, even though the residents have all the right to live and not to be killed, his innocent state makes him liable to be killed by the twin.
Hence, a right-based explanation of the liability of the twine and the resident makes the understanding and justification of the act of killing in self-defense more objectionable and controversial. Therefore, I posit that such an interpretation of killing an innocent threat using fundamental human rights creates more problems than it solves. Another similar example further accentuates the invalidity of right-based justification of killing an innocent threat. I would suppose that a fat man is sunbathing on a cliff under which another person is basking on the beach (McMahan (b) 388). However, one of the fat man’s friends pushes him off the cliff, and he falls on the man lying underneath the cliff (McMahan (b) 388). This condition creates even more perplexing issues regarding the right-based justification of killing an innocent threat.
In this regard, I may argue that if the person lying on the beach uses his umbrella to impale the fat man and kill him, he commits an impermissible act of killing an innocent threat, which would be reciprocal to killing an innocent bystander. To illustrate, I may posit that even though the fat man would kill you, he is morally innocent, as his intent is not to kill you ...
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