Prospect Theory and Regional Conflict: Russia's Decision-Making in Ukraine

Prospect Theory and Regional Conflict: A Case Study of Russia Decision-making in Ukraine
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Prospect Theory and Regional Conflict: A Case Study of Russia Decision-making in Ukraine
Introduction
External analysts keep struggling to comprehend why and how Vladimir Putin makes judgments about the deployment of Russian power overseas, including Ukraine. Behind the United States and NATO, Russia is the most assertive state to frame or reorganize the global order. Putin and the Russian elite have stated that they want to re-establish themselves as a regional superpower and a more prominent player in the international arena. Notwithstanding this, there is no agreement on Putin's intention to wield all aspects of Russian authority worldwide like in Ukraine. This paper seeks to underscore foreign policy decision-making based on Prospect Theory that increases the possibility of regional conflicts, particularly the Ukraine-Russia conflict's current event. In the event of underwriting this, the paper will initially expound prospect theory, then follow by a background of the Russia-Ukraine war before applying the approach into the decision-making process by one of the players (Russia). The paper chooses Russia's decision-making in the conflict since Russia has the perceived gains and risks but prefers to decide based on the profits regardless of the many dangers.
Following a short description of Prospect Theory, this research will review the relevant literature on a dispute judgment call. It will then define the numerous assumptions obtained from Prospect Theory relevant to the analysis of violence in greater detail. Prospect Theory is applied to a related topic in which extensive study has been undertaken.
For the sake of convenience and consistency, this paper will look at Putin's decisions from the perspective of prospect theory. After a quick review of what prospect theory has to do with an authoritarian ruler like Putin, the paper focuses on recent incidents to figure out his frame of reference. The report will conclude with broad insights to help readers comprehend how Russian President Vladimir Putin might make future choices.
Prospect Theory
Three fundamental human assertions define prospect Theory:
* Actors estimate outcomes using a basis of comparison.
* An actor's optimization model is harsher for losses than for benefits.
* Players are risk-averse for benefits but danger-acceptant for damages.
The decision-making procedure is separated into two phases. The initial 'editing' involves determining and specifying the benefits and drawbacks associated with distinct result alternatives using an unbiased basis of comparison (Levy, 1992 p.172). The future results are evaluated per the perceptual preferences during the second stage, assessment. These prejudices influence players' decision-making procedures, both explicitly and implicitly, in systematic, foreseeable methods that generate consequences that are frequently opposed to what a typical cost-benefit evaluation would anticipate (Wakker, 2010 p. 3). In conclusion, this paper will seek to demonstrate that the assertion that players assess multiple alternatives based on their approximate risks and gains, inevitably selecting the one that provides them with the most significant utility function, is oversimplified and disregards the complexities of human intellectual performance.
Prospect Theory encompasses several hypotheses developed from these fundamental discoveries and can be applied in the context of dispute more broadly. First is that, contrary to Rational Alternative Philosophy's particular function, "decision-makers assess each option afresh even against an unbiased point of comparison." Other ideologies have used similar mental referring mechanisms to support their claims. For instance, Jervis claims that players will 'view occurrences of how [they] interpret the indication provider' when signaling on a global scale (Levy, 1992 p.178). These prejudices subsequently influence whether characters are perceived as antagonistic or if indications, pledges, and warnings are believed to be trustworthy.
Prospect Theory claims, in a psychologically comparable way, that agents' behavior is influenced by establishing a point of comparison against which they judge possibilities and, if knowingly or not, influences their readiness to embrace uncertainty and hence their actions. As a result, profits and losses are allocated worth instead of the ultimate commodity (Bellé et al., 2018 p.830). Due to the obvious previously indicated connection between conceptualization and risk avoidance or desire, inclinations are flipped based on if they are perceived as possible profits or losses; a tendency is known as the 'reflection impact.' The 'disposition impact,' which alludes to a player's willingness to acknowledge a benefit rather than profit on a loss, is linked.
Even if catastrophic events with minimal odds seem to be somewhat overweighed, the 'assurance factor' detects that some eventualities are overvalued compared to others that are unknown, demonstrating the apparent absurdity of much social cognition. Eventually, the 'alienation impact' states that "to solve the decision between options, individuals routinely ignore elements that the options express, and concentrate on elements that differentiate them," resulting in "inconstant choices" if the same choice is presented with various aspects (Levy, 1992 p.178). All of these factors, separately or in combination, affect how a decision-maker evaluates a circumstance, the danger someone is prepared to embrace (knowingly or unknowingly), and his final decision.
