Common Pool Resources

Common Pool Resources
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Common Pool Resources
Introduction
The tragedy of commons ranks among the most influential ideas in the environmental movement today. The concept was first coined by Garrett Hardin, a renowned ecologist, in 1968, using the metaphor of a shared pasture land. He showed how people misuse shared resources for personal interests rather than for the common good of the group. His concept was strongly criticized by Elinor Ostrom, who argued that there are proven cases of communities successfully managing such common pool resources as forests, fisheries, and grazing lands (Frischmann, 2018). The arguments put across by the two economists show that although shared resources are susceptible to the tragedy of common, there are effective strategies for preventing occurrence of the scenario.
Definition of an open access common pool resource (CPR)
In economics, a CPR refers to a type of good that consists of a human-made or natural resource system such as a fishing ground or an irrigation system. The size or characteristics of the system makes it costly to deter potential beneficiaries from benefiting from using it. Unlike in the case of pure public resources and goods, common pool resources are subjected to overuse or congestion since they are subtractable (Dietz & Henry, 2008). A CPR is basically made up of a core resource (such as fish or water), defining the stock variable, and provides a limited amount of extractable units that define the flow variable. Although the core resource should be protected so that it can be exploited continuously, the fringe units can also be consumed or harvested. An example is a water well that belongs to a community. Whereas some people may want to draw water only for domestic purposes, others may also want to do irrigation with it. This shows that individuals have different approaches to the use of shared resources.
Why are CPRs vulnerable to a Tragedy of the Commons (TOC)?
The manner in which a society should manage its Common Pool Resources such as forests, fisheries, and grasslands is of great interest because it raises concerns. The solution to the problem has been presented in an Econ 1010 course, and it shows that such systems do not have the appropriate incentives to support sustainable use. Lack of government regulation or private property regulation leads to people inevitably overusing and exploiting them. This is what is referred to as the tragedy of the commons, a concept that was famously formulated by ecologist Garrett Hardin in a seminal paper he compiled in 1968 (Jensen, 2000). The concept is also taught to thousands of economist students each year due to its importance to understanding why CPRs are susceptible to a tragedy of the commons. Although the concept explains the susceptibility of CPRs to a TOC, it fails to comprehensively explain the concept of real world behavior.
Hardin presented his argument in this manner. First, he wants the reader to figure out a pasture that is open to all. In such a case, if the herdsmen of the pasture are rational and self-interested agents, then they will only think of how they can benefit from the pasture by adding more cattle to the pastures, and they assume that such benefits outweigh the costs incurred due to overgrazing since they are shared by all the users of the pastureland (Leal, 1998). Every herdsman continues adding cattle to the pasture, leading to the resource getting depleted. As a result, Hardin argues that all men tend to run to ruin. This implies that CPRs are susceptible to the tragedy of the commons due to self-interests and lack of regard for others. In this case of a grazing resource, every herdsman only thinks of themselves and how they can benefit from adding more cattle to the pasture land, leading to inevitable depletion of the resource.
Several scholars beyond the economics discipline have contradicted this argument because it makes unrealistic assumptions and fails to provide adequate evidence. One of the major critics was Elinor Ostrom, who argued that Hardin had confused a joint property commons with one that grants users open access, in which there are absolutely no restrictions on use (Kumar, 2002). There are a few cases of open-access regimes existing (such as fishing in deep seas), but in practical cases, Common-Pool Resources are usually governed by norms and rules which have been set by the users. This implies that Hardin’s concept of the grazing pasture being open to all fails to accurately map the operation of the commons in practice. As such, the argument presented by Hardin on the susceptibility of CPRs to a TOC being openness to all is highly debatable.
There is adequate, reliable evidence that shows that commons regimes are sustainable, such as what Ostrom defines. The existence of the commons in the cases of scarce resources is evidence that neither private property nor state coercion is a requirement for viability. According to the very exact words of Ostrom and his friends, although there have been cases of tragedies, there is also evidence that over the last couple of thousands of years people have successfully organized and managed Common-Pool Resources (Sarker, 2013). Further, users have long-term institutions which they have devised so as to govern such resources. Although the commons do not succeed always, they are far from having a doome...