Case Analysis: SWANCC

CASE ANALYSIS: SWANCC Student’s name: Course: Date: Analysis concerning the SWANCC case A group regarding the municipalities of Chicago area wanted to construct a waste dump within a region which had seasonal and permanent ponds, which migratory birds utilized. After the Engineers’ Army Corps within United States turned down the request concerning approval of the Act of federal clean water, they were sued by the municipalities. Among their arguments was that the migratory bird rule held by the Corps was in violation of the Act towards clean water, and that Congress had no constitutional power required for the ponds’ regulation. It is pointed out that the plaintiffs concerning SWANCC, were depending heavily upon the recent rulings by the Supreme Court within Morrison and Lopez cases. These had acted in opposition to some federal laws believed to exceed the constitutional power held by Congress to control interstate commerce. The ruling of SWANCC, brought about a 5-4 court divide. The majority opinion, within one reading, arrived at the conclusion that EPA and Corps had no capacity to go on utilizing migratory bird’s rule towards declaration of section 404 of jurisdiction above secluded waters. The court therefore highlighted that the rule concerning migratory bird was not reasonably propped up by CWA. It is clear that the rationale of the decision, nevertheless, was wide-ranging, emerging to rule out federal assertion concerning 404 jurisdiction section above isolated waters upon any basis. The court further stated that for it to rule towards the Corps, it would be necessary for it to have the perception that the Corps jurisdiction extends towards ponds which are not within the neighborhood of open waters. However, it realized that the statute text would not support this. The opinion of the majority, put down by the Chief justice, embraced the idea that within enactment of the amendments done within the year 1977 towards CWA, did not completely approve the broad definition by Corps about navigable water implemented within that year. The failure of the Congress to approve a bill within 1977, which contained of narrow definition regarding navigable waters, was not presented by Corps. This was pointed out by majority for the purpose of constituting the approval of the congress concerning the broad definition by corps. Therefore, the majority rejected the idea of offering the provided agency interpretations regarding customary deference by Corps regarding ambiguous statutes. They pointed out that no ambiguity was associated with section 404, and in case of its ambiguity, the deference would not be suitable especially where statute interpretation by an agency would appeal to Congress’ outer limits of power. This was in reference to the milestone decisions by the court within recent years concerning the attainment of commerce clause. It further indicated that the concern was principally strong where the interpretation of the agency permits encroachment upon conventional state power, over water and land use. The analysis held by majority addressed federalism and constitutional issues inbuilt within the utilization of broad interpretation concerning United States’ waters and evidently communicates that wetlands ought to hold a fundamental nexus towards passable waters so that the Corps may assert jurisdiction through the use of commerce powers of the congress. Nevertheless, some inconsistencies concerning the way the majority addressed the essential criteria towards the existence of nexus make it intricate for corps to make out the exact strength held by court concerning their jurisdiction assertion. An example in this case is the idea that reaffirmation was done by the court concerning their holding within Riverside Bayview which pointed out that certain waters were not recognized as navigable through the test fall of Gibbons in Corps jurisdiction. They simultaneously noted that assertions which were narrower concerning corps jurisdiction were not congress misinterpretations regarding the intent of congress regarding CWA. The commerce clause held by minority turns out to be more evocative concerning the held decisions by traditional court about issues of the environment. It is clear that the minority believed that ‘navigable’ as a term was written by the congress beyond CWA because it did not take in navigability within navigable waters’ definition. Therefore, they did not realize the issues regarding commerce clause innate within navigability removal as prerequisite for jurisdiction establishment, highlighting that the involved issues had already been tackled within preceding cases like Lopes as well as Hodel. In accordance with the minority, Hodel recognized that the congress was empowered by commerce clause towards particular activities’ regulation. Th...