THE PRC-TAIWAN CRISIS; ASSESSING ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES
Title Page.
(a) Title of the paper: The PRC-Taiwan Crisis; Assessing Alternative Outcomes
(b) Student Name.
(c) Course Number.
(d) Instructor Name.
(e) Date the paper was completed.
Length: Minimum of six pages, no more than seven pages (double spaced, not including the title page and Selected Bibliography).
Section I: Introduction.
(a) This section briefly summarizes the scenario and the three potential outcomes (Diplomatic Solution or Limited Intervention or Direct Attack).
Section II–Outcome Assessed to be most likely to Occur: [enter outcome here]
(a) Provide insight as to how you arrived at your conclusion.
(b) Provide examples from the ACH Matrix supporting and refuting each hypothesis (Step #3).
(c) Identify the “linchpin” evidence and discuss how it ultimately drove your analysis (Step #4).
(d) State the underlying assumptions associated with your linchpin evidence (Step #6)
Section III– Second Most Likely to Occur: [enter outcome here]
(a) Provide insight as to how you arrived at your conclusion.
(b) Provide examples from the ACH Matrix supporting and refuting each hypothesis (Step #3).
(c) Identify the “linchpin” evidence and discuss how it ultimately drove your analysis (Step #4).
(d) State the underlying assumptions associated with your linchpin evidence (Step #6)
Section IV- Least Likely to Occur: [enter outcome here]
(a) Provide insight as to how you arrived at your conclusion.
(b) Provide examples from the ACH Matrix supporting and refuting each hypothesis (Step #3).
(c) Identify the “linchpin” evidence and discuss how it ultimately drove your analysis (Step #4).
(d) State the underlying assumptions associated with your linchpin evidence (Step #6)
Section V: Conclusion
Citations - The Chicago Manual of Style Format
(a) If a citation comes directly from the PRC-Taiwan scenario students are only required to place the citation in quotations; no Turabian style citation is required.
(b) If a citation comes from a source other than the PRC-Taiwan scenario, then it must be cited using the Turabian format.
(c) A Selected Bibliography is required only if information contained in a report comes from a source other than the PRC-Taiwan scenario. The Selected Bibliography contains all sources consulted and cited in preparing your paper.
Analytical Terms of Reference
Papers must incorporate the following analytical standards which are common
throughout the Intelligence Community. These standards equate to the “content/subject knowledge,” “critical thinking,” and “writing conventions” section of the grading rubric.
Terms of Estimative Probability. The narrative essay should be limited to the terms of estimative probability listed below. Please note, the terms and percentages are designed to provide students with a numerical range of probability and standardize submissions to allow for class comparisons.
(a) Highly Likely + 85% chance
(b) Probable 60-84% chance
(c) About Even 45-55% chance
(d) Possible 35-44% chance
(e) Unlikely 16-34% chance
(f) Highly Unlikely 0-15%
Objectivity: Analysis should be free of emotional content, give due regard to alternative perspectives and contrary reporting, and acknowledge developments that necessitate adjustments to analytic judgments.
Independent of Political Considerations: Assessments should not distort or alter with the intent of supporting or advocating a particular policy, political viewpoint, or audience.
Based on All Available Sources of Intelligence: Analysis should be informed by all relevant information that is available to the analytic element. Knowledge gaps must be identified.
Properly describes quality and reliability of underlying sources: Accurately characterize the information in the underlying sources and explain which information proved key to analytic judgments and why. Factors affecting the weighting that the analysts gives to available, relevant information, such as denial and deception, source access, source motivations and bias, or age and continued currency of information, or other factors affecting the quality and potential reliability of the information, should be included in the product.
Properly distinguished between underlying intelligence and analysts’ assumptions and judgments: Identify underlying causes and/or behavior of systems, people, organizations, states, or conditions. Assumptions comprise the foundational premises on which the information and logical argumentation build to reach analytic conclusions. Judgments are defined as logical inferences from the available information or the results of explicit tests of hypotheses. They comprise the conclusions of the analysts.
Uses logical argumentation. The presentation should facilitate clear understanding of the information and reasoning underlying analytic judgments. Key points should be effectively supported by information or, for more speculative warning by coherent reasoning. Language and syntax should convey meaning unambiguously.
THE PRC-TAIWAN CRISIS; ASSESSING ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES
Student's Name
Institutional Affiliation
Course
Date
Introduction
The PRC-Taiwan relations have been characterized by adverse hostilities as each country seeks sovereignty and greater territorial control. PRC has always sought to control Taiwan by asserting its presence and might in Taiwan's territories. On the contrary, Taiwan has been seeking to be independent of any form of influence and has been pursuing its path to independence. Despite the hostilities, the two nations have continued to engage in trade that has boosted both their economic and cultural ties, leading to tremendous growth. The Analysis of Competing Hypothesis framework provides insights on the potential outcome of the relationship between the two states. Based on this framework, three potential outcomes are possible: a diplomatic solution or limited intervention, or direct attack.
Most Probable Outcome (Diplomatic Solution)
The most likely outcome to occur is that there will be a diplomatic solution between the two countries. This decision was arrived at by compiling the number of most likely hypotheses based on the total evidence submitted. The first evidence (H1aE1) pointed towards the possibility of having a diplomatic solution and a limited intervention, and no chance for a direct attack. S. The second evidence H1a E2 pointed to the possibility of all the hypotheses, with a remote possibility of having limited intervention and direct attack but a stronger possibility of still holding diplomatic talks. H1b E3, which talks about the military level alertness by Taiwan is irrelevant to all the hypotheses because Taiwan can only be increasing its surveillance to protect herself. The second evidence, H2a E1, presents a possibility of all of the three hypotheses occurring. The drills could be a warning to the target country to engage in diplomatic resolution. There is also the possibility of either limited intervention or a direct attack because the drills may not serve the intended purpose of scaring the parties into negotiations.