Even though there have been limited papers in the last decade investigating the relevance of prospect theory to foreign policy, two recent headlines of importance fall inside a group that has studied the theoretical approaches. Studies have addressed the difficulty of identifying a basis of comparison in a review of prospect theory in political theory by providing five variables: political establishment, ambition, reflexes, parallels, and sentiment (Levy, 1992 p.178). Similarly, the topic of aggregation had just a minor effect on foreign diplomacy. Although these publications address unresolved concerns in the continued deconstruction of prospect theory in foreign policy, such work has yet to be integrated and extensively distributed.
Others deviate from the standard by offering a statistical method for selecting a point of comparison, recognizing power grid, fairness, variations of the established order, and ambitions among the researchers who have tried to establish parameters for a method of establishing reference points (Bellé et al., 2018 p.830). This scientific formula is still in its early stages of development and has yet to be thoroughly tested. The authors showed her unique collection of variables, which have been used in the research in a limited number of cases (Rugger et al., 2020 p.623). The majority of studies in the subject of foreign policy, on the other hand, have not yet consolidated around a specific conceptual basis for analyzing and establishing a basis for comparison.
This study aims to give insight into applying different approaches of reference-establishing factors and analyze prospect theory using quantifiable methods, adopting a new methodology in status shortfalls to establish the point of reference (List, 2004 p.620). Even though other findings demonstrate there is no link between position shortfalls and conflict outcomes, when seen from a philosophical standpoint, the result only inhibits the ability of prospect theory to the approach described in this study (Levy, 1992 p.179). The findings suggest two things: a) that a nation's conception of standing has little effect on the outcome of conflicts it starts, and b) that position deficiencies as a criterion for identifying a frame of reference has limited personal explanatory value.
Russia-Ukraine Conflicts
President Vladimir Putin's actions against the independent states of the former Soviet Union tend to match a more significant trend of disintegration that began more than a decade ago, from backing for rebels in Moldova to the now appearing iconic war in Georgia (D'Anieri, 2019 p.23). The ramifications of Ukraine's current brutal conflict are echoing around the world. It begs the inquiry of where Ukraine and other troubled former Soviet countries are destined and what a global community concerned about resolving the crisis can do.
Two USIP seminars aimed to spot possible conflict causes, design likely explanations that could result in sizeable violent conflict, and identify chances for reconciliation. After that, the USIP dispute assessment group reviewed each situation with various experts and participants and several regional human rights activists and American and European professionals (Fengler et al., 2020 p.400). This examination culminated in some revisions to the situation. Still, it also highlighted the importance of fully understanding and addressing the vast extent of the possibility for violent conflict across the area and even beyond.
One is the degree of uncertainty caused by internal or external factors. Some regions may attract involvement since they are inherently insecure or on the verge of violence; others may be lucrative or significant enough for Russia to interfere (Harris, 2020 p.595). A succession war shortly after the death of a long-serving authoritarian ruler (Uzbekistan), a progressively autocratic dictatorship that tries to manipulate conflict dynamics and inhibits discord to centralize power (as in Azerbaijan), or a large immigrant Russian demography with real or imaginary concerns (as in Ukraine) could all contribute to destabilization.
One of the main drivers is Putin's ambitions and aspirations. Whether or if a conflict arises and how or where it develops is partly determined by Putin's goals (Raik, 2019 p.53). The purposes are to change national boundaries, freeze disputes to destabilize one or more nations, safeguard essential natural assets, and extend areas of influence for commerce and political advantage. Moreover, they include raising Russia's worldwide rank, dissuading Western intervention in indispensable nations in Russia, and inhibiting the accomplishment of the Maidan prototype in Ukraine so that it has no appeal for the Russian population and cohesion.
Another factor is the integrity of Russia's government and political backing for Putin. Russia's desire and aptitude to engage in a war could be driven or hampered by the Kremlin (Welt, 2019 p.5). Putin's capacity or willingness to interfere is likely to rely on Russia's significant constituents' confidence to embrace it. Failure in his administration could force an invasion, stoking Russian nationalist fervor and bolstering Kremlin backing. Another factor is the Western reaction to Russian actions and how they are interpreted (D'Anieri, 2019 p.24). A sluggish response from the West to a possible conflict could encourage Russian interventionism. Peacebuilding may be made more complicated by a lackluster response to the crisis.
Russian acts in Ukraine, nevertheless devious and haphazard they seem, proceed to be decisive if somewhat relatively brief, manipulations to accomplish Putin's objectives:
* Sustaining perpetual conflict.
* Retaining Ukraine off-balance from within.
* Guaranteeing it stays unacceptable to the West, and, more widely.
* Proudly displaying Russian may be in the head of an evaluated US and EU reaction.
