Leibniz: Argument on Existence of Material Substance and Doctrine of Indiscernibility of Identicals

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1 What is Leibniz's argument against the existence of material substance? Explain Leibniz's account of the relation between monads and composites (physical objects). In particular, what do you suppose Leibniz could mean by the "true atoms of nature."? What are the roles of appetition and apperception in Leibniz's philosophy? What is Leibniz's doctrine of the pre-established harmony? Contrast Leibniz's conception of the pre-established harmony of nature and grace with Spinoza's conception of Parallelism between mind and body.
The Existence of Material Substance by Leibniz
Leibniz's argument against the existence of material substance is founded on his belief in monads, which are immaterial and indivisible entities. He posited that the fundamental constituents of reality are these monads, which do not possess physical attributes like size, shape, or location. According to Leibniz, each monad has a unique set of perceptions, and the principle of sufficient reason ensures that there is a reason for these specific perceptions (Gut, 2017).
The Relationship Between Monads and Composites
The connection between monads and composites takes shape when considering that everyday physical objects, such as desks and chairs, derive their existence from a deeper layer of metaphysical reality. Within this framework, we acknowledge the existence of composites, essentially groupings of simple substances. Consequently, it follows that simple substances, as the foundational elements, must also be in existence. Monads, as immaterial, indivisible, and unique entities, collectively contribute to what we perceive as physical objects or composites. These physical entities do not stand alone as independent substances but instead emerge as phenomena through the interactions and perceptions of monads (Gut, 2017; McDonough, 2019; Whipple, 2022).
The “True Atoms of Nature”
Leibniz's mention of the "true atoms of nature" corresponds to his notion of "monads," which he defines as uncomplex, indivisible substances devoid of parts, and he posits that these monads serve as the elemental, immaterial building blocks forming the basis for all composite entities in the natural world.
Appetition and Apperception
Leibniz's philosophy introduces two fundamental ideas: appetition and apperception. Appetition signifies the inherent inclinations within simple substances, known as monads, to transition between different perceptions. These transitions reflect how monads engage with the world through their perceptions, guided by an inner principle of activity and change. This internal force, constituting the essence of each monad, finds expression through appetition, which impels monads towards fresh perceptions and sustains their active participation in the ever-evolving flow of mental life (Kulstad & Carlin, 2007).
Conversely, apperception relates to the awareness or conscious understanding of a monad's internal state. It represents the level of consciousness a monad possesses regarding its mental states and transitions. Leibniz notes that apperception is not universally present; it does not apply to all souls and may not be a constant attribute across all beings. Typically, apperception is associated with spirits, such as human souls, and is seen as a distinctive feature of these entities. While it encompasses various forms of consciousness, including self-awareness, it does not necessarily involve these higher levels of awareness (Kulstad & Carlin, 2007).
Leibniz's position on apperception in non-human entities, particularly animals, remains controversial. Some evidence suggests that Leibniz occasionally implies that animals, or at least certain animals, might possess apperception or consciousness. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that he challenges the Cartesian notion that animals are mere material automata devoid of consciousness. This ongoing debate leaves questions regarding the apperception of non-human entities (Kulstad & Carlin, 2007).
The Doctrine of Pre-Established Harmony
Leibniz's theory of mind-body causation is intricately linked to his doctrine of pre-established harmony. This doctrine encompasses several vital principles. Firstly, it disallows the idea that one created substance's state can be the actual cause of a state in another created substance, effectively negating the possibility of inter-substantial causation. Secondly, it stipulates that any non-initial, non-miraculous state of a created substance finds its genuine cause in a preceding state of that substance, affirming the concept of intra-substantial causation. Lastly, it asserts that each created substance is inherently programmed, at the moment of its creation, to act in perfect harmony with the natural states and actions of every other created substance, ensuring a state of mutual coordination (Kulstad, 2020).
Translating these principles to mind and body, Leibniz posits that no mental state can be considered the real cause of a state in another created mind or body. Similarly, no bodily state can be deemed the genuine cause of a state in another created mind or body. This effectively rules out any direct causal relations between mind and body. Instead, Leibniz's theory holds that what may seem like real causal connections between mind and body are, in metaphysical reality, the outcome of their mutual compliance and coordination following his third principle (Kulstad, 2020).
For instance, when Smith experiences the pain (Sm) resulting from being pricked with a pin (Sb), a scenario that appears to indicate body-to-mind causation, Leibniz would argue that the actual cause of Sm was some prior state of Smith's mind (soul). The bodily state Sb had no role in causing Sm. Similarly, in instances of apparent mind-t...