Evidence H2a E2 points towards a diplomatic resolution because the pentagon had confirmed PRC's acceptance to limit mobilization of its forces. There was less likelihood of a limited intervention because the parties were already headed to the negotiation table. Conversely, the possibility of engaging in a direct attack was irrelevant. Evidence H3b E1, which entails agreement by the UN to mediate the process, directly points to the first hypothesis, which is a diplomatic solution. Therefore, the second and third hypotheses are irrelevant to the evidence presented. Evidence H3b E2, which entails Taiwan's agreement to downgrade their military, is also a positive sign towards solving the issue diplomatically. Therefore, the rest of the hypotheses is irrelevant. Finally, evidence H3b E3, which entails the presence of continued good economic ties between the two countries, also pints to the possibility of having a diplomatic solution between the states. The rest of the hypotheses is irrelevant. Therefore, the problem between PRC and Taiwan is likely to be solved through diplomatic relations because it is the hypothesis which the highest number of relevant evidence.
Second most likely outcome (Limited Intervention)
Besides diplomatic intervention, the tension between the two states is also likely to be resolved through limited intervention. This decision is arrived at based on the number of associations (+) that the hypotheses attracted based on the available evidence. The first evidence in support of this intervention is H1a E1, which entails continuous economic growth between PRC and Taiwan irrespective of the political differences. Certain friendly and neighboring countries have used the technique of limited intervention to mark their territories against their neighbors. The second form of evidence is H1a E2, which addresses the talks between President Hu-Jintao and the UN Secretary-General a month before the elections. If the talks collapse without an amicable solution, then the UN might send its troops to the border between the two countries as a limited intervention, which makes it a viable option. The move may not immediately lead to a direct attack because there first have to be signs of defiance from the two states to warrant the direct attack hypothesis. Evidence H1a E3 in which PRC calls for the intervention of the UN in quelling the tensions, also has a possibility of limited intervention because the UN can opt to threaten Taiwan by sending its troops and hence sending an indirect message.
Evidence H1bE1, where Taiwan's National Security Bureau unravels plans to amplify the tensions between the two countries, may require either limited intervention or direct attack. Limited intervention is the most viable immediate action as the relevant authorities will opt to send a warning to the organizers of the plan. Evidence H1b E2 talks about PRC mobilizing its forces on air, land, and sea along the Taiwan borders is an indicator of preparedness for war. Therefore, the two possible hypotheses include either limited intervention or direct attack. Evidence H2a E1, which shows footage of PLAAF bombers conducting drills, has a potential for all the hypotheses. However, it is more likely to lead to either limited intervention because it will increase the tensions between the two countries. Under extreme conditions, it may lead to direct attacks. The hypothesis on limited intervention does not correlate with the PRC's agreement to limit its mobilization against Taiwan because it is illogical for the PRC to limit its mobilization and eventual utilization of the resources.
The hypothesis of limited intervention is also rendered possible through H3a E1 evidence, which may be used to discourage any planned attempts. These attempts may also culminate into direct attacks. When the army troops receive mobilization, the most probable course of action could be to conduct. Similarly, this evidence is also likely to lead to direct attacks. The rest of the evidence is not applicable to the limited intervention or direct attack hypotheses. Therefore, the conflict between the two countries.
Least likely outcome to occur (Direct Attack)
The direct attack has the least number of correlations in terms of the available evidence. These least number of correlations shows that it is less likely to be adopted in the cause Evidence H1a E2 shows that President HuJintao and the UN Secretary-General help talks before the elections. The linchpin evidence in support of this assertion is that the talks may collapse, which will lead to a direct attack. Another evidence in support of this hypothesis is H1a E3, in which the PRC calls for the intervention of the United Nations to quell the tension between the two countries. The United Nations can either adopt a peace deal or under extremely dangerous or irreversible situations, and they can opt to use force whereby they will deploy their army into the territories of the games. Evidence H1bE1, in which the security agency uncovers the plans to intensify the tensions between the two countries, can lead to mistrust between the countries.
Consequently, they may decide to directly attack each other. There is also evidence of the mobilization of air, land, and sea. Such mobilization sends a wrong message to the warring partners. In most cases, such messages are often taken and acted upon immediately. Among the immediate actions to such threats would include a direct attack to safeguard its territory among the possible environment. This course of action is also supported by the evidence H2a E1, which notes that their PLAAF members are conducting drilling prior to the country's election. The purpose of this drilling was to pass a message to the relevant people of the impending attack. The method is based on the tree available hypothesis that a country is likely to take in response to a given crisis situation. This section has most of its other areas as being irrelevant in relation to the situation at hand. This blankness implies that despite the several pieces of evidence available, the situation is likely to take a given approach only in certain cases. Direct attack is only probable in cases where the relationship between the countries is worse, and the member states have prepared their respective means of staffing.
Evidence H3a E3 also shows that despite the efforts at mediating the two countries, news from PLA had shown that PRC armed forces were getting ready to attack anyone who showed or tended to undermine...