Richard Nixon in China

Nixon in China
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Nixon in China
President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in the February of 1972 is considered one of the most iconic political statements in the history of the world following what that visit could bear diplomatically in decades to come. Nixon’s visit stemmed from a long-standing feud between the US and China. Upon the arrival of President Nixon in China, the focus was put on what could be the outcome of the surprise engagement. Primary among the aspects of focus was the media coverage of the visit. Media outlets engaged the public through television videos and newspaper prints in an attempt to update the public on the occurrences within China. The released documents of the visit by the U.S. State Department entitled Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) give detail of what transpired throughout the visit. This paper analyses the contents of that visit from the declarations in FRUS relative to the reports from the media. For purposes of this analysis, this paper will foster the publication by the New York Times titled “Nixon Talks Further with Chou and Drives to View Great Wall”. The findings of this analysis will conceal the extent to which the media was barred from the important elements of the visit and how the public was kept informed even though with only mild details.
The visit by Nixon to China was based on a range of factors that formed the basis of conversations in the media. The visit was preceded by a long-standing disagreement between China and the US. Partly, En-lai highlighted the vast differences between the nations at the initial meeting while receiving Nixon. According to MacMillan, the US and the People’s Republic of China had been battling for over 25 years before that meeting. En-lai highlighted what he believed to have been the cause of the disagreement as the many years of humiliation that the Chinese had endured at the hands of the outside world. Some of the cases cited by the premier were America’s position in the Korean War and the decades of fear since the Chinese became a republic in 1949. The primary element of the tension, according to En-lai was the prominence that China was gaining globally at the detriment of America. Other citations fostered the positions of both the US and China on matters of Indonesia and Taiwan.[MacMillan Margaret, Nixon and Mao: The week that changed the world (1st ed.). (Random House, 2007, 53)]
Nixon’s visit to China was highly explored by various outlets with FRUS divulging more details about the visit. According to MacMillan, Nixon had a wide range of meetings during his visit to China. Significant among the meetings was that with the then Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai. Both the official and media records indicate that Nixon met with the premier on two occasions. The first occasion was when the premier received the president at Peking. The reception at Peking airport was highly published in the media as it would outline the monumental handshake between the two leaders. The handshake was principally important as it set a reminder of the 1954 Geneva Conference in which America’s secretary of State at the time, John Foster Dulles, had ignored to shake the outstretched arm of the Chinese premier. According to MacMillan, the brief engagement between the two leaders from the airport reception was only setting grounds for the meeting that would ensue later.[MacMillan 2007, 56.] [MacMillan 2007, 53.]
The second official meeting was a private one held at the guest house. The FRUS details indicate that this was a more formal meeting. In the second meeting, both the US and China had set the official messages that they were intending to portray as per the conditions of the meeting. The first proclamation by the US was on global peace in which it was important for both leaders to commit to ensuring peace. The US stated that the Chinese were aware of their obligation to inform the People’s Republic voluntarily of any event that could affect that nation. The US notes that the need to declare information was done without any demands for reciprocity. The American side had carefully carried out the unilateral undertaking of engaging China concerning several continents. Given this overarching policy, it made sense for the American side to go through with this process in regard to a U.S. peace offer in Indochina. Both parties probably kept meticulous records of past conversations. They clarified what happened about specific topics, such as the level of detail of the U.S. strategy in its eight-point plan. There was no need to have additional discussions on this. The final declaration by the US was a commitment that the U.S. side wanted to emphasize that the discussions had not been held to enmesh the People's Republic of China, but rather to represent the new strategy required to bring about the fundamental transformation in relations that the United States is pursuing as policy. However, the US noted that establishing trust requires some degree of trust between the parties, which can be challenging if some isolated statements take on a significance that was not intended.
The Chinese faction also made declarations in the second meeting according to the FRUS details. Principally, the Chinese called for an unstoppable historical trend that was toward independence, emancipation, and revolution for all nations and people. The People's Republic reiterated that b big or small, all countries should be treated equally. On the same note, powerful nations should not oppress weaker ones and vice versa. China declared that it was opposed to all forms of hegemony and power politics and that it will never become a superpower. Further, the Chinese side declared that it firmly supported the fight for freedom and liberation of all subjugated people and nations.  Moreover, people everywhere had the right to choose the social systems that best suit their needs. They also have the right to defend the independence, national identity, and territorial integrity of their nations, as well as to oppose foreign control and aggression. Each nation needed to withdraw its troops from foreign lands.
There were further areas of contention that the Chinese declared in their proposal. Principally, China showed its support for Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The three countries, China stated, should be allowed to achieve their goals freely. The Chinese showcased their support for the seven-point proposal as well as noting areas of their discontent with the proposal that needed renegotiation. The People’s Republic wholeheartedly endorses the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea" being abolished as well as the eight-point plan for the harmonious integration of Korea proposed by the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971. China t vehemently rejected the resurgence and externalization of Japanese militarism. In their declaration, China confirmed that the aspiration of the Japanese people to establish a democratic, independent, neutral, and peaceful Japan should be honored.  Additionally, China adamantly preserved that India and Pakistan should immediately withdraw all of their forces to their respective territories and their respective sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir. The position was further emphasized by India's support of the Pakistani government and the motivation of their people to stay sovereign and independent.
There are a few insights to highlight from the declarations of both nations during the visit. Principally, the two nations were committed to settling the disputes that they had been facing since China was declared a republic through an open approach to their problems. The openness would stem from sharing necessary information regarding issues that could concern either. Both China and the US further noted that the challenges that they faced at the time could not all be resolved at the meeting. However, emphasis was to be put on various conflicts across the globe. It is worth remarking that both the Chinese and the US showcased their different positions on various conflicts around the world beginning with Vietnam and extending to other countries like Indonesia, India and Pakistan, Korea, and Vietnam among others.[Castrillón-Kerrigan, David. "China-CEE Relations in a New Era: The Drivers Behind the Development of the Platform for Regional Cooperation 16+1 *." CS Ciencias Sociales no. 37 (May, 2022): 63-65]
The New York Times was among the most prominent media outlets in showcasing Nixon’s visit to China. In the publication titled “Nixon Talks Further with Chou and Drives to View Great Wall” by Max Frankel, the newspaper outlines what had transpired in the two meetings before Nixon visited the Great Wall of China before the visit ended. Frankel noted that a considerable amount of the conversation between the two leaders was mostly private. However, the bits that were leaked to the media gave an insight into the areas that the conversations had centered. Primarily, Nixon indicated that the visit to China was a monumental one in global diplomatic strides. Using a philosophical approach, Frankel quoted Nixon to have acknowledged the rift between the nations both p...