Intelligence Failure - Iraq War

ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE FAILURE – IRAQ WAR
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Introduction
The justification for the 2003 Iraq War was the US judgment that Saddam possessed biological and chemical weapons and was developing nuclear weapons. This judgment was based on two pieces of information; Iraq’s procurement of aluminum tubes that are used in enriching uranium and Curveball’s assertion that Saddam had developed 38, 000 liters of botulinum toxin and 25, 000 liters of anthrax bacteria. The US judgment proved to be a massive failure because no evidence of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons were found in Iraq. Some critics even argued that the evidence that the intelligent community had was circumstantial and could not even be used to prosecute Saddam in a civil case. Since Curveball had defected from Iraq, conducting a personnel audit would have helped to assess his character and the quality of the intelligence he was sharing. Similarly, brainstorming would have provided alternative uses of aluminum tubes thus challenging the belief that Saddam was building rotors for uranium enrichment. This paper examines the intelligence failure on the aluminum tubes that were supposedly planned to be used in the manufacture of rotors and the belief that Iraq had stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. The paper also assesses how the use of personnel audit and brainstorming would have prevented intelligence that led to the Iraq War.
Background
The intelligence failure concerning the Iraqi War has been at the center of political controversies in the last two decades. The war began in 2002 when President George W. Bush declared that Saddam’s possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the US vulnerability following the 9/11 attacks made disarming Iraq a priority. This declaration resulted in the invasion of Iraq by a US-led coalition and the successful removal of Saddam from power. Although the defeat and capture of Saddam was a significant achievement, the failure of the US intelligence community was highlighted domestically and internationally. For instance, the findings of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction revealed that the United States intelligence community was mistaken in all of its assessment regarding Saddam’s possession of weapons of mass destruction. Other scholars have argued that intelligent failure occurred because there were grave deficiencies in the way intelligence assessment was conducted and conveyed to policymakers.[Siracusa, Joseph M., and Laurens J. Visser. "George W. Bush, Diplomacy, and Going to War with Iraq, 2001-2003." The Journal of Diplomatic Research Diplomasi Araştırmaları Dergisi (2019): 1.] [Pfiffner, James P., and Mark Phythian. "Appendix D: Excerpts from post-war US investigations." In Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq. Manchester University Press, 2018.] [Tracey, Richard S. "Trapped by a Mindset."]
Intelligence failures
* Aluminum tubes for uranium enrichment
The most notable intelligent failure was related to Iraq’s purchase of aluminum tubes (70750-T6 alloy) that were supposedly planned to be used in the manufacture of rotors and gas centrifuges that enrich uranium. This piece of intelligence was correct because Iraq had ordered more than 3000 aluminum tubes from China. However, the intelligence community’s interpretation of the use of aluminum tubes was erroneous and based on unproven concepts. Other than aluminum tubes, the manufacture of rotors and gas centrifuges requires the procurement of other materials that are used to manufacture other parts of the centrifuges. The intelligence community did not find any information indicating that Iraq had ordered other materials yet it still maintained that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons. Similarly, the production of one nuclear bomb requires 10, 000 gas centrifuges, which would have forced Iraq to build a massive centrifuge storage facility. A facility that holds 10, 000 gas centrifuges would have been easily spotted by US drones and even allowed the Pentagon to order airstrikes. However, US drones flying over Iraq and spies within the country did not find any centrifuge storage facilities in Iraq, which indicates that Saddam’s regime was not manufacturing rotors and gas centrifuges.[Kameel, J. (2015). The Iraq War: Bad Intelligence or Bad Policy?. American Intelligence Journal, 32(1), 79-86.] [Betts, Judith, and Mark Phythian. "Managing the Consequences of War: Post-war Inquiries." In The Iraq War and Democratic Governance, pp. 117-158. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2020.]
* Stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons
Just before the US marched into Iraq, President George W. Bush asserted that Iraq had 500 tons of chemical weapons that included mustard gas and VX nerve gas. Part of this assertion was based the 1999 report of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) that alleged that Iraq had produced 38, 000 liters of botulinum toxin and 25, 000 liters of anthrax bacteria that could murder millions of people when used. Bush’s claim was also based on the information provided by Curveball. Curveball was an Iraqi engineer and had shared with the Germans that Saddam was using mobile laboratories to transport biological weapons from one region to another. The F...