Over the next 3 - 5 years, Russia chooses to maintain the status quo and makes no effort to establish a severe peace treaty (Fix, 2018 p. 500). Notwithstanding the Minsk accords, cease-fire breaches persist.
Prospect Theory Application
Putin is anything but not mysterious; he is a reasonable, self-interested person constrained by moment and knowledge. Although motivated and limited by domestic actors, he eventually takes action in honor of the Russian Federation (Doverholt, 2022 p.12). The information studied in this paper is openly accessible, yet it is frequently just what Putin and the Russian government want overseas viewers to see. Though this restricts his understanding, he is reluctant to publicly announce ideas instead of his genuine thoughts and objectives (Oxford Analytica, 2022 p.4). He accepts his public remarks while noting his motivations to exaggerate or downplay his assertions.
Vladimir Putin started his public career as a middle-ranking KGB official in East Germany, then Moscow and Saint Petersburg. He served in the First Division somewhere at the moment, which was in charge of gathering intelligence operations that are foreign and conducting covert operations (Wells, 2022 p.60). After the Soviet Union fell apart, Putin was head of the FSB until he was appointed Russian Prime Minister in 1999 and then President when Boris Yeltsin abruptly resigned. Since his ascension to reign, ex-Soviet security and intelligence professionals have assumed control of significant aspects of Russian national authority, including the administration, military, press, and private (Doverholt, 2022 p.15). Putin has transformed Russia into a controlled democracy, concentrating authority and power in himself and his loyal inner circle.
Putin, like other rulers, is obsessed with his capacity to stay in office and his reputation as an excellent Russian leader. Putin has meticulously cultivated a character of masculinity, toughness, and conventional Russian ideals (McCarthy, 2022 p. 16). According to poll results, Putin obtains a big public perception bump through clashes with outside critics as several Russians unite behind their ruler. Putin's subjective position must be examined in terms of his perspective of his point of reference like any problem is articulated, and its objective worth is evaluated (Balcaen et al., 2021 p.81). It is especially crucial because Putin does not distinguish himself from the government in any way.
Ultimately, Putin turns his attention to the current global order. He outlines a dysfunctional West-dominated organization that was eroding global cohesion and trustworthiness. He sees NATO's continuous expansionism, as well as more significant military deployments along the Russian border, as a threat to their safety (Welt, 2019 p.7). "[The West] is continuously attempting to trap Russia since Russians have an autonomous viewpoint," Putin says (Raik, 2019 p.53). Anything, however, has a boundary. And the western allies have toed the threshold with Ukraine." Therefore, he chooses to react depending on the possible risks as outlined by the prospect's theory. 
Current Invasion
The prospect theory designates how Putin gauge and pick between available choices and explains why Putin unswervingly diverges from the likelihoods of rational choice like handling the issues diplomatically. Putin's claim that the Soviet Union's demise was the "biggest geographical and political disaster" of the modern period and his belief that Ukraine is not a legitimate country reflects a dissatisfaction with the status quo. It is plausible that Putin's decision to take Crimea is an effort to recoup some of his losses (Welt, 2019 p.7). However, there could be other damages as well. The possibility of an energy-independent Ukraine endangers Putin's vision of the Soviet Union and Russia's financial state (Harris, 2020 p.597). Holding Ukraine from negotiating alliances with the Europeans and leaving Russia's influence in the region has necessitated a dwindling gas supply.
As per prospect theory, Putin's recent hasty conduct could be explained by the erosion of Soviet Union–era grandeur, energy supremacy, and territorial sovereignty. However, while the theory is often the most accurate way to predict how individuals view risk, it is far from flawless predicting foreign affairs (Oxford Analytica, 2022 p.4). It is challenging to connect a situation to a particular political thought due to new knowledge, shifting actors, and politicians' fluctuating beliefs (D'Anieri, 2019 p.27). On the other hand, Putin's moves appear to be following some of what prospect theory forecasts, and with Ukraine's intention to cancel military units from Crimea, it seems that Putin's risk has paid off—at least for the time being.
As per the prospect theory, Putin is inclined toward risk acceptance when antagonized with options between losses (losses frame) and risk aversion when provoked with selections over gains (gains setting). Putin selects invading Ukraine with so many losses to his country regarding the loss frame, including military and economic issues (Oxford Analytica, 2022 p.4). He does this despite having an option to sit back and watch if the NATO expansion could happen, threatening their security. With a massive military deployment along the Russian-Ukrainian boundary and hostile rhetoric, Putin keeps threatening an intrusion of Ukraine. Russian aggressive weaponry and capabilities have been stationed within striking range of Ukraine (Welt, 2019 p.10). Putin has matched this escalation by stating unequivocally that Ukraine has always been their part and that Kyiv must return to power. 
The risk posed by Russia is esp...