Best Countermeasures to Avoid Crashes on Airports
This is for the 6th episode only Write a response style paper reflecting each chapter of the Managing Risk textbook. (10, two page papers) This is to be a “real-life” style response, focusing on each chapter's topic. Use statistics, accident reports, prevention data, real-life incidents, etc. Describe the best countermeasures that you as a pilot can use to mitigate these risks. Each response must encompass a minimum of two pages (font: 11; line spacing 1.15) and clearly present the problem and explain the best-practice countermeasure, documenting your answer. This is not an opinion paper. books required are... Wilson, D., & Binnema, G. (2014) Managing risk: Best practices for pilots. New castle, WA: Aviation Supplies & Academics, Inc. ISBN: 978-1-61954-109-2 Federal Aviation Administration (2009). Risk management handbook. Oklahoma City, OK: Author. ISBN-13: 978-1782661634. (Downloadable for free)
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Episode 6 Runway Safety: Bluegrass KY
A Bombardier regional jet, Comair Flight 5191 crashed during takeoff on 27th August 2006 from the Blue Grass Airport in Lexington, Kentucky. The aircraft had been assigned runway 22 AT the airport for the takeoff, but instead decided to use runway 26. Due to the short distance of Runway 26, it was not possible for the aircraft to safely take off. The crash led to the death of all 47 passengers as well as two of the three crew members, and the only survivor was the first officer of the flight (AOPA, 2014). At the time the accident occurred, the first officer was responsible for flying the aircraft. However, according to the transcript of cockpit voice recorder, the first officer was not the pilot who was in command of the plane.
According to the crash report produced by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the conclusion of the investigators showed that the most probable cause of the accident was the error of the pilot. The crash was caused by a number of factors. First, the aircraft had been cleared to use Runway 22 for takeoff, but after the pilot confirmed this information, he taxied onto Runway 26 (AOPA, 2014). Second, this runway was not only unlit, but it was also approximately half the size of the runway that it had been cleared to use for takeoff. Third, since the air traffic controller did not have to retain visual contact with the airplane, he started to do other administrative duties after he had cleared the airplane for takeoff. This implies that he was not able to see and determine that the airplane was taxing to the wrong runway.
Best-pra...