Phases of the EM and Early 1900s Disasters and the Impact on Emery Management

Phases of the EM and Early 1900s Disasters and the Impact on Emery Management
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Phases of the EM and Early 1900s Disasters and the Impact on Emery Management
Emergency management (EM) entails dealing with risk and risk avoidance. EM is critical in the security of individual’s daily lives. Therefore, EM should be integrated into daily decisions instead of being acted upon in response to major disasters. EM is an essential role of the government. In the U.S., the states are responsible for public risks, with the Federal government assisting when State entities are overwhelmed by a disaster. Since the 1900s, different agencies have been involved in responding to disasters. The interagency response to disasters in the early 1900s forms a basis for EM today. Some notable disasters that have warranted interagency involvement include the 1900 Galveston flood, the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and Fires, and the 1918 Great Influenza Pandemic. These have demonstrated that interagency collaboration is critical in EM.
Interagency Responses
The 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and Fires elicited responses from the insurance industry. The disaster had led to the loss of lives and property. Individuals who had insured their properties started claiming compensation from their insurers. The insurance industry reacted to the massive loss by adjusting claims. The city’s real estate board responded by passing a resolution that called for the calamity to be seen as ‘the Great Fire’ instead of ‘the Great Earthquake’ (Siemens & Gillon, 2010). The main reason for the board’s resolution was because a majority of the insurance covers excluded losses caused by the earthquake. The insurance companies continued to invoke earthquake exclusion to avoid coverage, which forced many policyholders to sue for compensation. In response to the massive losses insurers had incurred, the industry sought to protect itself from a repeat of the losses incurred due to the earthquake. Insurers inserted “anti-concurrent causation clauses” in almost all insurance policies dealing with property. The clauses indicated that where the damage occurred even partially by an excluded cause, there would be no coverage, even where a covered cause contributed to the loss (Siemens & Gillon, 2010). The disaster was a wake-up call for insurance companies and policyholders.
Additionally, the insurance industry demanded that San Francisco constructed a high-pressure system that Dennis Sullivan had earlier proposed if the city wished to have an insurance policy written once more. The local government reacted by proposing the Auxiliary Water Supply System (AWSS) in 1908. The project was completed in 1912 at the cost of $5.2 million. AWSS consisted of static water supplies, pump stations, pipe networks, fireboats, and cisterns. The system guaranteed water reliability for firefighting purposes. The AWSS supplemented the municipal water supply system meant to fight fires under non earthquake conditions. Hence, the fire department did not need to wait for an earthquake to use the AWSS. Instead, the department could use AWSS to respond to greater alarm incidences hence confirming the system’s functionality.
A day after the 1900 Galveston flood, citizens selected a committee to assist in recovery efforts. The Central Relief Committee (CRC) was supposed to take care of the needs of the survivors. The CRC paid for the construction of new housing units and the repair of damaged ones. The American Red Cross responded quickly to the disaster. The organization assisted in the distribution of food and other necessities. It supplemented the efforts of the CRC. The Municipal government agreed to the construction of a seawall and raised the city’s level (Ramos, 2014). The measures were taken to prevent the city from future storms. The measures taken proved helpful when a hurricane hit the city once more in 1915. About 90% of the buildings outside the seawall flooded (Kennedy et al., 2011). Only eight people lost their lives during this time, demonstrating the essence of the seawall.
During the Great Influenza Pandemic in 1918, the government collaborated with news outlets to play down the severity of the pandemic. The popular newspapers often mentioned Influenza as an item at the bottom of the page. Other papers mentioned the pandemic in a jesting manner to downplay its seriousness. The newspapers remained silent despite the high rate at which the pandemic was killing people (Jivraj & Butler, 2013). The government also failed to respond to the Influenza pandemic through effective communication. As a result, the public has little information about what was happening. The lack of adequate information meant that the public was not well informed on minimizing the pandemic (Jivraj & Butler, 2013). The silence was mainly because people were already tired of the welfare and did not want to receive news of yet another tragedy. The silence of the media and the government served to relieve pain. At the same time, organizations owning social spaces failed to respond appropriately to the Influenza pandemic. For instance, social theaters in Dundee did not close despite their poor ventilation, which made the places ideal for person-to-person transmission of the virus (Jivraj & Butler, 2013). Schools closed at the discretion of the headteachers as opposed to a directive from the authorities.
Lessons Learned
In the three disasters assessed in this paper, several lessons were learned that helped enhance disaster response. The first lesson that was learned was that there was a need to improve response time. In any disaster, the longer the response time, the higher the likelihood that more people will peris...